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BRITISH RACIAL DISCOURSE

A study of political discourse about race and race-related matters at parliamentary and borough council levels.

IN TWO VOLUMES : VOLUME TWO

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BRITISH RACIAL DISCOURSE

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CHAPTER NINE

THE NATURE OF IDEOLOGICAL AND DISCOURSIVE

DERACIALISATION

In previous chapters, various characteristics of ideology have been discussed. In this chapter an attempt is made to describe one of the most noticeable features of British ideology dealing with matters recognised as 'racial' by the social observer - namely, the reluctance to acknowledge the existence of a racial dimension to social relations.

People make sense of their social environment by describing (explaining) and evaluating it, and deciding on how they, and others, should behave within it. Certain features may be selected for good reason or, from the point of view of the social observer, almost randomly, as having significance for understanding social processes. Among many others, family or tribal groupings, nationality, social class and race, at different points in history, have all been used as central, ordering, and causally efficacious principles.

'Race' is a complex concept that has accreted meaning within the different explanatory and justificatory frameworks of which it has historically been a part. The term has been applied to different social groups discernible for a wide range of reasons: skin pigmentation, physique, descent, religion, cultural practices, etc. Once identified as a 'racial' group, established networks of association provide guidelines on how that group is to be described, assessed and reacted to. A racial ideology is one in which racial description (explanation), evaluation and prescription are given pride of place. The actual differences between groups of people acquire significance insofar as they are used as anchorage for

larger and larger conceptual models of human existence. In Kantian terms, the concept of race does not arise from 'raw' experience, but from the exercise of 'understanding'. The racial object is theoretically, or more correctly, in the political context, ideologically, determined. But in the nineteenth and twentieth century, no ideology has achieved, for any length of time, an unassailable position in the struggle to command men's minds. Nevertheless, when an ideology does manage to win widespread support, it simultaneously acquires greater power to fashion the world in its own image. As an ideology comes to be established, an endeavour will be made to impose it upon the real world by implementing its prescriptions for political practice and social organisation, the perception of whose effects will subsequently strengthen its claims to represent the reality of social relations.

In Britain, the fortune of racial ideologies has varied considerably. The discussion of racialisation and deracialisation should be approached with the recognition that the models men build of the world must serve their immediate political purposes, have some foundation in reality, and be persuasive when presented in the face of alternatives. In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, racial ideology self-evidently served to justify white mastery of the Empire, and reflected the actual relations of domination and subordination found within it. The challenge from socialist alternatives, stressing the racial equality of human kind, was as yet not strongly articulated. In the latter part of the twentieth century, the possibility of ideological forms possessing a racial dimension, becoming established, will depend on existing patterns of general and racial domination, and subordination, and the desire to maintain or change them.

In this chapter, I explain what I mean by 'racialisation' and 'deracialisation', and go on to outline and expand on their various forms and the difficulties of recognising their empirical manifestations. Distinctions are made between practical and ideological deracialisation, between synchronic and asynchronic deracialisation, and between systemic ideological deracialisation and strategic deracialisation. Strategic deracialisation and the intentions and motives of those who make use of it are then examined in greater detail. Mention is also made of the 'racism of the heart' and the 'racism of the head' and their bearing on deracialised discourse, as well as of the particular form of strategic deracialisation referred to here as 'sanitary coding'. Following this, three techniques of sanitary coding are described: equivocation, stress, and the use of words to facilitate mental imaging. Finally, a case study is offered of the means by which the concept of strategic deracialisation can be applied in an analysis of the discourse of borough councillors.

Racialisation

Racialisation is defined in Webster's dictionary as "the act or process of imbuing a person with a consciousness of race distinctions or of giving a racial character to something or making it serve racist ends". Within this definition is contained the idea of process, the act of coming to adopt 'race' in a situation in which it was previously absent. The recognition of historical racialisation is brought about by comparing time (1) without race and time (2) with it. Racialisation, in this context, is an historically comparative matter, and it is in this sense that it has come to be popularly used.

Racialisation may be used to describe changes in the real world,

in conscious or non-conscious social behaviour and physical and cultural characteristics, or alternatively, it may refer to changes in the symbolic world, in the way human beings choose to account for what they perceive, and how they act.

In the former case 'racialisation' could be used to describe the formation of racial groups. Such a process need not be recognised by the human actors themselves and is attributed in hindsight by the social observer. Alternatively, human beings may consciously and purposely pursue the goal of establishing what they regard as a race, or in the case of Right-wing parties, such as the National Front in Britain, of preserving 'blood purity' and 'racial integrity' by preventing the 'death wish' of miscegenation and 'half-breed degeneracy' (Spearhead, Nov 1978). I shall call this, 'racialisation of practice' or 'practical racialisation'.

The adoption of a particular ideology as a result of a group finding itself in need of an explanation for its apparent success in dominating large areas of the globe might result in the pursuit of policies facilitating practical racialisation and the preservation of group exclusiveness, e.g. the prevention of miscegenation, control of immigration, repatriation, genocide, and widescale colonisation. Alternatively, the de facto pursuit of such policies might stand in need of justification best served by the adoption of a racial analysis of the situation. In either case, it might be hypothesised that the actors' ideology and observed practice are inclined to enter into correspondence.

Although practical racialisation is of great interest, the main concern of this study is with the symbolic world of discourse. With regard to discourse, historical racialisation refers to the increasing use of racial elements in a verbal context where they

were previously far fewer in number, or absent altogether.

Racialisation of discourse occurs when increasing use is made of some or all of the following: racial categorisations, racial explanations, racial evaluations, and racial prescriptions. Racial categories may, of course, be used without, for example, advancing racial prescriptions, but racial prescriptions necessarily entail the use of racial categories, and will frequently be accompanied by racial evaluation.

The racialisation of discourse does not require the evaluation of the relationship between racially differentiated groups to be one of morally superior to inferior. As it is used here, 'racialisation' may be said to occur whenever there is an increased descriptive mention of race. But in turning to the prime example of the racialisation of discourse in the nineteenth century, it is clear that the ideology of scientific racism did establish a moral order of the races, and constituted a racially inegalitarian justificatory system. The racial evaluations, and accompanying descriptive and explanatory matrix, supported prescriptions that when implemented would permanently disadvantage certain racial groups. While there is no logical reason why racial categorisation and explanation should in themselves be associated with racially inegalitarian evaluation and prescription, this has nevertheless been the historically recurrent pattern, leading to the suspicion in some liberal circles that the very descriptive mention of race is a harbinger of racist justification and racialism.

But it is also possible that discourse might have to be increasingly 'racialised' if certain racially discriminatory practices are to be recognised and eradicated. The stubborn refusal to see the way a social system operates on racial lines may

support and maintain racially discriminatory practices. Unless political actors become more aware of the appropriateness of racial categories for describing their society, and begin to object to the fact that it is organised on racial lines, there might be little scope for eliminating racial practices. Black 'conscientisation' and white radical political development (in which a white person sees for the first time that blacks are different in the sense that they are discriminated against) could be regarded as examples of this kind of racialisation.

'Racialisation', in this sense, then, has to do, not with groups increasingly subscribing to racism in a negative inegalitarian sense, but to their growing awareness of, and indignation at, racial injustice. Racial evaluation and prescription is directed at refuting racism and eliminating racist practice. Racial explanation in this context is still important as a matrix supporting evaluation and prescription, but becomes transformed as theories are adopted to explain racial differences, not as immutable natural forms whose effects account for many facets of existing social phenomena, but as superficial epiphenomena mistakenly presented as explanations by those seeking practical advantage. Race acquires importance only because of its considerable historical and contemporary success as a reified category with starkly obvious social effects.

'Racialisation', here, involves the recognition of race as a means to non-racial moral ends. To avoid confusion, it might be useful to introduce the expression 'anti-racialisation' to describe the process of altering the matrix of racial explanation and of attacking values and policies that produce racially inegalitarian ends.

Ideological or discursive racialisation refers, then, to the

introduction into discourse of racial categorisation, racial explanation, racial evaluation, or racial prescription. The historian identifies ideological racialisation by comparing at least two expressions recorded on different occasions and noticing the appearance for the first time, or the increasing number of racial elements in, the temporally subsequent expression.

As the classic example of historical, ideological racialisation, Curtin (1964) mentions the 'new flowering' of pseudo-scientific racism beginning in the pre-Darwinian era of the 1830s: "the groundwork was laid for the racial doctrines which were to dominate Western thought about non-Western peoples for a half century or more" (p. 363). The change, Curtin asserts, "was merely one of degree: where earlier writers had held that race was an important influence on human culture, the new generation saw race as the crucial determinant, not only of culture but of human character and of all history" (p. 364). Bolt (1971) also gives a detailed account of the nineteenth-century racialisation of British thought and its pseudo-scientific basis.

Racial ideology's justificatory function for human actors is hinted at by writers such as Kiernan (1969) who mentions the use that white settlers made of the emerging "regular body of doctrine" that "drew on both science and divinity, pseudo-Darwin and pseudo-Bible harnessed together. It was flattering to the white man to think that inalienable higher qualities, not merely better weapons, had brought him to the top" (p. 230).

Ideological racialisation's practical consequences are described by writers such as L.P.Curtis (1968), who in dealing with the relationships between the English and Irish during the Victorian

period, claims that the stark contrast between "English and Irish character and culture in the nineteenth century derived a good deal of force from theories about race and national character which were steadily gaining in popularity during the Victorian period" (p. 5). He hypothesises that the racialised ideas of the Victorian governing classes about the Irish people and character help to explain why "English policy in Ireland failed to treat the causes rather than the symptoms of Irish national aspirations" (p.3).

In summary, two main categories of racialisation in history may be distinguished, of which the latter is of more interest in the context of this study. First, there is practical, biological, or actual racialisation, dealing with the formation of racial groups, and second, there is ideological or discursive racialisation (and its antithesis anti-racialisation) constituting part of the account human beings give of their social world.

Ideological or discursive deracialisation

This chapter is centrally concerned with the various forms of ideological or discursive deracialisation and the means by which their presence might be identified in British political discourse. Just as discourse may be racialised by introducing or increasing the number of racial elements within it, the opposite process of eliminating or reducing racial elements may also occur. The counter-process to ideological racialisation, then, is ideological deracialisation. Ideological deracialisation consists in the attenuation of, elimination of, or substitution for, racial categories in discourse, the omission or deemphasis of racial explanation, and the avoidance of racial evaluation or prescription (after Webster).

Deracialisation, involving the elimination of racial elements from discourse, should not be confused with anti-racialisation, in which racial elements are included for the purpose of achieving racial justice. Ideological deracialisation involves reduction in both egalitarian and inegalitarian references to race. Such reduction need not occur in partnership with practical deracialisation (e.g. desegregation of schools, abolition of discrimination in public places, increasing interracial friendships) which is just as likely to be accompanied by strident anti-racialisation campaigns as by the attenuation of racial discourse. If, in the observer's view, deracialisation occurs because a particular society is no longer faced with any practical racial problems and therefore has no need to deploy racial categories, the situation may be described as one of 'synchronic deracialisation'. If, on the other hand, it occurs in a context in which there is plenty of evidence of actual or racial domination, oppression, and conflict, while there is obvious avoidance of racial questions at the discursive level, then deracialisation may be referred to as 'asynchronic'. Asynchronic deracialisation has often been noted as a marked feature of racially stratified social systems. Rose's account (1948) of black/white relations in the United States offers an excellent example.



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From Myrdal's point of view (1962) such conversational avoidance results from the great distance between the American creed of equality and liberty (the justificatory system) and the reality of racial inequality. Whatever explanation in terms of creed or material interest is offered for the public avoidance of the topic, it serves as an example of asynchronic ideological deracialisation on a grand scale.

In a previous chapter, the characteristics of ideology were set out in some detail. An ideology was said to be a set of publicly expressed beliefs held in common by a group of people and having the effect of justifying a particular state of affairs or course of action, whether that state of affairs was intended by any human agent or beneficial or harmful to the system in any way. In discussing deracialisation, it is necessary to make a distinction between systemic ideological deracialisation (of the sort described by Rose, above) in which assessment of intention is irrelevant because deracialisation is judged as an effect of a massive, impersonal belief system, and individual or self-conscious deracialisation, in which individual or groups operate strategically to hide their racist intentions in the face of nominally-held public counter-values.*




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In the case of systemic ideological deracialisation, it is quite possible that the mass of human actors might be unaware of the deracialisation process. Its identification must depend on the social observer comparing his assessment of the social process with the social actors' account of the same situation.

Figure 7 The identification of ideological deracialisation



If the social observer notes a wide discrepancy between his informed assessment of a situation as 'racial', and the account offered by the social actors, in which no mention is made of racial processes, then he might legitimately assume a state of asynchronism where some form of systemic ideological deracialisation is taking place. His opinion might be additionally supported if it is confirmed in the experience of racial minority groups who feel that their lives are circumscribed by unjust racial practices of which whites appear callously oblivious.

Whereas a general racialisation of practice and ideology could be said to have occurred in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (even though when biological racism was most prevalent there were those who denied its importance), the contrary process

of general deracialisation might be regarded as characteristic of the post second-world-war era. While it is unwise to accept such unifactoral causal connections uncritically, it is tempting to simplistically associate ideological and practical racialisation with the growth of empire and the establishment of colonies, and ideological and practical deracialisation with the end of empire, the growth of the national liberation movements, and the defeat of fascism.

In the context of recent British history, however, a new development in the form of an asynchronic ideological deracialisation seems to have occurred. A practical racialisation within Britain has come about as black migrants have been allocated to particular occupational strata and have met with widespread discrimination and rejection. At the level of general discourse, the indigenous white British have made little secret of their racial animosity, but, for a variety of reasons, that animosity has failed to find much direct expression in specialist political discourse. As a result, the deracialised feature of British ideology has become increasingly apparent. (There are, of course, many historical examples of discursive deracialisation, see note.)

International events and pressures, the persistence of traditional ideological formulae, the existence of ideological levels, and structural divisions between one class and another, between controllers of the media and the mass, and between politicians and populace, are some of the reasons that have so far been offered for the discrepancies between the observer's assessment of racial practice and its accompanying public justificatory forms. Whatever the observer's assessment of its causes and effects, the

importance of a deracialised ideology in justifying political acts as serving the general interest of the community as a whole including the black population, must continually be stressed.

This study is concerned with ideological configurations dealing with racial matters. Of these, ideologies with deracialised features seem to be of central importance in British politics and have consequently, in this account, been given preference of attention over the flagrantly racialised ideologies of the Ultra-Right. Ideologies do not have to be explicitly racist in order to create circumstances resulting in perniciously racist effects. Failure to recognise racist features, to offer explanations in terms of racial categories or to present egalitarian solutions that take account of racial differences, might be blamed on the dominance of ideological forms that systematically exclude racial elements from consideration, or reformulate them according to some alternative principle of organisation such as social class. Ideologies of this kind may possess advantages over the classical racism of the nineteenth century. As Myrdal recognised, a popular egalitarian creed may be maintained as a justificatory form and yet serve to sanction 'subterranean' racist practice, either by direct avoidance, or by reformulation of the practical issues.

This study as a whole attempts to acknowledge the importance of deracialised ideologies, which are approached from three angles. In Chapters Seven and Eight, the implications of Conservative and Labour values for immigration and race relations policies are examined. The general theme running through the discussion is that Conservative and Labour ideologies deal with issues of class politics, and that racial issues are, perforce, slotted into traditionally established class-based formulae. The justification

for racial practice, therefore, is invariably offered in predominantly class terms, with subsequent attenuation of, or substitution for, racial categories. Issues bearing on race can still be discussed, but the observer becomes conscious of the fact that the prevailing class milieu affects the justification offered for the policies applied to racial groups, and more strongly, leads to inappropriate class-based policies being adopted in contexts deserving racial analyses and prescriptions. Extensive ideological deracialisation occurs as a result of the continuing use of class-orientated categories, evaluations, and prescriptions in a situation judged by the social observer to deserve at least some degree of analysis in terms of independent or semi-independent racial categories. The application of Conservative and Labour values to immigration and race relations offers a particularly central instance of the phenomenon of ideological deracialisation.

In Chapter Ten, slightly more formal and general properties of political argument in the field of race relations are examined. The parliamentary debates on measures to control immigration provide an opportunity for more detailed analysis of the way racial issues are handled. Inasmuch as deracialisation occurs in this context as a result of the deployment of longstanding forms of political pleading and defensive argumentation, it may be regarded as systemic, in contradistinction to the self-consciously strategic forms outlined below.

The third angle of approach is to be found in Chapter Eleven dealing with the parliamentary debates and borough councillor's views on race relations and race relations legislation. The problem


of legislating against racial discrimination in a context in which few politicians feel themselves in a position to admit to the racial animosity of their electorate, produces some of the most interesting examples of deracialisation - both intended and unintended. The political actor is forced to acknowledge the existence of prejudice and discrimination in order to discuss measures to alleviate their effects, but seeks at the same time to avoid locating responsibility for these vices among the white electorate. The observer is able to examine the way in which self-evidently racist practice is described and evaluated (consciously or unconsciously) within the discourse. The general features of this analysis once again give some indication of the extensive nature of ideological deracialisation.

Systemic ideological deracialisation, apparent when the social observer compares his estimate of the extent of racial practice with its lack of mention in the discourse of social actors, may be compared with what I have chosen to call 'strategic deracialisation', which constitutes a special case of the former. It is sometimes possible for the social observer to recognise a discrepancy between what a social actor intends and what he says publicly. Often it is not possible for the intentions of large groups of people to be assessed, particularly when there is advantage to be gained by disguising those intentions. In talking about deracialisation, therefore, the social scientist is more likely to be referring to the previously mentioned, systemic deracialisation than to the individual examples of strategic deracialisation which he may occasionally be in a position to recognise. Nevertheless, strategic deracialisation, and for that matter, strategic racialisation,

are most interesting ideological phenomena well worthy of attention.

The social observer has two potential sources of information about the social actor's intention and purpose: the actor's discourse and his behaviour, including its performance and outcome. The observer may compare the actor's speech in private and public, or compare his claims with his purposeful behaviour.

Figure 8 The identification of strategic deracialisation



It must, however, be allowed that although outcome might be a good guide to intention, people's intentional actions can produce unintentional outcomes. Recognition of the difficulty of proving intent in a court of law is illustrated by the 1976 Race Relations Act which, while making it an offence to use threatening, abusive, or insulting words in a public place in circumstances where race hatred is likely to result, no longer required intent on the part of the accused to be established. Of course, the sociologist need not subject his interpretation of a situation to the rigours of legal proof. Circumstantial evidence may be such as to warrant the reasonable presumption of intent in many situations in which an agent could have acted otherwise but failed to do so, with harmful or potentially harmful consequences for a member of another race. 'Intent' is used broadly in this context to refer to conscious

design or purpose on the part of the agent, to his awareness of the meaning of his utterances and of the effect of his action. Many clues might be used by the sociologist as evidence of the agent's intent - not least, the fact that the consequences of his actions have been pointed out to him by others.

A distinction may be made between an agent's private discourse and his public discourse, particularly when the agent is a public, political figure hoping to present an honourable and persuasive face to his audience. Should the observer have access to the 'private person' - as indeed he may, if he is thoroughly investigating the many facets of a person's life* - it may be possible to contrast the agent's consciousness of race and commitment to racial values and policy, with his public utterances. Both the private and public figure can then be adjudged racist or non-racist according to the estimation of the observer.

There are, in fact, four possible combinations, two involving agreement between private and public stances and between speech and behaviour, and two involving disagreement. The cases of agreement are commonplace and need only be mentioned in passing. First, there is the obvious case of the person who is racist in his private opinion and public remarks, and makes no attempt to hide his animosity towards members of other races, often vociferously expressing his opinions in order to influence others. Despite the judge's ruling, the Kingsley Read case - 'one down, one million to go' - serves as a well-publicised example. Second, there is the non-

* Quite obviously, he may be given access by family, friends or government agency to personal or private papers. Alternatively he may use all the techniques of investigatory journalism or police work.

racist in private opinion and public utterance. He may be non-racist in that racial matters neither concern him nor impinge on his social world in any way, or anti-racist in the sense that he opposes both privately, and publicly, racial explanations, racist evaluations, and racist prescriptions.

The cases of disagreement between private intent and public language have received far less attention though they are of considerable significance in the discussion of racial matters. The third case, then, is of discursive racialisation, in which a person who appears to have no racist intent makes remarks recognised by the observer to have marked racist connotations. The same person may also unwittingly be engaged in practice that has a racialist effect. If the observer should point out to the person concerned that he (the observer) regards his discourse as racist he might be met with a number of responses, of which I shall mention two, the one signifying linguistic misunderstanding, lack of awareness, or insensitivity, the other disagreement of substance.

The actor may refuse - in good faith - to acknowledge that his utterance could carry such a meaning, or he could admit to ambiguity and immediately seek to clarify his position. These responses would indicate linguistic misunderstanding, lack of appreciation of the insulting nature of a remark, or possibly something else besides.

As examples, we may consider expressions - possibly dead similes and metaphors - that might give offence to people of another race, such as 'nigger in the woodpile', 'nigger-brown', 'working like a black', 'mean as a Jew', 'greasy as an Arab', or 'Chinese torture'. Also jokes reflecting disparagingly on the abilities of a particular racial group may be told unselfconsciously, apparently without malice, and with expressed amazement at the possibility of hostile

reaction - 'but I only said it in jest'. When the attention of the speaker is drawn to the wider pejorative connotations involved, or to the violent reaction he has invoked, he may be acutely embarrassed by this new self-awareness, particularly when in racially mixed company.

The case of Mr Marcus Shloimovitz's campaign to delete derogatory definitions of the word 'Jew' as 'usurer', 'extortionate money lender' and 'fraud' from British dictionaries might also serve as an example. To achieve his end Mr Shloimovitz intended to make use of the 1976 Race Relations Act which prohibits incitement to racial hatred, but the Attorney-General refused to allow his legal action against the Hamlyn group of publishers (The Guardian, 31.10.1978). Without knowing the actual reaction of the publishers we might imagine two defences. They might claim that they had neither intended nor realised the offensive nature of the entry and make an effort to delete it. Alternatively, they might argue that a dictionary definition of this kind is not evaluative but descriptive, does not imply any racist intent, and is unlikely to have a racialist effect. This is disagreement over the substance of racism. Defenses of this kind are frequently offered for 'racist' jokes*.

The actor might agree with the observer's interpretation of his words, but disagree with him that a particular evaluation and prescription, implicit or explicit, constituted racism. He might stubbornly argue, for example, that a particular racial difference

* Another way of endeavouring to ensure an audience does not attribute racist intent is to get a black comedian to tell jokes about blacks, or an Irish comedian to tell jokes about the Irish.

(e.g. intelligence) did exist, and that his prescription (that schools should be segregated) did not derive from a belief in the moral inferiority of a racial group, but from a natural, psychological difference, or existing social difference, that could best be morally remedied by differential treatment (separate education). In such a case, the social observer must decide on the complexities of whether the protester is indeed racist by recourse to his own (the observer's) moral judgment of what constitutes racism. He is at least able to note the extensive reliance on racial categorisation and explanation, even though there is disagreement over application of the criteria of racism to the actor's discourse. The possibility that a person may not be willing to recognise, or be capable of understanding, his own racism in speech (and action) must be acknowledged.

In one case, the Commission for Racial Equality investigated a complaint against Genture Restaurants Ltd. and its chairman, John Weston-Edwards that he refused to accept a booking for a private party because there would be too many black people in it. The company first claimed it refused the booking on the grounds that the party was too large, but the booking list revealed that other parties had been accepted with larger numbers. In his statements to the press, Mr Weston-Edwards said he refused the booking because the party contained too many black people. By 'too many', he said he meant more than ten: "We refused a party that was predominantly black because it would create an imbalance among our guests. This isn't being racist. The club holds 200 people and if there were 195 black people inside, this would hardly encourage a white person to come in, would it?" Mr Weston Edwards was arguing, in other words, that his prescription of racial balance should not be construed as

racist. And as evidence of his good intent he let it be known that his night club employed black people: "Our head doorman, who decides who comes in and who does not, is West Indian". Nevertheless, the effect of the policy was to deprive a private party of black people of a facility because they belonged to a general category of blacks and this act was intended.

The fourth case, and the one with which this chapter is most concerned, is of the person whose intent is racist but who expresses himself in a non-racist manner. I have previously referred to this situation as self-conscious 'strategic deracialisation'.

The actual motives of the person who verbally camouflages his racism may be many and varied, but two categories have frequently been recognised: an affective and a cognitive, or, to describe it more idiomatically, a 'racism of the heart' and a 'racism of the head'.

With regard to the 'racism of the heart', a person may have feelings of racial animosity, fear, or uncertainty, but, for a variety of reasons, have no desire to publicise them. For example, he may recognise that racist remarks lack respectability, and under certain circumstances might cost him his job or promotion. He thus strenuously seeks to eschew all public signs of his hostile disposition towards people of another race. His public discourse is thus 'strategically deracialised', in contrast to his private world. Jenkins (1971), in criticising the work of Deakin, offers some indication of the reasons that might lead to this occurring in Britain: "if there is an ethic of fairness embedded in our culture and system of law, one would expect a tendency for those who practise racial discrimination not to mention, nor to admit to it, in interview situations" (p.14).

The publicly disguised, but strongly felt racism of the heart, might most aptly be referred to as the 'Iago syndrome', in recollection of the treacherous villain who conspired to destroy Shakespeare's Othello. Thus, Iago confides his secret thoughts:

Though I do hate him as I do hell pains,
Yet, for necessity of present life,
I must show out a flag and sign of love
Which is indeed but sign.

(Othello, Act 1, Scene 1.)

The disguised 'racism of the heart' can be revealed in many ways: for example, in 'off-stage performance', in 'body language', in slips and inconsistencies in speech, in avoidance of racial matters, in failure to express an unambiguous view on the race issue, in a tendency to reclassify in a non-racial manner issues recognised as racial by the observer, in the use of euphemism, and in the discriminatory consequences of the agent's interracial transactions. Sometimes an Iago can be tricked or provoked into revealing his deep-seated animosities; sometimes he is discovered as a result of inference from a chance remark or joke, or of an unexpected outburst at someone who happens to be of another race; sometimes his discomfort in the presence of black people, or their discomfort in his, gives rise to suspicion.

In a more speculative vein, the kind of repressed racist feeling described here is likely to be found in a group which has experienced a high degree of alienation (interpreted racially) and which is relatively politically powerless. The group's racism is manifest in the general discourse of everyday life, but is not allowed to intrude into the hegemonic specialised discourse of the political arena, where it is deemed unacceptable. Occasionally, as in the case of Powell 'mania', these politically subterranean expressions are given the opportunity to surface, with frightening

consequences. But the Iago is usually kept in check by his knowledge of the organisational sanctions that can be used against all those who express or act out deviant values. His deracialised public discourse is a product of the fear of the consequences of making known his inner anger.

'Racism of the heart' can be contrasted with 'racism of the head', although the two are by no means exclusive. In dealing with specialised political discourse, it is the racism of the head that deserves attention. Politically expedient ideological deracialisation of accounts of actions privately acknowledged to have racist effects falls under this heading. The politician, in weighing up the overall political situation, may decide that a racist policy is necessary to placate his electorate, or for other reasons, that further his ends.

While recognising the racialism inherent in the implementation of his policy, he does not draw attention to it, but seeks rather to ignore or hide its effect. When challenged, he may deny such consequences exist, or in admitting the consequences, argue that they are not racist, or that they are negated on balance by the overall benefit to the community as a whole and even to the unfortunate victims of his racialism. The politician's justification is typified by its acceptance that racist belief and racist practice are evil and should - *ceteris paribus* - be avoided. But in his weighing of aims and objectives, anti-racism is afforded low priority, as it may hinder the achievement of objectives of far more importance to him. Racist effects are not 'intended' in the sense that the pursuance of them is an important end in itself as apparently was the case in the Nazi extermination of the Jews. Rather they are 'intended' in as much as they are acknowledged to be a necessary means to other political ends, such as placating an

electorate that has expressed its dislike of black people.

For example, Crossman in his diaries admitted that in 1965 the Labour Party had "become illiberal and lowered the quotas (of immigrants) at a time when we (had) an acute shortage of labour". "Nevertheless", he continued, "I am convinced that if we hadn't done all this we would have been faced with certain electoral defeat in the West Midlands and the South-East. Politically fear of immigration is the most powerful undertow today" (1975-1977, Vol 1, p.299).

Even though a racist policy might be followed by a politician seeking to remain in power with popular support, the policy is likely to be justified by appeal to non-racist criteria: a process of ideological deracialisation.

There are many reasons why a person might not wish to adopt a classical racism for justifying discrimination. It may be inimical to the predominant general ideological climate and to the particular ideological stream of socialism or conservatism on which he draws. Also, overt acceptance of racism may be untenable in the face of the fact that Britain waged war against the Nazis, the consequences of whose anti-Semitic policies were later revealed in all their horror. In addition, there are well-established national and international standards and conventions, such as those enshrined in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, deploring racism and discrimination on the grounds of colour, race, or creed. In the late twentieth century racialism is internationally condemned and those, as in apartheid South Africa, who publicly pursue racist policies, suffer strong admonition.

There are also sound economic and political reasons for avoiding overtly racist policies. Britain has important economic interests and trade relations with countries which are likely to respond in a hostile manner if ever they learn that their Nationals or even

members of their racial group are being abused. In a world divided between socialist and capitalist camps, and with the New Commonwealth having gained political independence, the importance of maintaining formally correct postures towards other racial groups has increased. For example, Rose (1969, p.209), recognising the effect of foreign policy on attitudes to immigrants at home, mentions as considerations for delaying the introduction of immigration control in the 1950s, the general acceptance of the changed composition of the Commonwealth, and the increasing stress on the importance of its multi-racial nature. The 1961 Commonwealth Immigrants Bill was later to be strongly criticised by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers of Jamaica, the West Indies Federation, Pakistan, and the Irish Republic, and the Indian Deputy Minister for External Affairs.

Internally, too, politicians, however unscrupulous, may be in two minds about exploiting the race issue. Encouragement of race conflict might create a Pandora's box, the lid of which once lifted, might be impossible to close. Mindful of a Northern Ireland situation, politicians already in positions of power might be reluctant to initiate policies that could disrupt economic activity and result in large-scale disorder. Above all, those in power will never wish to run the risk of losing control of the situation. For example, Rose (1969, p.215) describes how the disturbances which took place in Nottingham and Notting Dale in August and September 1958, and Oswald Moseley's attempt to capitalise on the latter with his political campaign in North Kensington in 1959, increased both the will to legislate and the need to reassert anti-racist sentiment. In 1968, the Commonwealth Immigrants Act was rushed through Parliament in an effort to curb both the rate of Kenyan Asian immigration and the clamour from the press, pressure groups within

the population and various right-wing politicians. In seeking to reduce racism by introducing this racialist measure, the Government could scarcely justify its action in racist terms. The danger of the consequences to law and order of overt racist rhetoric, the behaviour it results in, and the political reaction it engenders, have been recently illustrated in the riotous street demonstrations in South East London.

Attention has also been drawn to the decisive factor of the black vote in a number of marginal constituencies (Layton-Henry, 1978). The self-conscious politician of liberal persuasion will not wish to jeopardise this possible source of support. (Nevertheless, the part played in national elections by Enoch Powell reveals the potential power of an alternative racist and nationalist ticket (Seymour-Ure, 1974, Phillips, 1977).)

Such reasons partly explain politicians' attempts to purge their discourse of racism. Less cynically, the harsh demands of the political world, the need to placate and win the support of various social groups by making doubtful concessions, set against the politicians' earnestly held moral standards, might create a dissonance that can only be resolved at a verbal level. In his person, a Member of Parliament reflects a conflict of two views of how a public figure should behave. He is an individual morally responsible in his own right, committed to his own particular conception of the 'good', but he is also a representative of the people's will - reflecting their collective goals. When the moral and the popular do not coincide, he must find ways of reconciling them.

Politics is, as Gouldner (1976, p.29) so neatly puts it, "a kind of selfless work" in which the ideologue "claims to be altruistic never seeking to his private interest but speaking only on behalf

of "the World"". The politician seeks always to present his policies as serving the collective good of the nation and of mankind. If he cannot actually serve both the racist interest and his vision of the collective good, he may be able to disguise his partiality behind a facade of words. This is not to say that he disingenuously conspires to fool the public all of the time: more often he uncritically - but conveniently - accepts his own public presentation of self, and cannot understand the carping criticism of those who accuse him of hypocrisy. He thinks of himself as being realistic and as making the best of a situation in which he has little choice.

If he does not directly set out to harm people of another race can the politician be accused of deliberate racism? Is his discourse self-consciously deracialised if he cannot be shown to have privately embraced a prescription acknowledged by him to have racist effects? In these cases, the social observer must decide by reference to all the evidence available to him: to the politician's public and private statements and to his defense of policy, the consequences of which have been pointed out to him, to the persistence and regularity of the actions that adversely affect other racial groups, and to the refusal to follow other available policies. The politician exists in the context of a political eristic that forces him to defend his position and in that defense, makes it obvious that he is conscious of alternative interpretation of and counter-justifications for his deeds - both ends and means. In a phrase, the observer must judge the politician 'against a context'.

But the social observer's act of highlighting the phenomenon of strategic deracialisation must always be a hazardous business in which he runs the danger of losing his value-free stance and of

being drawn into the political arena. To label an action 'racialist' and to impugn the motives and values of a politician are not only controversial acts in themselves, but are made doubly so, when the express purpose of the politician's discourse is to justify his racist actions non-racially. He is most unlikely ever to agree in public with the social observer's assessment of the situation. This is why strategic deracialisation is such a difficult phenomenon to pin down, and why the observer must usually content himself with a study of systemic deracialisation, recognised by noting an asynchronism between actors' and observer's accounts of the social system, and involving no insight into the actors' motives and intentions.

If the social observer has difficulty in identifying 'strategic deracialisation', then another question is posed. If, in order to placate an electorate, a politician self-consciously seeks to pursue policies with racist effect behind an ideological edifice in which racist sentiment plays no part, how is he to lay claim to satisfying their demands? How, after deracialising his discourse, does the politician convince the audience that he is continuing to pursue racist ends? If the social observer has difficulty in interpreting the politician's intentions, is it not likely that an audience clamouring for racist measures will likewise be misled? This question reveals a whole new facet of the phenomenon of deracialisation - but one which is of great importance to understanding many of the features of British racial discourse.

Sanitary coding

So far I have concentrated on the actor's attempt to present his actions in a favourable light by justifying them non-racially. But the question has arisen of how, if the politician is seeking to gain political advantage from a public deracialisation of popular racist acts, members of his electorate are to be reassured that he is acting to allay their fears. In other words, how can he communicate his intentions to the audience?

Most obviously, the deeds of the politician belie his words. His audience recognises that he has taken action as a result of public pressure in a context where no secret is made of widespread animosity towards black people. That legislation makes some provision for popular demand is easily recognised, and the presumption is augmented, paradoxically, by the accusations of racism levelled by the political opposition. Thus, despite the denial that the 1968 Immigration Act was racially discriminatory, it was clear from the timing and from television pictures of Kenyan Asian arrivals seeking to 'beat the ban' that the legislation was aimed at black people. The statement by the Archbishop of Canterbury to the effect that the legislation was discriminatory only confirmed what was popular knowledge. In whatever terms Members of Parliament described their action, the electorate understood their intentions. With the clear-cut example of the 1968 Act, there is no real difficulty of political communication, but what of the many other circumstances, particularly those preceding legislation, in which the politician seeks to gain popular support for racist ends?

The politician's language must serve two functions: to guarantee immunity from ideological attack (nobody wishes to be labelled 'racist')

and at the same time to reassure audiences - possibly no more inclined to admit to their racism than he - that he understands that their problems arise from an 'alien' presence and that he intends, or has taken action, to alleviate their anxieties.

This dual demand may be dealt with verbally in a number of ways, the popularly parodied expression "I am not a racist, but ..." being a public attempt to conjoin a respectable declaration of anti-racism with a racist prescription. Fortunately, the self-contradiction of this technique is often so obviously transparent that it proves grimly amusing to those who self-consciously oppose racism. I have also mentioned the phenomenon of politically balancing racism against non-racism and anti-racism. But there is a further much more widespread and insidious technique available. The politician who is at odds with the dominant non-racial justificatory systems can make use of a phenomenon that I have chosen, for obvious reasons, to call 'sanitary coding'. Below, I outline three common techniques of sanitary coding: the use of equivocation, stress, and the use of words to facilitate mental imaging. By 'sanitary coding', I mean the ability to privately communicate racist ideas with a discourse publicly defensible as non-racist.

First, there is the technique of equivocation. A distinction has long been made between the denotation of a term - the class of object to which it applies - and the connotation of a term - the properties possessed by all of the objects denoted by the term. In Logic, 'connotation' refers to a term's total informative significance rather than to its emotive significance, alone. We may distinguish three different kinds of 'connotation': the objective, the subjective, and the conventional.

A term's objective connotation is the total set of characteristics common to all the objects that make up its denotation. The objective connotation of a term does not vary according to the perception of the individual: it is conceived as existing independently of those who perceive the common characteristics of the objects in question. The difficulty arising from the concept of objective connotation is that even when all items denoted by a term are known, the list of all the characteristics that those items have in common would be massive and virtually impossible to compile. The public meaning of a term cannot consist of the objective connotation.

The subjective connotation of a term, on the other hand, is the set of all the properties that an individual believes are possessed by the items denoted by the term. The subjective connotation varies from one individual to another. For example, for any individual, the term 'curry' may be understood to refer to Indian food as a whole, to Indian food of a particular consistency and taste (excluding, for example, Tandoori chicken), to food that contains a certain amount of garam masala, tumeric, jeera, chilli, etc., to a method of cooking, or something else besides. The subjective connotation varies according to experience of eating and cooking, cultural contact, knowledge of spices, etc. Subjective connotation changes from individual to individual, and for the same individual through time, as he acquires new beliefs through experience.

Logicians and lexicographers consider the subjective connotation of a term inappropriate for purposes of definition because of its interpersonal variation through time. Instead, they concentrate on conventional connotation which emerges from the need to communicate with as little misunderstanding as possible. A group's members attach the same meaning to a term when they agree to use the same

criterion for deciding on whether any item belongs to a term's denotation. These agreements over usage, existing in the memory, or vocalised in instructions to children, or systematically laid out in the lexicon, are normative as well as descriptive. A term is governed by public rules of correct usage: there is a way in which a term has been used in the past and ought to be used in the future. Humpty Dumpty was wrong in telling Alice that when he used a word it meant just what he chose it to mean: in order to be understood by others, he had to rely on conventional, as opposed to subjective connotation.

But the relationship between subjective and conventional connotation is complex. By coming to share their subjective meanings, individuals can eventually establish a new conventional meaning. A term with an old, established conventional connotation can begin first to carry a subjective and then a new conventional connotation. Furthermore, both old and new conventional connotations - with different denotations - may exist side-by-side, giving rise to equivocation in many situations in which the context does not make the meaning obvious.

In Logic, equivocation has always been dismissed as an informal fallacy of ambiguity, but in political rhetoric it has valuable uses. The lexicographically formalised, conventional connotation of a term can always be appealed to as the 'real' meaning of a word, and the new intersubjectively-established connotation dismissed as a mere colloquialism or as an unintended and accidental accretion.

How words come to gain a respectable and formalised connotation, or to lose one, why there is a constant generation of new connotations, and whether some words are more prone to change than

others are interesting questions which cannot be extensively explored here. However, it is clear that many words denote (more or less obvious) items in the physical and social world and that there are important differences in the part these items play in the life of the community. Social institutions vary in their exercise of power and public influence, and their susceptibility to change. The significance of what a term denotes and which person, institution, or grouping denotes it, determines its formal connotation and the likelihood of it maintaining its original meaning. A legal term used in a stable legal institution may maintain its meaning for many hundreds of years; in politics a term may change its connotation significantly in the space of a few decades, while a term used in youth culture may change as suddenly as fashion.

The political aspects of changing meaning patterns can be glimpsed in a number of ways. Expressed fear of slang and neologism can be seen as an attempt to maintain secure patterns of publicly established meaning against the covert connotations of various social strata, sub-groups, roles and statuses, movements and cults. Without shared public meaning, it is always difficult to be sure what other groups are discussing, and subversion of the established order may always be possible. Neither should the symbolic value of language difference be neglected: because patterns of speech are difficult to acquire, they serve to identify people's class position and to perpetuate ideas of class exclusivity. Domination, particularly ideological domination, requires the ruling group not only to be identified and understood when it seeks to be identified and understood, but to understand those it must control. Subgroups can advantageously use their patois, dialect, jargon, idiom, etc., to thwart outsiders and officialdom, just as officials may use

officialese, technical terms and legal expressions to intimidate, impress, or deceive the public.

A useful distinction may be made between on the one hand, the publicly expressed and publicly permissible connotations sanctioned by the norms of major public institutions and regarded as traditional and, on the other hand, the widely-shared, privately expressed, but publicly inadmissible connotations sanctioned within primary and other groups, and often rapidly changing. In the light of the many contexts in which language can be used appropriately or inappropriately, such a simple dichotomy must be treated as a very crude tool of analysis. It serves, however, to reveal a common political technique known to all students of the 'double entendre' since time immemorial.

By relying on the public and private connotations of a term acting in tandem, a variety of effects can be achieved. Two statements may be made simultaneously, one relying on the public, the other on the private connotations of the single expression used. A vulgar or unwholesome matter can be described politely: the euphemism. Or an expression referring superficially to a non-tabued act may have a further contextually detectable tabued referant: the sexual pun. The coexistence of public and private connotations, one announcing what ought to be mentioned, the other announcing what ought not to be mentioned, can be regarded as a form of code or cipher. The underlying private message, however, is not secret in the sense that it is known to only a select few: most or all of the audience might recognise its presence and be able to decipher it with ease. It is secret in the sense that the speaker is in a position to refute it.

When challenged to account for his remarks, the speaker may defend himself by denying the presence of the underlying message,

and asserting that the public meaning should be taken at its face value. What he really said is there in public for all to see, and the private connotation is a product of his audience's minds, of their subjective connotations. And how can he be held responsible for others' subjective interpretations? Anyone who challenges him to justify his use of the private code runs the risk of being asked to provide evidence that it has been used at all. In addition, to admit to knowledge of the existence of such a code, implicates the challenger in a connotative conspiracy. The motives of someone who is forever reading unwholesome meanings into a wholesome discourse or imagining insult when none is intended must be extremely suspect. The speaker indignantly protests his innocence and points at the guilty challenger. The speaker cannot be held responsible for meanings supplied by his audience.

To the politician, coding of this kind has many advantages. He is able to make use of a publicly justifiable discourse to make private assertions that would be indefensible if expressed at an overt public level. He is able to be publicly non-racist and privately racist. Sanitary coding reconciles the need to morally justify a statement with the need to make known a dubious attitude and policy.

The one commonplace example of sanitary coding is provided by politicians' use of the ubiquitous terms 'immigrant' and 'immigration'. Dummett has concisely identified and exemplified the syndrome in the following manner:

At all times the propaganda in favour of 'controlling immigration' has been understood on every side to mean 'cutting down on coloured immigration', yet as with the wording of the law itself the defender of control can exclaim indignantly that he never mentioned colour but only the number of people coming into the country: while if he is attacked from the right, he can point out

that everyone understood his remarks to refer to coloured immigration.

(1973, p.185.)

Dummett went on to provide examples in which the contextual usage of the term contrasted absurdly with the traditional connotation (thus offering evidence of the presence of another private connotation).

The Times had a headline in 1970 stating 'Immigrant births on the increase', a nonsensical statement if we are to suppose that an immigrant is a person who has travelled from another country to this one; if you are born here your only migration has been from your mother's womb to the outside world. The text below the headline, moreover, made it clear that the births referred to were of non-white children, and not of the children of Italian, Cypriot, Hungarian, Irish, Australian, or other white immigrants to this country. Politicians and journalists refer quite often to 'second and third generation immigrants', a meaningless description, again, of people born here to ancestors who were not born here (pp. 237-238.)

Dummett suggested that:

The way the word 'immigrant' has come to be used is particularly striking when we look at the fact that migration has been so mixed. Had all, or even almost all, the new arrivals in this country been non-white over the last twenty-five years it would be a very natural thing for the word 'immigrant' to have become synonymous with 'non-white'. But this has not been the case. (p.239.)

She went on to ask why the term 'immigrant' occurred instead of 'coloured' which could also have been used as shorthand in newspaper headlines for West Indians, Indians, Pakistanis, etc. This term, however, would have had the disadvantage that, had it been used consistently, "... a number of news items would have looked as racist in presentation as they actually were" (p.240.). Although 'coloured' has been used particularly in crime reporting, 'immigrant' has been more popular in the quality press. Dummett mentioned the example of a Times headline, 'Immigrant Visitor Excluded', placed over a Law Report:

"Under the law in question, the Immigration Act 1962, immigrants and visitors were two separate categories the former entering the country with a view of taking employment. The headline, therefore, made no sense at all in relation to the report, but it would have been most unlike The Times to put 'Coloured Visitor Excluded'. It might also have given the unfortunate impression that colour was the reason for the exclusion of the man in the case (which of course it was). But The Times readers would have no difficulty in understanding that an immigrant visitor was a non-white person trying to enter the country temporarily." (p.240,)

As a further instance we may take Enoch Powell's speech delivered in Birmingham on 20 April 1968 (Powell, 1969, pp.281-290). Excluding the passages in parentheses, Powell referred throughout to "Commonwealth immigrants", "immigrants" and "immigrant-descended population". However, the audience was left in no doubt as to the racial connotation of these terms. The tone was set in the second paragraph by the quote from the "middle-aged, quite ordinary working man" who claimed that "in 15 or 20 years' time the black man will have the whip hand over the white man", and by the letter that Powell read from a woman in Northumberland who was woken and abused by two "negroes" and followed by "wide-grinning piccaninnies". In this particular passage, it was obvious that with the help of the attribution made, "immigrant" and "black" were being used synonymously. With these apparently very tenuous indicators, set against an already well-established usage, "immigrant" meant black and alien. Dummett was quite right in pointing out that the word also suggests a person strange to this society, alien and different: "it is then very easy for white people to make the transition to believing dark-coloured people, however many generations from now, to be 'aliens in our midst'" (p.238).

Of course, frequently used terms may begin to lose their sanitary nature. What then happens when a government is forced to take in more immigrants against the wishes of many party supporters as in the case of the Ugandan Asians? Here, there is a very real need to escape from the by now well-established private connotation and to find a more neutral or positively evaluated term. One speaker at the 1972 Conservative Party Conference, in attempting to justify the Government's decision to admit the Ugandans, claimed they were "refugees and not immigrants" (CPCR, 12.10.1972, p.74). Further examples of coding are offered in note 11.

Of course, sanitary coding is not confined to equivocation in the use of terms. Ambiguity can be assured, and an underlying racial meaning imparted by the use of emphasis or stress: a technique better known in Logic as the informal fallacy of accent.

The effect of accent can be achieved in a number of ways. It is most likely to be made use of in newspaper reporting, where certain points can be stressed or unstressed by being mentioned or omitted in a particular context. A newspaper may emphasise or deemphasise an item of news by situating it on different pages, by devoting more or less space to it, by giving it headlines, by placing certain words in bold or italicised case, or by accompanying the story with a picture. In speech, the effect of accent can be achieved by stressing different words or phrases.

When challenged to justify a particular pattern of emphasis conveying an unwholesome meaning, a defendant will readily admit to what he has said, but deny the existence, or instead, the significance of his accenting of the item. This cannot so readily be shown to have been intended. Because the meaning of stress is not so apparent, so clear cut, or so unambiguous, there is always a route

of escape from the implications of the original message. The challenger is accused of reading in unintended elements for which the person who spoke or wrote cannot be held responsible, and who now claims he is being cruelly misunderstood. The challenger can often only justify his position by insisting that the discourse in question be considered in context and accompanied by its 'accents'.

The Press Council's condemnation of John Junor, the editor of The Sunday Express, for identifying a doctor in a manner likely to stir up race hatred serves as an example of racist stressing and its defense in terms of another stress intended. The editor had described how when an old vagrant had been taken to hospital by the police, the doctor who examined him had 'sent him packing'. Later the vagrant had been found dead in a car park. In the next edition, Junor gave the doctor's Arabic name, pointing out that he had omitted to mention it previously. He added that he did not know his nationality but suspected he did not wear a kilt or come from Auchtermuchty. The Press Council upheld readers' complaints that the way the doctor's name was published with distinctly racial connotations was totally unjustifiable. In defending his action, Junor claimed that studiously avoiding mentioning a man's colour or origin was a kind of inverted racism and that printing a name did not contain innuendo unless one believed a doctor making a fatal error should be shielded from public criticism (August 1978).

The manner in which the Press operates by selective coverage and in an already existing cultural context has been adequately described by Halloran (1974), Hartmann and Husband (1974), Hall (1978) and others. The Community Relations Commission Memorandum (1977) recommended the Press Council to draw up a code of conduct on the reporting of race relations using the following headings: accuracy

and objectivity, moderation and balance, interpretation and context, avoidance of stereotypes and of reporting race or colour unnecessarily, the widening of sources of information. Among questions journalists were recommended to ask themselves were: is the story given a front page lead? How much space is it given? Is the story treated sensationally, or is it placed in the context of a background of facts or overall policy? Has the other point of view been expressed? Is the story only newsworthy because a black person is involved? Is the story joining a 'bandwagon' of crime or immigration stories? Nearly all of these questions are related to methods of stress.

Use of words to facilitate mental imaging

Hall et al's repeated references to 'images' in discussing the reportage of racial issues (1978) are not accidental, and it is only in an examination of 'imaging' that a fuller account of the process of sanitary coding can be offered. Like Berkeley, we must distinguish between the ideas imprinted on the senses ('ideas of sense' - objects perceived) and ideas "formed by the help of memory and imagination" which he calls 'images'. Referring to images, Berkeley wrote "I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure ... It is no more than willing, and straightaway this or that idea arises in my fancy ..." (Berkeley, 1710, par.28.)

For psychologists, imaging refers to the "sensory-like experiencing which occurs in the absence of appropriate sensory stimulation", (Hunter, 1957, p.184), or as it is usually metaphorically put, to 'seeing in the mind's eye'. Hunter points out that much remembering occurs in the form of imaging, or reliving an experience in a sensory manner: this is 'memory imaging' (as opposed to 'after imaging'). The use of 'imaging' is not limited to the realm of the visual, e.g. imaging of a black or white face; but can be extended to include

auditory imaging, e.g. the howl of the lynch mob, the sound of reggae music; tactile imaging, e.g. the feel of smooth skin, or of clammy hands; gustatory imaging, e.g. the taste of hot pepper sauce, salt fish, or rum; olfactory imaging, e.g. perfumes and smoke; and organic imaging e.g. feelings of fear, nausea, cold, stomach ache, repletion after a large meal. Neither must imaging always be of the real: it is also possible to image - or imagine - mythical creatures, e.g. women with the tails of fish or men with the bodies of horses, and mythical events. An image is not necessarily static or single but may convert into another, or unfold as a series.

In the nineteenth century, Francis Galton investigated the imaging of a hundred men of whom at least half were distinguished in an intellectual discipline. Questions were asked about the clarity and detail with which they could image various experiences such as that of their breakfast tables. Galton's research indicated considerable differences between individuals in their ability to produce images. Some reported no images at all although they could describe their breakfast tables in verbal terms, while others reported images of the finest detail.

Subsequently, other research has confirmed the wide range of individual differences in imaging and also differences between the various sensory modes: visual, auditory, etc., and within any one mode, e.g. visual imaging need not be coloured. Nevertheless, certain generalisations are possible. Visual imaging is the most commonly occurring, followed in declining order by auditory, and then with similar frequency gustatory and organic, and then olfactory. Individuals who are good at imaging in any one mode tend to be good

in others. And most interestingly for our purpose, ability to image in any one individual varies according to what he is trying to recall. Hunter states:

If it is a concrete unique object such as a face or voice, imaging tends to occur more frequently than if it is an abstract argument, a decision or logical deduction. Even although these latter items were originally experienced in concrete terms, such as a seen or heard communication, their recalling is accomplished with a lesser accompaniment of imaging.

Another important aspect of imaging is that:

... people who deal chiefly with abstract lines of thinking report a less than average ability to 'summon up' images. This fact was first noted by Galton who found his hundred men of intellectual distinction lower in imaging ability than children and adults selected from non-professional walks of life. Confirmation came in 1909 from an American psychologist, G H Betts, when he asked both college students and professors about their imaging. The students most frequently reported their imaging as slightly better than 'moderately clear and vivid' while the professors most frequently reported it as slightly better than 'vague and dim'. The relation between skill in abstract thinking and lack of imaging ability seems well established ... the reason for it seems to be that the more efficient and successful the thinking, at least of a logical nature, the less it is accompanied for most people by imaging. It would appear that images are too concrete and specific to be of great service in reaching solutions by high-level thinking. And as an individual's skill in abstract thinking develops, it increasingly interferes with and weakens his somewhat outmoded skill in imaging, until he may not be able to image even when specifically asked to do so.
(Hunter, 1957, pp.192-193.)

Berkeley argued against the possibility of abstract general images (or ideas), and in favour of seeing the image as a particular. By this he meant that insofar as the aspects of an image are specifiable, then it must be possible to specify them consistently. Luria's case notes on Shereshevskii, the mnemonist, also confirmed that imaging was closely related to the specific and sensorily experienced and not to the abstract and generalisable, for which words and logical mathematical symbols were more suited.

In comparison with generalised terms, images retain the status of 'exemplars'. They may hinder the understanding of the more complex physical and social relations which words and word formulae enable us to grasp. Nevertheless, it is apparent from Luria's account of Shereshevskii's phenomenal memory that he relied for recall on his conversion of elements into visual imagery.

...the visual quality of his recall was fundamental to his capacity for remembering words. For when he heard or read a word it was at once converted into a visual image corresponding with the object the word signified for him...

Images then, may act as powerful memory enhancers, while at the same time, as exemplars maintaining the link with the specific, they may weaken the capacity of the individual to form higher level generalisations.

The link between mental images and terms is a complex one, possibly because of the ambiguity of the word 'idea', which from the time of Locke has been used to refer to a variety of entities: the immediate objects of sensory awareness (sense data), memory images, concepts, and others besides. In this context, I must simplistically distinguish between images, whether internal or external, and the terms or sentences of language. As Taylor (1970) explains:

.... sentences differ enormously from pictures, even conventional pictures like maps and geometric representations. The latter at least preserve some of the characteristics of what they represent, in particular spatial relationships: their mode of representation is not wholly conventional. Language, on the other hand, is wholly conventional in its relationship to the world ... (p.133.)

Mental images, when described in words or drawn publicly on paper, can often be seen to have much in common: but whatever their external manifestations and culturally inspired origins, they are experienced privately and must be converted into public 'symbols',

in order to be communicated. Despite the complexity of the relationship between language and imaging, we may suppose it to be two-way: language may give rise to images and images may give rise to language.

First, it seems clear that the language of a speaker may vary in its propensity for inducing images in a listener. Poetry, for example, frequently presents word combinations that succeed in providing the individual with particularly rich, exciting and unusual images. But this effect is scarcely a feature of scientific prose or of legal documents: in fact, such effect would appear to be deliberately avoided in these contexts. The general and the abstract are not prone to presentation in the specific form required of the image. And, in addition, as I argue below, memory imaging is likely to have an effect on the listener's response. The advantage of prose or poetry, containing expressions that lead to prolific imaging, might lie in the pleasure they give to the listener in their immediacy and motivating power and in the ease with which they may be remembered at a later date.

Second, the sentence giving rise to the image, the image itself, and the later interpretation of the image must be distinguished. Most importantly, an image is not, and cannot be represented by, a sentence. Rather by holding in mind a particular image, an individual may compose a number of different sentences to describe its aspects.

From a moving visual or auditory image, of, for example, a ghetto, a number of descriptive sentences may be derived. The housing is multi-storey, grey, drab and illkept, and the streets are dirty and full of garbage. Whole families, crowded immodestly together, live in single rooms. People dressed in shabby clothing

stand shiftless and idle on the street corners. The siren of a police car wails; a black youth runs past; a white policeman orders him to stop; he runs on; there is a loud crack of gunfire; the youth falls wounded in the back; red blood soaks into the gutter. And these are not all: the imager may be able to describe other details: the dress, age and appearance of the people in the street, what was said, the number of policemen, the size of the pool of blood. These are properties of an individual's image, or series of images, of the ghetto, not of the term 'ghetto' and its personal or conventional connotations. The image of the ghetto does not make any single sentence about ghettos, but can be used as an inspiration for the development of many sentences. Individuals can produce a wide range of sentences from their images. The image can be compared with a model in science: from the model, a number of hypotheses may be arrived at.

Although images may derive from the idiosyncratic, personal experiences of an individual, popular images often come to be shared by large numbers of people. People not only lead a common social life in worker and consumer roles, but they are also exposed from an early age to the visual and auditory matter comprising (non-linguistic) culture. The pictures of little red riding hood and the wolf, or of Hugh Lofting's King Koko of Dr Dolittle fame (see Suhl, 1975), of witches, and of cannibals and cooking pots, help to create the child's visual images. Pictures and cartoons, illustrations of all kinds, in newspapers, films and on television, provide an immense library of folk imagery on which large numbers of people must draw in their mental reproduction or composition (through combination) of images.

Hartmann and Husband (1971, p.5) point out that:

The prevalence of images and stereotypes deriving mainly from the colonial experience and at least implicitly derogatory to coloured people may be gauged from the existence of a number of traditions of cartoon jokes. These include the missionary in the pot, the fakir on his bed of nails, the snake charmer, and the polygamous Eastern potentate with his harem.

With the advent of television in particular, the scope for imaging large areas of the unknown in a standard manner, rather than with idiosyncratic fantasy images drawn from vividly descriptive prose passages, has probably increased considerably. It is worth noting the powerful visual and auditory impact of many advertisements. Where personal contact with black people is not available as a direct referent as in an all-white context, even more reliance is likely to be placed on media images.

This is not, however, the place to discuss with exactitude the changing substance of the mental image: of significance here, is the likely existence in many individuals' minds of images that have some, if not a great proportion, of their features in common. And because of the similarity of much human experience, certain images will be regarded by their imagers as pleasant and enjoyable, while others will be seen as frightening, unwholesome, or nightmarish. Possibly, this is to state the obvious, but it acquires considerable significance in the discursive context.

The politician may use sentences that are particularly effective in producing mental images in his audience. From his familiarity with the cultural milieu, he may intuitively or consciously select and describe images which the audience can be relied on to capture in a predictable way. If he is particularly skilful he need not provide a detailed verbalisation: rather he can depend on his listeners' interpretation of a mediating image

to enable them to arrive at the conclusion he intends for them. As with the other forms of sanitary coding dependent on equivocation and accent, the provision of images has a number of advantages.

The politician need not state his message in full but can rely on his audience to construct boggy men and demons, holy innocents and heroes, from their prevailing cultural or folk images. In this way, if they are to make an accusation of evil intent, his ideological opponents must accuse the population of possessing sacrilegious images and at the same time acknowledge that they themselves have cognisance of them. The politician denies all responsibility for the meaning his audience has derived: images, as with dreams, may be interpreted in a number of ways. The technique, like others, does not exist in a cultural vacuum. It depends on already existing, prevailing and well-established folk images of which there is no shortage in the long history of British and colonial race relations. Hartmann and Husband (1971) stress that race communication exists within "the framework of meanings that serve to define the situation within any social group". However, the range of available images is immense and new ones can be invented and established if sufficient social commitment is forthcoming.

The other advantages of 'image provision' have already been mentioned: an image may act as a mnemonic and, perhaps, at the same time, serve as a barrier to abstracted general thinking, the latter proving a positive advantage to an anti-rationalist politician. Most famous examples of oratorical discourse, of speaking to the people, are replete with image-building terms. We need only think of Churchill's post-Dunkirk 'We shall fight in France' speech, in which the images created become increasingly definite as the

scenario of the fighting shifts from seas and oceans, to fields, streets and hills.

Where racial discourse is concerned, it is instructive, if commonplace, to examine Powell's speech of 20 April 1968, for its plentiful supply of expressions that are apparently successful in inducing vivid images, particularly those of conflict between black and white. Of course, the fact that others' conversation is reported within the speech (the mode of attribution, see below) in no way lessens impact, and the commonplace nature of the simile and metaphor probably increases it:

'... the black man will have the whip hand over the white man.'

.... a decent, ordinary fellow-Englishman, who in broad daylight in my own town ...

It is like watching a nation busily engaged in heaping up its own funeral pyre.

.... to enact legislation of the kind before Parliament at this moment is to risk throwing a match on gunpowder.

.... they found themselves made strangers in their own country. They found their wives unable to obtain hospital beds in childbirth, their children unable to obtain school places, their homes and neighbourhoods changed beyond recognition

.... she saw one house after another taken over. The quiet streets became a place of noise and confusion ... Windows are broken. She finds excreta pushed through her letter box. When she goes to the shops, she is followed by children, charming, wide-grinning piccaninnies. They cannot speak English, but one word they know. "Racialist", they chant...

This description of one white old-age pensioner living in a 'respectable street' may provide the listener with a homely Anglicised image of the formation of the black ghetto, augmented in its topicality and strength by the presentation on the television screens at that time of the rioting, looting, and arson of the 1968 American race riots. The American experience was associated directly with English

developments as is illustrated by the section of the speech that followed.

As I look ahead, I am filled with foreboding. Like the Roman, I seem to see 'the River Tiber foaming with much blood'. That tragic and intractable phenomenon which we watch with horror on the other side of the Atlantic ... is coming upon us here by our own volition and our own neglect.

(Powell, 1969, pp.281-290.)

Local case study: strategic deracialisation

A number of interesting methodological questions are raised by the concept of discursive deracialisation. The interviewing situation is frequently conceived as a binary role relationship between a respondent and interviewer joined in the common task of giving and obtaining information. Textbooks on interviewing technique usually make a somewhat simplistic distinction between information about behaviour that in principle is verifiable by appeal to outside sources and information about attitudes or psychological states that is not. Behavioural reports are said to have the property of accuracy or inaccuracy, whereas attitudinal responses can only be consistent or inconsistent. It is frequently assumed that the success of the interview depends on receiving 'truthful' responses to the questions asked: accurate in the case of behavioural and consistent in the case of attitudinal information. The degree to which this is not achieved is known as 'the response effect'. (See Sudman and Bradburn, 1974.) Traditional analysis of the interview situation might equate the phenomenon of deracialisation with inaccuracy, inconsistency, and the response effect, generally.

The methodological difficulties associated with deracialisation, however, require further elucidation. Initially, a distinction has to be made between the following frequently confused modes: (a) The

factual expressions of the respondent that have the property of being true or false should be distinguished from the expressions of value and prescriptions that do not have the property of being true or false. Some factual expressions may be shown to be true or false by checking them against other independent assessments of the evidence e.g. beliefs about immigrant numbers, but others which purport to describe, for example, the mental or physical state of the respondent, e.g. a claim to feel physically sick at the sight of a black and white couple holding hands, can only be established on the authority of the respondent himself. (b) Then there are the assertions made by the interviewer about the content or form of the factual, evaluative and prescriptive replies made to the interviewer by the respondent. These assertions are factual and have the property of being true or false, e.g. when the interviewer asserts "The respondent stated that all black people ought to be repatriated" he is making a claim that it is a fact that the respondent uttered a prescription of a particular kind (whether or not he, the respondent, was sincere) and this claim is either true or false. (c) Next, there are the assertions made by the interviewer about the truth or genuineness of the replies he receives from the respondent. In the case of the replies that purport to be matters of 'external fact' there may be alternative means of checking their veracity. Under these circumstances an index may be compiled of the likelihood of specific topics being answered correctly or with exactitude by a given population. Survey material is termed 'accurate' when it is in accordance with other reliable sources of information. To claim, however, that 'accuracy' is a property only of information about behaviour and not of information about attitudes or psychological states is surely too restrictive. Information

about attitudes and psychological states can also be subject to some, albeit limited, scrutiny. While confirmation of the existence of psychological states, and the sincerity with which evaluations and prescriptions are held, must ultimately rest with the individual who lays claim to them, it is evident that a thorough knowledge of other circumstances in which that individual expresses himself by deed or word might enable a more ubiquitous or privileged observer than the normal interviewer to claim the respondent has lied or has provided deliberately misleading answers. This applies not only to matters of fact but to matters of value: e.g. "I told the interviewer that I believe black people commit the same amount of crime as whites but there is no doubt in my mind that they commit more" (descriptive false), and "The interviewer asked me if I thought blacks should be repatriated. The sooner the better, though I hesitated in saying that to him" (prescriptive).

Identification of a deliberately misleading answer cannot be satisfactorily described as an inconsistency on the part of the respondent, although inconsistency between at least two of his responses is the only way in which doubt can be cast on the nature of his reply to the interviewer. Rather the respondent is deliberately, and often in a thoroughly consistent manner at a public level, disguising what he knows to be his deep-seated feelings on a particular issue.

The error in accuracy or inconsistency recorded in the responses to survey questions is a matter of great concern to social researchers and is known as the 'response effect'. If the interviewer is reasonably competent, the fact that a particular answer has been given by a respondent can be guaranteed: what cannot be,

is the truthfulness, exactitude, honesty, and sincerity of his reply.

A number of factors are held to adversely affect the likelihood of receiving 'truthful answers', all of them arising from the interaction between interviewer and respondent and the nature of the task engaged upon. Some of the factors are within the immediate control of the two parties, others have been established long before the interview is ever conceived of but are brought into play at its inception.

There are technical problems of how best to frame the questions, such as the choice between open and closed questions, the latter providing a limited framework of responses from which the respondent must choose. Discursive deracialisation might be automatically thrust upon the respondent if no satisfactory racial terminology or statement is made available in the choice of answers permitted to him. (With regard to the survey of local councillors, the majority of questions were open-ended.)

There are the factors traditionally classed under the general heading: 'problems of self-presentation'. It is assumed that the respondent is always likely to act in order to reduce personal discomfort and to make a favourable impression on his audience. Thus the respondent's replies to threatening and anxiety-provoking questions need to be treated with caution. Anxiety might not only be caused by the subject matter of the question, but by the fact that the respondent just does not know the answer. Under such circumstances, he might avoid embarrassment by guessing. More importantly, from the point of view of the discussion of the methodological problems associated with strategic deracialisation,

is the 'socially desirable response'. If the respondent recognises that his behaviour is considered to be socially or politically undesirable by others, or that his views might shock a possible audience, he might decide to provide the interviewer with the socially or politically respectable answer, rather than with the truth. A similar phenomenon, known as "acquiescence", occurs when the respondent, perhaps for the sake of politeness, offers the answers he feels the interviewer is likely to approve of. It is apparent that much of the discussion of strategic deracialisation could be centred on the issue of self-presentation.

Then there is the factor of self-sufficiency of expression, which was partially raised in discussion of ideological levels. It is possible that although a respondent feels strongly about an issue he may not have at his disposal an adequate form of words with which to express his feelings. Alternatively, he may borrow expressions from friends or newspapers which he thinks are appropriate to his circumstances but which, to the researcher, sound false, laboured, or incorrectly used. The respondent might adopt what, to him, appear to be the only available and correct forms of discourse with which to express himself, however inappropriate they might seem to himself and to his close acquaintances.

Next there is the factor of saliency. An issue may exist for the respondent only when it is raised by the researcher. The respondent may have given the matter little or no attention before that time, or never have thought about it in that connection.

Finally, it is worth mentioning the characteristics of the interviewer which may affect the respondent's reactions. Apart from the interviewer's competence in conducting the interview, there are his extra-role characteristics, from which the respondent draws his

cues: his sex, age, race, speech, dress, educational level, social class, and his political, religious, or other affiliations.

The survey of local councillors, with which we are concerned, could be seen simply as a series of binary interactions taking place over two months between a single interviewer and a number of councillors, the task being to discover the councillors' views on race and race-related topics. The interaction was, of course, far more complicated than this model suggests. Councillors belonged to political parties to which they owed allegiance and from the leaders of which they frequently sought advice before agreeing to be interviewed. There was also evidence that prior to being interviewed some councillors discussed the questions with those who had already been initiated.

But, apart from the interaction started in response to the researcher's request for interviews, many of the councillors saw themselves as members of a political party whose views they tried hard to represent, however misguidedly. They did not slavishly follow a party line - indeed, they prided themselves on their independence of mind on many key issues. Nevertheless, they identified themselves as stalwart members of the Conservative or Labour party and often strove to support their own opinions by linking them to an historical strand of Conservative or Labour thought.

Loyalty to their constituency and ward party, particularly in the face of opposition attack, forced them to consider their utterances carefully for fear that an injudicious public remark would cause political embarrassment. Because of the consequences of adverse publicity in the local press, councillors often sought advice or approval for their actions, before committing themselves. Given the Borough's legacy of Powellite reaction and appalling

reputation in the field of race relations, councillors were likely to be even more cautious in approaching this area. This was particularly true among local Conservatives who had suffered more than most from Powell's decision to abandon their party and the constituency of South West Wolverhampton for the Ulster Unionists and South Down.

As well as seeking to be loyal party members, councillors also wanted to be seen as good ward representatives, at the service of the public and the town. It was believed that a good councillor voluntarily gave a great deal of his time to sorting out the problems of local people. He made himself regularly available for consultation and studiously attended council and committee meetings and performed his civic duties. All citizens of whatever political or skin complexion were entitled to his impartial service.

The phenomenon of deracialisation is best understood against this background of political loyalty and public service. An important distinction was made between private expressions of heartfelt opinion ("off the record") and public expressions that would stand up to the scrutiny of the general public, the press, colleagues, and political opponents. Public expressions should never damage or cause embarrassment to the party. In any public encounter, the councillor sought to establish whether he was 'on' or 'off-stage'. Was he speaking as a councillor and party member or as an anonymous individual? His decision would be made on the basis of what he perceived to be the consequences of the utterance. For many councillors, of course, there was little discordance between private and public opinions. A councillor who has been in a political party for many years soon learns to express even his most deviant thoughts in party rhetoric. There are few local political

actions that cannot be justified in terms of some aspect of a given ideology. Nevertheless, it is often recognised that the party's 'face-saving' formulae are a mere form of words, a public relations exercise, behind which the real business of feeling, thinking and acting has to be conducted. Councillors actually seemed to enjoy playing the game of 'political presentation' or of putting on "different hats", and distinguished clearly between those of their views that could and those that could not be publicly aired. They were perhaps made even more conscious of the difference between general and specialised political discourse by their role as spokesmen for local citizens and pressure groups. Local demands had to be translated from anecdotal, passionate expression of feeling into orthodox political rhetoric. Interest articulation involved a thorough knowledge of the two modes of speech - and in the dangerous case of racial affairs - an ability to deracialise.

Councillors reacted to the survey of their opinions in a predictable fashion. The interview usually fell into three phases (a) an informal introductory session, (b) a formal session in which the councillor responded to the questions of the schedule, and (c) an informal commentary and discussion about the survey, and their own, and other councillors' responses to it. These phases did not always follow in chronological order - interruptions in the formal session caused by a tape change-over, or a break for tea, were invariably used for informal exchanges.

The introductory sessions, in which the interviewer attempted to establish his credentials, were useful in providing evidence of councillors' fears and anxieties. In the main, they wanted reassurance about the purpose of the survey. Would the information be used for some vague but uncontroversial academic purpose or would it find its

way into the hands of the political opposition or press, to be used in some ill-defined way to the detriment of the individual or the party? Councillors feared that, unwittingly, the individual might reveal himself as an unworthy representative of his party or, alternatively, expose the party's confidences. In return for the granting of an interview, the interviewer had to guarantee the trust that was being placed in him. Nevertheless, the formal interview was invariably cautiously undertaken with the councillor taking care to present his most impressive public face.

Self-presentation in this context meant the presentation of the public councillor: the representative of the people and the party, to the people and the party. The socially-desirable response was that sanctioned by the party and public opinion. The traditional analysis in terms of a hypothetical truthful response from which the actual response differs in some way is scarcely applicable to this context. There is a truthful, accurate or consistent public response and sometimes, a parallel, but differing, truthful, accurate, and consistent private response, neither of which can unhesitatingly be awarded supreme status. Deracialisation occurs when the private racial response is not matched by a public response. The racial response, however, is not in some way 'superior' or more honest, despite the fact that it is frequently conceived as the 'deeper' reality, the 'real man', or the 'heart of the matter'. Rather the public response is important because it is the effective political reality. In fact, the public response constitutes the dominant justificatory system, and councillors see themselves as having a duty to the party, and to society generally, to see that it stays dominant.

Why then is deracialisation of interest? It is because it indicates the presence of a subterranean set of beliefs, which always runs the risk of being exploited by politicians prepared to take on the task of establishing a new racial justificatory system and undermining the fragile hegemony of the old.

But, if racial responses are private or subterranean, how can they be identified and examined? The sudden outbreak of Powell 'mania' mentioned previously, might have provided an opportunity to study the collective phenomenon. But, leaving this possibility aside, the existence of a subterranean world, racial or otherwise, can always be casually confirmed from any long-standing acquaintance with political life. Public figures are prone to confide "off the record" in those they feel are sympathetic to their views. They frequently assume, often correctly, but sometimes mistakenly, that the people they find themselves in contact with on social occasions share their interest and perspective in politics. Quite by accident, the researcher may find himself present at a gathering of an 'inner' political circle, at which public figures reveal quite openly the gap between their public statements and private opinions, and discuss, in true Machiavellian style, how best to manipulate their gullible audiences. Seldom, however, does the researcher have systematic access to such circles, and were he to break those privileged confidences, that same access would soon be denied to him. Clearly, there are both pragmatic and ethical reasons why data acquired "off the record" cannot easily be used in social scientific studies.

It was only by comparing (b) the formal interviewing session with (c) the informal commentary and discussion about the survey that the phenomenon of strategic deracialisation was revealed in the survey, and then it was only vividly and indubitably illustrated in two of the

many interviews. A further interesting case is also discussed below. But if councillors were taking the trouble to deracialise their discourse for the sake of a comparative and unproven stranger, it was quite surprising that as many as three actually took the risk of revealing their subterfuge. The act of confiding in the interviewer might be accounted for in a number of different ways. One councillor was relatively inexperienced and seeking to impress the interviewer with his political ability. Another showed symptoms of acute anxiety throughout the formal interview and seemed most relieved at its termination. One councillor, set in his ways and giving the impression of having weathered every conceivable political storm, treated the interview in a light-hearted and contemptuous manner. But in all three cases, the councillors admitted to racist feelings only when they felt they were speaking "off the record". Usually this meant, quite literally when the tape-recording had been completed. In one instance, the contrast was so blatant that I felt compelled to note down at the time and immediately after our meeting broke up, as much as I could recall of what was said after the tape recorder was switched off. In another instance, when a cassette was merely turned over, a councillor appeared to think that the tape-recorder had been switched off.

The fact that the material under discussion was only revealed "off the record" raises the ethical question of whether it should be reported at all. I have serious qualms about damaging the reputation of councillors and must emphatically stress that strategic deracialisation, rather than being general to their discourse, was a rarely proven feature. Nevertheless, I think the pledge of anonymity is sufficient safeguard for the few individuals concerned and that the phenomenon of deracialisation is of ample importance to warrant closer scrutiny.

In essence, then, deracialisation was identified by comparing non-racial responses received in the formal interview with racial responses registered in the informal exchanges during and after its completion. Here then are two examples:

- (1) Now that you've switched that thing off, I'll admit I'm race prejudiced. We used to live with West Indians on one side and Indians on the other. Do you know what I mean by 'housewife'? Well, there were six men and two women living there and the women looked after the needs of the men. And they had parties till two or three in the morning. When I went out on one occasion to tell them about the noise I had a knife held to me. And then the Indians would turn their record player on at seven in the morning. My wife nearly had a breakdown. I lived there for four months. If you'd had that sort of experience you'd be prejudiced wouldn't you?

(Interviewer: Well, I would never have got that impression from your answers.)

I've been learning to control my prejudice for twenty years. I know I shouldn't feel that way to a group as a whole but, when you've had that sort of experience, you do.

- (2) I only hope I've made a little bit of sense because I've felt so inhibited (reassurance given). I suppose I could have been more open and frank in some of my answers. I hope there was some little sense in what I said. In fact I am worried about the size of the coloured population in Wolverhampton. Now this is off (indicating the tape recorder), I went to a religious service in a temple one Sunday afternoon. There were six hundred Indians all squatting on the floor and I asked the question, where they came from, because I was disturbed. I thought they would have come from all over the West Midlands, but they hadn't. To my horror they were all from Wolverhampton, and I thought, well six hundred, and they weren't all in there because there were more in the street outside. It was full of them. In that particular hall there were six hundred, and as I told you, in one school there were thirteen different nationalities. It's frightening. It does worry me. We're going back to your questions now. They're not quite up to the standard of whites, for want of a better expression. They're having bigger families, aren't they? - While what I call the better class, the brainy people, they're confining themselves to one or two children. You see what I mean? You can get a terrible imbalance, can't you? Then you've got all this uprising, for want of a better word, of the coloureds. You think about it. It's dreadful to think, isn't it? There were six hundred in that

room that day all live in Wolverhampton, and the incident of the ten little nigger boys. Well, it makes you think, doesn't it?

(1) and (2) serve as straightforward examples of simple deracialisation. (3) The interviewer was convinced that the third example was a clever case of sanitary coding. Because of its length it does not allow for verbatim reproduction. In this instance the interview was interrupted by the councillor's wife who brought in cups of coffee and was encouraged to stay by the councillor. The councillor then invited her to provide additional responses to his own on questions which he selected for her. His answers were bland, hers clearly hostile to black people: "I know the darkies have got preference over our youngsters". This procedure continued for five minutes until the interviewer pointed out as tactfully as he could that he came to interview the councillor and not his wife. After general laughter, the wife departed from the room but not before standing at the door and giving further vent to her opinions on the "darkies". The councillor then pointed out to the interviewer that his wife acted as his secretary and should know what she was talking about as she had dealt at length in his absence with the many people who came to the house. "She sees the other side of it." Although his answers were by no means free from suspect racial remarks, they conformed to a 'party position' and were markedly less hostile to black people than his wife's. The interviewer had the distinct impression from the orchestration of the answers and the general support given to the wife's position, that the councillor had deliberately used her to give expression to the responses with which he himself agreed but had chosen not to voice.

CHAPTER TEN

DERACIALISED JUSTIFICATIONS FOR IMMIGRATION CONTROL GIVEN BY

MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT

(AN ANALYSIS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES ON IMMIGRATION)

Many features of British deracialisation are well illustrated by the speeches made in favour of the 1962, 1968 and 1971 Immigration Bills. In the previous chapter, I indicated some of the methodological difficulties of establishing that deracialisation had purposely been practised in any given discourse. Nevertheless, in the examples that follow, the tendency for immigration controls to operate in a racially selective manner is most marked, while the justification offered for the bills rarely makes use of specifically racial description, evaluation and prescription. The observer is entitled to remark on the discrepancy between the actual racial context and the politicians' account of it.

But, apart from the systemic nature of the deracialisation, there appears to be plenty of evidence that the politicians were fully conscious of the racially-charged atmosphere in which they were operating. The effect of the Bills, of which all were either fully-conscious-or were made aware in the context of the accompanying ideological eristic -- was to reduce the number of black migrants. While the real intentions of the legislators cannot be unquestionably established, there is ample evidence that their purpose was the placation of a racially hostile electorate. Needless to say, the tactical 'racism of the head' was seldom admitted in the debating chamber. And the claim that all those who supported the measure were self-consciously employing techniques of strategic deracialisation is impossible to vindicate.

This chapter is confined, therefore, to an examination of the

actual texts of parliamentary speeches on immigration policy made in the decade 1961 to 1971. Although I hint at the likelihood that self-conscious strategic deracialisation is being practised, I concentrate on the actual argument forms used in support of immigration control. The formal and recurring nature of many of these forms in debates on a wide variety of topics provides yet more evidence that established ideological structures circumscribe public utterances about racial issues.

In the context of political eristic, the specific formulae (mentioned previously) are arranged into persuasive argument forms and used as rhetorical devices. While political values may differ markedly between the parties, argument forms are likely to be shared in common - although the frequency of their use will depend to a large extent on their suitability for the task in hand. Of course, one reason why argument forms appear to be so ubiquitous is that, as socially observed features of discourse, they are formulated at a higher level of abstraction than party values. Nevertheless, their consideration reveals substantially more of the underlying structure of British political discourse, its techniques of persuasion, and its effective deracialising properties.

I offer a brief account of the provision of the three Bills under examination, their stated objectives, the grounds on which they were contested, and of the remarks of their chief supporters and critics. I then go on to examine, in detail, the argument forms and rhetorical modes used in the speeches made at the main parliamentary debates over the Bills.

General outline

The object of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Bill was "to control the immigration into the United Kingdom of Commonwealth citizens from other parts of the Commonwealth and to ensure the deportation of such citizens on the recommendation of the criminal courts". In moving the second reading of the Bill on 16 November 1961, Mr Butler indicated that the control was to be exercised through an employment voucher system, the vouchers being issued by the Ministry of Labour. There would be three categories: A, people with a specific job to come to; B, those who had recognised training, skills, or qualifications which were useful to the country; and C, those who did not fall into either of the above categories, who would be issued with vouchers on a first come, first served basis. Wives, and children under sixteen, of voucher holders were also allowed to enter. (Distribution of Category C vouchers was reduced, and finally abolished by the 1965 White Paper Immigration from the Commonwealth.)

The Bill was strongly contested in its passage through Parliament by the Opposition Labour Party and a number of Conservative Members. After the Conservative Home Secretary, Mr Butler, moved the second reading, Gordon Walker replied in favour of the Labour Opposition amendment declining to approve a Bill which

... without adequate inquiry and without full discussion at a meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers removes from Commonwealth citizens the long-standing right of free entry to Britain and is thus calculated to undermine the unity and strength of the Commonwealth; gives excessive discretionary power to the executive without any provision for appeals; will be widely regarded as introducing a colour bar into our legislation; and through providing for health checks and for the deportation of those convicted of certain criminal offences, fails to deal with the deplorable social and housing conditions under which recent Commonwealth immigrants and other subjects of Her Majesty are living.

In the course of the debate, Hugh Gaitskell, Leader of the Opposition, claimed that the Government wished to exclude Commonwealth citizens because they were coloured and because of the fear of racial disorder. The exemption of the Irish from the Bill revealed it to be "a plain anti-Commonwealth measure in theory and a plain anti-colour measure in practice".

In summing up for the Conservatives, Mr Hare, the Minister of Labour, denied that the Bill had been based on racial discrimination and promised that the Government would deal with the Irish anomaly if a way could be found of making control measures work in practice.

The Bill was strongly criticised by Commonwealth governments and the government of Eire. Norman Manley, Prime Minister of Jamaica, issued a statement declaring that the Commonwealth would never again be the same:

England has failed the first time it has had to cope with the problem of assimilating a fairly substantial number of persons of different races and colour. There is no question of economic necessity.

Despite the strength of the Opposition, which clearly demonstrates the universal awareness of the racialist effects of the measures, the Bill received the Royal Assent on 18 April 1962.

The decision to introduce the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill of 1968 was first announced by Mr Callaghan on 22 February 1968 in the House of Commons. As a consequence of Kenyan Legislation designed to implement a Kenyanisation programme, approximately 7,000 Asians holding British passports had arrived in Britain in the previous three months. Mr Callaghan feared that if no action were taken the numbers of immigrants entering would increase and create strain on the social services in areas of settlement. A Parliamentary debate on 15 November 1967 had already raised the fears of the Asian

community in Kenya that, despite their British passports, they might at any time be deprived of their right of entry, and this also had had the effect of increasing the rate of immigration.

In early February, leading Conservatives began to demand legislation to reduce the number of immigrants, despite the fact that many of the Asians of East Africa were citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies. On 23 February, the Labour Government published the Bill which was enacted one week later on 1 March 1968. The Bill provided for the application of immigration control to citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies, holding UK passports, who had 'no substantial connection' with Britain. All citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies would be subject to immigration controls except those who had been born, adopted, or naturalised in Britain, or who had obtained citizenship by registration under the British Nationality Acts of 1948 and 1964. A British passport holder whose father or paternal grandfather fulfilled any of these conditions would also be exempted from control. Other provisions of the Bill made it an offence for a Commonwealth citizen to land in Britain unless he had been seen by an immigration officer and for anyone who helped an immigrant to land without authorisation. Immigration officers could also require an immigrant as a condition of admission to report to a medical officer. The existing right of a dependent child under the age of sixteen to be admitted where only one parent was living in Britain was also removed.

After the Bill was published, a protest march of 2,000 demonstrators delivered a petition to 10 Downing Street. The Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Michael Ramsey, in his capacity of Chairman of the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants, declared that four features of the Bill were 'thoroughly wrong'.

Racial classification would for the first time be embodied into the Law, the Bill failed to include the recommendation of the Wilson committee for an appeals system, the number of Asian immigrants to be allowed to enter was 'unreasonably timid' and unjust for people classed as United Kingdom citizens, and a class of virtually stateless people would be created.

The Home Secretary, Mr Callaghan, moved the second reading of the Bill on 27 February 1968, claiming that the main political parties were committed to the development of a multi-racial society and that the Bill had to be considered in conjunction with the Government proposal to introduce a Race Relations Bill, to establish equality of treatment in the sensitive areas of housing and jobs: "Both Bills are essential parts of a fair and balanced policy on race relations". Mr Callaghan regretted the need for the Bill, yet emphatically repudiated the suggestion that it was racist in origin or conception.

For the Conservatives, Mr Hogg stated that he viewed with abhorrence the idea of devaluing a British passport but felt the Government had a right to legislate. The Bill was not a racist measure in any offensive sense of the word, because in addition to the Asians, it affected many people in Kenya of white origin, and control would still have been needed if Britain had been faced with the prospect of the same numbers of immigrants from Scandinavia, Italy or France.

It seems clear from these defensive remarks denying racism, that those principally involved in the legislation were fully aware that it would mainly affect a racially identifiable group of British passport holders.



The Conservatives put down an amendment to establish a right of appeal against the Act's provisions. The Bill was given a second reading by 372 votes (209 Labour, 162 Conservative) to 62 (35 Labour, 15 Conservatives, 10 Liberals, 1 Welsh Nationalist and 1 Scottish Nationalist).

The 1971 Immigration Bill repealed the 1914 Aliens Restriction Act, much of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, and the whole of the 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act and the 1969 Immigration Appeals Act, replacing them with a single system of immigration control for Commonwealth citizens and aliens. It specified the categories of people - known as patrials - who would have the 'right of abode' in the United Kingdom and who would be free from immigration control. Patrials were people born in Britain or who were citizens by adoption, registration, naturalisation, or who had a parent or grandparent who was born in Britain or who had acquired citizenship by adoption, registration, or naturalisation. It also included citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies who had come from overseas and had at any time been settled in the UK for a continuous period of five years and Commonwealth citizens who had a parent or grandparent born in the United Kingdom. All people, including Commonwealth citizens, coming to Britain for employment would require a work permit issued for a specific job, place, and period, and only wives and children would be allowed to accompany the permit holder.

The Bill received its second reading on 8 March 1971 by 295 votes to 265. In moving the Bill, the Home Secretary, Reginald Maudling, said that 'patriality' had been attacked as a racial concept, an argument he wholly rejected. There was no reason why a country should not accord those who had a family connection with it, a particular and special status: "It is said that most of the

people with patrial status will be white. Most of us are white, and it is completely turning racial discrimination on its head to say that it is wrong for any country to accord those with a family relationship to it a special position in the law of that country" (Hansard*, 8.3.71, p.46).

In replying for the Labour Opposition, Mr Callaghan claimed that the Bill adversely affected the legal status of Commonwealth citizens resident in Britain, without altering the numbers of immigrants. The Bill was "sailing under false colours" and was "a sop to prejudice". It was a thin attempt to make those who had not studied it, believe that it would reduce immigration (8.3.71, p.59). He went on to say, however, that he did not consider the provisions of the Bill were racialist in conception because they could apply to a white Australian but not to a black Jamaican. "In regard to a black Jamaican who is born here and leaves to go to Jamaica, if his son or grandson decides in due course to come back he will be free to do so ... But a white Australian who originated in Italy will not ... be able to come here ..." (8.3.71, p.66).

Enoch Powell said that the only part of the Bill relevant to reducing immigration was the provision for repatriation.

What then are the criteria used in the Bills for distinguishing between categories of people and reducing the numbers entitled to enter Britain? Most obviously, despite their discriminatory effect against various racial groups, the Bills never make use of overt racial categories. The 1962 Act purported only to 'control'

* Subsequent dated references of this kind are to Hansard.

immigration, and to relate it to work opportunity; the 1968 Act to control citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies who had "no substantial connection with Britain", and the 1971 Act "to accord those with a family relationship ... a special position in law ...". By taking some other non-racial feature of black people, the fact that many were unskilled or found it difficult to obtain jobs at a distance, that their parents or grandparents were not born in Britain, superficially non-racial reasons could be offered for exclusion.

Quite clearly, a racialist practice was being publicly justified by politicians with non-racist discourse. This phenomenon becomes more interesting when seen against a background of a section of the electorate that expressed in no uncertain terms a hostility towards black people as a group. The news media reflected the electorate's preoccupation by focusing on specific and frequently negative features of black immigrants and sensationalising them, with the overall effect of increasing and spreading already existing alarm and anxiety.

Argument forms and rhetorical modes

An analysis of the 27 parliamentary speeches made in favour of the 1962, 1968 and 1971 Immigration Bills on the occasion of their second readings provides a further opportunity for understanding the techniques of British deracialisation. If racism is defined in Banton's words as the doctrine that "a man's behaviour is determined by stable inherited characters deriving from separate racial stocks having distinctive attributes and usually considered to stand to one another in relations of superiority and inferiority" (1970, p.18), then no overt acknowledgement of belief in racism is to be detected

anywhere in those speeches, Banton is absolutely right when he says that "as a biological doctrine, racism is dead" (p.28). But, as I have repeatedly argued, it is not sufficient to claim that the old definition of racism does not apply, and to abandon the study there. What is said in favour of the proposed legislation with its recognised racial effects must be described with the aid of more refined tools.

The deracialised arguments put forward during the course of the three parliamentary debates are analysed below with the aid of a seven-fold classification and a scheme of rhetorical modes. I mention all of them briefly before going on to deal with each in detail. Examples are drawn from the speeches as set out in Hansard in favour of immigration control.

Table 15 List of argument forms and rhetorical modes

Argument forms

1. Personalised dispositional and agential
 - (i) blacks inferior to whites
 - (ii) blacks different from whites
 - (iii) blacks threat to whites
 - (iv) blacks privileged in comparison with whites
 - (v) other/general/vague
2. Abstracted social process
 - (i) black focused
 - (ii) white focused
 - (iii) government focused
 - (iv) other/general/vague
3. Populist
4. Economic
5. Pro bono publico
 - (i) to advantage of all (general population, both black and white)
 - (ii) to advantage of whites
 - (iii) to advantage of blacks

Table 15 (continued)

6. Reciprocity

- (i) they do it - why not us (agential)
- (ii) they are affected, we are affected (effective)
- (iii) debit balanced against credit (cancelling)
- (iv) other symmetry

7. Means-orientated

- (i) descriptive of means
- (ii) procedural - correct procedure followed
- (iii) effective - has intended effect
- (iv) consistency - is internally consistent

Rhetorical modes

- (a) Techniques of quantification
- (b) Analogical transformation
- (c) Ambiguity
- (d) Attribution

(1) Personalised, dispositional and agential arguments are those that single out the personality, behaviour, or other personal, and group characteristics of (black) immigrants, in order to justify the actions, policies, or attitudes (in this context, legislation) directed at black people.

(2) Abstracted social process arguments. Accounts of the social processes that occur as a result of blacks migrating to Britain are used to justify legislation.

These two categories rely largely on their substantive content of negative attributes for their persuasive effect and are more subject-specific and less formally constituted than the other arguments mentioned below. In this respect they resemble the ideological formulae described in the chapters on party values.

(3) Populist arguments. Mention of the fact that a measure is popular, or a belief or attitude widely shared, is used as a reason for taking action.

(4) Economic arguments. The assertion that there is a shortage or maldistribution of resources in a variety of social services, etc., is offered as a justification for limiting immigration. It is

regarded as axiomatic that the citizens of a country should have first claim to its resources, irrespective of their abundance.

(5) Pro bono publico arguments. The politician tries to establish that the action under consideration will benefit all or most members of the community. The argument consists in describing how the benefit accrues.

(6) Reciprocity arguments justify legislation in terms of balance or exchange. They may consist in making a comparison of the behaviour of two agents ('if they do it, why shouldn't we?'), in giving an account of the effects of an action on different parties ('both black and white are affected'), or in matching a positively against a negatively evaluated action (cancelling technique).

(7) Means-orientated arguments concentrate not on deciding whether a goal should be pursued, but on the ways of achieving a goal that has already been taken for granted.

In addition to the seven major forms of argument, four rhetorical 'modes', which have the effect of helping to deracialise the discourse still further, are extensively employed in debating the Bills. They are:

(a) Techniques of quantification. These refer to the variety of ways in which the politician quantifies the people, actions, or social processes, which he is describing. In the case of opposition to migration, the rhetorical device will be used to stress the magnitude of the immigration, and possibly to imply that the group as a whole possesses adverse qualities. Often quantification involves fallacies of division and composition, the confusion of distributed and undistributed characteristics, the use of vagueness and indeterminacy (e.g. 'many', 'a large proportion'), the misuse of mean, mode, and median, faulty correlation and its confusion

with causation, and analogical transformation (see below). As a common species of the quantification technique we must also mention argument by example. Some politicians depend heavily on anecdotal material, relying on their listeners to convert the individual case to a general law. The reverse strategy that the general law applies to each individual without exception is also a common presumption that has even come to be seen as part of the psychological definition of a prejudiced attitude.

(b) Analogical transformation. Analogy involves the comparison of a phenomenon existing in one sphere with that in another with the effect that a structure is recognised or suggested in the first phenomenon by the structure in the second. Two of the most popular analogies in the debate on immigration are the comparisons of migration with 'flooding' and 'invasion':

Black immigrants (A) are to Britain (B)
in the same way as
flood water (C) is to land (D)
(or invasion (C) is to a country (D))

The terms A and B, together, are generally known as 'the theme' while the terms C and D are known as 'the phoros'. The precise qualities of the phoros need not be spelt out. With the help of accompanying imagery, it is easy for audiences themselves to supply to the theme the known qualities of the phoros, e.g. that floods and invasions are dangerous and destructive. Metaphor can be seen as a condensed form of analogy combining an element of the theme with an element of the phoros, e.g. 'immigrants are flooding into Britain'.

The 'trope', or analogical transformation of a term or phrase possessing a direct referent to the real world into one possessing metaphorical connections, is widely used in political discourse. Its advantage is that while the phoros can be read harmlessly

('flood' need only have the implication of rapid movement), an additional effect can be achieved indirectly from its many other (unstated) properties (the destructiveness of floods). As the properties of the phoros are not normally spelt out in this way, analogical transformation may be used as an obscurantist, defensive strategy that shields the politician from an accusation of racism. And yet analogy, when used in argument and for didactic purposes (e.g. Aesop's fables) can have immense persuasive power.

(c) The mode of ambiguity is related to the techniques of quantification and analogical transformation. Put simply, this consists in creating difficulty in deciding on the full connotation of a word or phrase, as, for example, when talking about 'the problem' in a particular context without specifying the precise nature and cause of the problem, its circumstances, consequences, agents and their motivation (if any).

(d) Another commonly occurring defensive mode is that of attribution. Instead of making an assertion outright, a politician may quote the assertion of another with which he agrees. In this way, quotation marks can morally insulate him from the accusation that he himself is responsible for that assertion. At the same time the remarks retain their rhetorical effectiveness. In addition, if his evaluation or prescription can be attributed to another person or persons, it may be presented as a matter of fact. That it has been said is a fact, even though the truth of what has been said remains in dispute. Thus, to replace 'I say', 'I think', with 'you say', 'he says', 'they say', 'they think', acts as a useful mode of absolution from the accusation of racism.

(1) Personalised dispositional and agential arguments. The arguments that people are most disposed to regard as 'racist' are those that focus on the unfavourable characteristics of members of another race. When these characteristics are regarded as generally distributed, virtually unchangeable over long periods of time, and indicating an inferiority in the performance of the essential human functions - particularly in the sphere of the moral, then it is most likely to be claimed that the discourse is racist in a classical sense. In the past, nature, inheritance, or birth, rather than nature, culture, or upbringing, have been used to explain the discrepancy between one group's behaviour and another's, and, therefore, if skin colour is taken as the example to go by, nothing can be done in later life to change it. It should, of course, be born in mind that other hereditary characteristics may be subject to cultural modification, but to those who think along racist lines, culture may also be something determined, perpetual in its fundamentals, linked closely to biological characteristics, and in most respects immutable. As I have observed elsewhere, the genetic/cultural distinction is probably irrelevant to the vulgar racist.

In justifying various actions directed at members of another race, it is plainly not necessary to use a definitive form of racism in terms of belief in genetic inferiority. Other possibilities exist. There is, of course, no requirement to employ arguments that mention a racial group's characteristics at all, but even when they are mentioned, there are a number of ways of avoiding the accusation of racism.

First, for example, the claim that blacks are inferior to whites may be defended by reference to non-moral criteria: technological,

educational, medical, economic, hygienic, etc. It is not, of course, the blacks' fault that they are inferior in these respects, but then again, it remains a fact of life that must be taken into account in policy-making. Even when the difference is seen as cultural and 'adjustable', emphasis may be placed on cultural evolution with thousands of years being deemed necessary for adaptation to modern civilisation.

Second, it does not have to be stated that blacks are inferior to whites: a mere suggestion that they are different will suffice. The audience is usually in a position to judge for itself the merits of those differences, and rank racial groups accordingly. Poorer conditions among blacks have only to be mentioned for both the conditions and those bearing them to be seen as undesirable. The point here, however, is that the politician does not have to go as far as to overtly evaluate the differences. And even if differences are regarded as being between equals, they may still be seen as an obstacle to relations between the groups, indeed as a good reason why they should remain separate in their own 'zones of influence'.

Third, blacks may be seen neither as inferior, nor as personally different from whites, but as a group whose loyalties lie to itself, and whose interests if pursued would be harmful to, or irreconcilable with, those of the whites. Blacks are seen as a threat, then, not necessarily because they have different needs, but because they are competing with whites to satisfy similar needs. The view that black aims are politically malignant might easily be grafted on to this stem if the stance of economic competition is reinterpreted in terms of a black personal moral agency directed at overcoming entrenched

white interests. Sometimes this line of thought is extended further in the claim that in relation to whites, blacks have been given unfair advantages and are privileged citizens. How else, we might infer as the suppressed premise, can the inferior ever be in a position to threaten the superior?

A number of axes of emphasis can be identified in the arguments concentrating on the characteristics of a racial group. First, the group may be treated either as an abstract collectivity whose properties, of whatever kind, belong to the whole, or as numerous, separate, but identical individuals, each performing in like manner. Second, the group may be regarded much in the same way as a natural, but not necessarily physical, phenomenon, having no morality, rather like, for example, a plague of rats, or alternatively, it may be imbued with moral, probably evil, purpose. Third, it can be either passive or active, dispositional or agential,

As a rule, in any situation of race conflict the (black) minority group will be seen as the initiator, and moral blame will be attributed to it rather than to the (white) majority group. Thus, the responsibility for expressions of white animosity towards black people is likely to be placed on the shoulders of the black victim. It is the black immigrant who is seen as disturbing a perfectly satisfactory status quo. Change itself comes to be treated as undesirable and the black immigrant has only to be present in a situation in which before he was absent, to be held responsible for the reactions to any change.

For the reasons outlined in the preceding two paragraphs, it is frequently difficult to preserve the distinction between assertions of inferiority, difference, and threat. In addition, treatment of

the group as an abstract collectivity possessing the characteristics of a natural phenomenon, sometimes makes it hard to decide whether an argument should be classified as 'personalised dispositional and agential' or as 'abstracted social process'. This is particularly so where analogical transformation is extensive. The merit of any consequential indeterminacy lies in its extension of the possibilities for deracialised discourse.

With regard to other techniques of discursive deracialisation, the two model characteristics of faulty or ambiguous quantification and analogical transformation can obscure the actual dispositional and agential assertions being made about the category. Put simply, it is not always clear what proportion of the category possesses the characteristic in question, and whether the word used to refer to the category is metaphorical or factually descriptive. Analogical transformation must always raise the question of the respects in which the analogy holds good. The politician's defence against racism lies in denying that an assertion of difference or inferiority refers to all members of the group in question or that an analogy holds good in the respect considered by others to be racist. It also lies in drawing attention to characteristics that have some empirical basis even though (from my point of view) the empirical basis can scarcely serve to justify the immense significance with which the characteristics have become imbued.

In the speeches examined here there was considerable variation between individual politicians in the emphasis they placed on personalised dispositional and agential argument. Some Conservatives, like Cyril Osborne and Harold Gurden, used them extensively, whereas others, such as R A Butler and John Hare, rarely mentioned them. Neither were they the prerogative of the Conservatives: a good

sprinkling could be found in the speeches of Labour members, such as Charles Pannell and Roland Moyle. Of the 17 examples of dispositional and agential arguments in the three Bills, only 3 could be interpreted as implying the inferiority of black people, and then not without complication. As a whole, personalised dispositional and agential arguments accounted for approximately 13 per cent* of the total justification in favour of the three Immigration Bills as debated in second readings in the Commons.

Personalised dispositional and agential arguments as pure forms without numerous protective modal shields were not often to be found, and, in providing examples, it is probably more useful not to strip them of these deracialising defenses but to present them, shrimp-like, in all their complexity.

Black inferiority. Of immigrants, Osborne (C) said: "Either we have got to bring their standards nearer to our standards or we have got to let them drag our standards down to theirs, or we have got to have control of immigration" (16.11.1962, p.721). It is clear from this that immigrants were considered inferior because their standards were lower, but indeterminacy serves to obscure the nature of the standards in question. They could be moral or technical, or something else besides. The accusation of classical genetic

* These figures were arrived at by taking all speeches in favour of the Bills and examining each for the seven kinds of argument. A speech was credited with an argument form if that form were found one or more times within it. Theoretically, up to seven different argument forms might be found within any one speech, but in practice only two or three would occur. However many times a single argument form appeared in a speech it was only counted once. Each argument form is expressed as a percentage of the total occurrence of all seven argument forms found in the twenty-seven speeches made in favour of the three Bills at their second readings.

racism is at first made improbable by the suggestion that their standards might be raised, but then the strong agential reference to them dragging "our standards down" and seeming to want to, implies a deep-seated disposition on the part of the immigrant to favour low standards. Quantification is of the universal rather than the particular kind: all coloured immigrants have these standards. It is worth comparing the above example with the remark of the Labour MP, Charles Pannell: "It is usually when the immigrant impinges on working class standards that there is so much intolerance in the working class" (27.2.1968, p.1283). It is never made clear where, when, and in what way, the immigrant impinged on working class standards.

Black difference. Assertion of black difference cannot easily be distinguished from assertion of black inferiority. There was wide agreement that certain differences, e.g. poverty, overcrowding, ignorance, lack of skill, and slumdwelling were most undesirable: the audience did not need to be told this, and the degree to which the black person was seen to be an agent of his own dismal condition was hinted at, but rarely spelt out. Charles Pannell (L) said "... we must consider the ethnic groups which come within these islands and the fact that their whole way of life is entirely different from ours (27.2.1968, p.1281). Roland Moyle (L) claimed that immigrants "inhabit their houses more thickly than we do because that is the way of life to which they have become accustomed in warmer climates" (27.2.1968, p.1308). Is this just another way of asserting, with moral overtones, that blacks preferred overcrowded conditions and given the choice would select them, or is it a

genuine, if misinformed, attempt to provide sociological information? The interpreter has to decide. Reginald Maudling (C) argued that "The problem arises quite simply from the arrival in this country of many people of wholly alien cultures, habits and outlook ... who tend to concentrate in their own communities" (27.2.1968, p.1345). But we are not treated to details of alien ways and why a problem arose, and the question of the desirability of and responsibility for 'concentration' remains vague.

The theme of difference itself, repetitively emphasised, but still left at a conveniently ambiguous, abstracted level, is exemplified by John Hall's claim that "We cannot overwhelm ourselves with the large number of people who, however worthy, are alien, have alien cultures, different temperaments, totally different backgrounds and habits and different ways of life ..." (27.2.1968, p.1320). That they were innocent victims of fate and morally blameless seems to be the defensive function of "however worthy", but this cannot counterbalance the sheer fact of being alien, with all its unpleasant connotations of externality, of not belonging, of not possessing a functional place in the social order, and hence, inferentially, of being a 'foreign body' and a hazard to that scheme.

Cyril Osborne provided a number of fascinating arguments which centred on the characteristics, quite obviously undesirable, of immigrants. In one example he used attribution - a Sunday Times quote - to the effect that "a certified job is no guarantee that the immigrant will not worsen the slum problem" (16.11.1961, p.723). In the same speech, he made reference to immigrant poverty and numbers, accompanying it with the classical colour-is-not-my-criterion defense: "In my opinion, had they faces as white as snow, their great numbers and their great poverty would have made control of

their coming into this country inevitable" (16.11.1961, p.721).

Also of great interest, is the typically ambiguous quantification of "great numbers" and "great poverty",

Black threat. The more virulent strains of justification in terms of black difference merge imperceptibly with those of black threat. Harold Gurden (C), for example, concerned himself with the crimes of coloured immigrants. The police had to settle "little brawls which take place, not only among coloured immigrants but certainly among immigrants" (16.11.1961, p.738).

Crimes are not committed only by coloured immigrants, but those that are are out of all proportion to the number of immigrants and are of the worst kind - murder, rape, bloodshed, theft, dope peddling, sex crimes and so on (16.11.1961, p.739).

Gurden's faulty crime statistics might be sneered at in the House, but his use of qualification and quantification illustrate a common and effective rhetorical device.

Crime rates in two different populations are compared and it is freely admitted that crime in itself is not only a hallmark of immigrants, but that theirs is more frequent and of a worse kind. The assertion of greater frequency of criminal acts as a property of the class of immigrants is then distributed among members of the class, each individual being thought of as criminal. The argument from the general to the particular, and from the undistributed property of a crime rate to a distributed property of a criminal propensity in all blacks is fortified by the simultaneous use of the contrary technique of arguing from the particular to the general. This is achieved by the inclusion of anecdotal material - the individual who inflicted grievous bodily harm on a 53 year old woman, and the man inspired by witchcraft to wield a chopper. By a process of simple enumeration of crimes, the conclusion is reached that the

whole class is criminal, And, of course, if all immigrants are considered criminal, their presence, collectively or singly, is a threat to the indigenous population.

In a vicious piece of attribution, Gurden also used a letter purportedly written by a West Indian to the editor of the Trinidad Guardian. This mode obviously works well if a black person himself is credited with the expression of his own exploitative intent.

Of the numerous calumnies quoted, these serve as examples:

"... We extract millions of dollars from Britain and America and we don't even have to show appreciation ... We breed like flies and don't have to bother with marriage and responsibility for the kids ..."

(16.11.1961, p.740.)

The disparaging simile of "breeding like flies" (rather than like human beings), reveals how easily inferiority, difference, and threat can be combined. The letter as a whole also draws attention to the undeserving nature of black people -- to their profligacy. The suggestion seems to be that they should be seen and treated in the same way as the British undeserving poor of the last two centuries. If such a comparison is made by the audience, it provides a powerful traditional guide to attitude and action.

Gurden's speech is very near to what many informed people would consider to be racism, but its interest lies in the modalities of quantification, analogy, ambiguity, and attribution, which provide it with some degree of protection, although perhaps not as much as was expected in Parliament in 1961. It is worth pointing out that both Osborne's and Gurden's speeches were repeatedly interrupted in the Commons (as recorded, Osborne 39 times, Gurden 14 times), probably not only because they carried heavy responsibility for the Bill under discussion, but because what they were saying was so

thinly disguised and repulsive to other Members.

(2) Abstracted social process arguments. Not all social process arguments are abstracted, and sometimes it is difficult to distinguish them from personalised arguments. Gurden, for example, gave a description of slum development in which the characteristics and complicity of the immigrants appeared to play an important part, but personal blame was not clearly attributed:

Opponents of the Bill say that the housing problem was with us before the immigrants arrived but the Birmingham problem has been aggravated to an extent never before known. Slums now exist in hundreds or perhaps even thousands where previously they could be measured in dozens. Never was there such filth and obscenity. The humiliation and degradation of these people are dreadful.

(16.11.1961, p.742,)

The social process argument differs from personalised argument in that emphasis is placed on the specific process of interaction between two or more parties, rather than on the characters that they manifest when they exist separately. Nevertheless, although interaction involves at least two parties, the initiation of, or blame for, the outcome of the process can be ascribed. Where the process of immigration is concerned there are a number of possibilities: the agents might be seen as the black immigrants, or as the indigenous white population, or possibly, as the government of the day that permitted, or omitted to stop, the migration. But, just as in the case of strikes, where the immediate cause of disruption to production - the workers' withdrawal of their labour power - is held responsible for the situation, and where the role of government or management is played down, we might expect the black migrant to be seen as the main culprit in any outcome arising from migration.

However unjust the existing state of affairs, disruption to it

is generally defined as undesirable, and those who disrupt it are thought of as undesirables. What is noticeable in the arguments about the effects of migration is the widespread absolution from responsibility and blame of the white population and the techniques employed for achieving this. The chief ones mentioned here are those of depersonalisation, abstraction, and ambiguity in the ascription of causality, accompanied by analogical transformation on a massive scale. Mention of the 'dangers of racial tension' reveals little or nothing about the agent or his motives. Indeed, the social process arguments tend to convert the immigration issue into a scientist's laboratory report in which various chemicals come to be mixed by some mysterious third hand. The statistical analogies ('rate of growth figures') and natural disaster analogies ('flood', 'avalanche', and 'explosion') provide the backcloth for a reign of chaos without the need for moral agency. It is not the immigrant, but immigration, and not the white racist, but poor race relations, that cause the havoc. As Husband (1975) puts it "Why is black immigration a threat and a problem - because of white racism. No wonder the question was not asked". Here we see the displacement and dissolution of the moral issue through the deliberately clumsy mesh of abstracted social relations. The role of analogy and the construction of social models play an important part in both deracialising the justification and yet nevertheless justifying the discriminatory legislation.

In attempting to classify the social process arguments, I distinguish those whose primary focus is on black immigration, those whose focus is on the state of the indigenous white community, and those which appear to be unfocused. Arguments in favour of immigration control nearly all centre on black immigration. The

massive extent of the accompanying analogical transformation might also permit of a typology of analogies to be devised. Approximately 22 per cent of the argument forms used in the second readings of the three Bills and in support of them, fell under the heading 'social process' and there was almost no difference in frequency of use between Conservative and Labour members.

In the context of the Bills, the social processes that need to be described are first, immigration and, second, the resultant pattern of settlement and contact. Both issues require analysis in terms of cause and effect, but where immigration control is the main issue, the effect is of greater concern, for this is offered as reason for control.

It is difficult to find many examples of social process arguments that are not abstractly indeterminate or analogical in some sense or another. Obliginglly, Reginald Maudling (C) argued that control of immigration became necessary "because of the scale of immigration which took place, and because of the speed at which it took place, and because of the way in which it was concentrated in certain areas where whole districts changed their character very rapidly" (8.3.1971, p.43). With regard to settlement and contact, Roland Moyle (L) asserted that "where people of different cultures and races meet, there are bound to be tensions" (27.2.1968, p.1306), while Patricia Hornsby-Smith (C) talked of "the concentration of too many in too few areas" (8.3.1971, p.117). The use of words such as 'tensions' and 'urgent social problems' encourages an audience to believe measures should be taken to alleviate the 'problem', but avoids spelling out in detail and without ambiguity, its nature. As Nigel Fisher (C) so clearly recognised, the phrase "social strains and stresses", "in simple and rather cruder language ... really

means colour prejudice" (10.11,1961, p.780), an unpleasant accusation better left unstated by electorally-conscious politicians.

The use of numbers. Reference to an individual or group in terms of a number is often looked upon as the epitome of an abstracted and depersonalised relationship. It is no accident that those seeking to deracialise a situation should discover the 'problem of numbers', and make extensive use of analogies borrowed from the world of statistics. The sheer 'void' of the categories presented enables the listener to paint them in with his own mental image of swarms, hordes, and flows. R A Butler talked of "the sheer weight of numbers" and "unlimited numbers", Cyril Osborne of the "ugly facts of these figures" and the numbers "growing and growing", John Hare of the "rate of growth of the figures" and the "steeply rising curve", and Duncan Sandys of "astronomical figures". In all these cases, the indeterminacy of the quantification and the emphasis on size and immensity play a part in convincing the listener that action has to be taken. And, in addition, copious statistics and accompanying jargon decorate the discourse with the status of science.

Flux analogies. Perhaps the most popular treatment of black immigration is to compare it to the flow of water, which, in sufficiently large quantities, is likely to overwhelm and destroy life and property. The use of the analogy is probably encouraged by reference to "population flows" in demography, but its benefit also lies in its suggestibility of the need for orderly control of an impersonal force. The measure taken can then be projected as a worthy piece of civil engineering comparable to building a barrage or river embankment. In dealing analogically only with inanimate

matter, it raises no moral question about the effect of confinement on real immigrants. "Influx", "inflow", "great flood", "upsurge", "wave", "pouring in", "danger of being swamped and overwhelmed" encapsulate the very essence of the parliamentary language of immigration control. The popular solution lies in the social process of "absorption", a slow and limited business if we retain in mind the image of blotting paper. Only a few can be 'absorbed', and then but slowly and with care. Such is the nature of an analogically transformed social process.

Volcano analogies. Once immigration has taken place, the local storage tank of the ghetto comes to the fore. Roland Moyle (L) claimed that "the immigrant problem builds up into the ghettos in our cities" (27.2.1968, p.1309). Here the immigrant fluid exerts such pressure on housing and education that the services run the risk of "collapse". Patricia Hornsby-Smith (C) mentioned the "truly enormous problems stored up and waiting to be solved in about twelve of our great cities and conurbations" (8.3.1971, p.117).

"Pressure" on resources is easily metamorphosed - no doubt with the aid of the 1968 "conflagrations" in American cities - into volcanic and explosive form. Quintin Hogg (C) talked of immigration as "a difficult and explosive matter", Reginald Maudling of the serious consequences if the rate of immigration went ahead too rapidly: "There is bound to be a flashpoint somewhere and if the flash occurs everyone will be burned and probably seriously burned" (27.2.1968, p.1345). Sir Frederick Bennett warned that "we have an enormous responsibility to do our best to ensure that the safety valve is not invoked at too high a rate and does not build up undue pressure"

(27.2.1968, p.1339). With a change to a white focus, John Hall claimed that there was "bound to be an explosion among the indigenous population" (27.2.1968, p.1319).

Proliferation analogies. Although the Immigration Debate did not employ the immigrant birth rate and family size as a central theme, it should be noted that alleged rapid rates of immigrant reproduction - or to use a term with animalistic imputation employed in common parlance: "breeding" - provide ample opportunity for developing analogies with insects and animals e.g. locusts, flies, and rats, that have the reputation of speedily reproducing in large numbers.

Martial analogies. Another popular grouping of analogies are those that compare immigration to invasion, and treat the meeting of two peoples as a battle ground for space and other resources. Through this transformation, social process arguments begin to resemble economic arguments. But in that the soldiers of an invading army are human beings, frequently malevolent in intent and action, the analogy has a resemblance to the first category of personalised argument, and provides opportunity for the attribution of more virulent qualities to immigrants. As examples, James Callaghan (L), in reference to the Kenyan Asians, warned of "the prospect of an invasion" (27.2.1968, p.1247), and Charles Pannell (L) referred to "hordes of Asians coming into this country at an alarming rate" (27.2.1968, p.1280).

Other possibilities for pejorative metaphor and trope lie in comparisons with the spread of disease: plague, viruses, bacteria, infections of the body politic. The list of possibilities is extensive.

Apart from the commonly recurring analogies used to convince the population of the need for immigration control, some other slightly more original comparisons provide bases for cognitive ordering and explanation of a more complex kind of the processes of migration. In the passage of the Bills under consideration, Cyril Osborne's "honey pot" and Quintin Hogg's "run on the bank" spring readily to mind.

In attempting to answer the question of why immigrants come to Britain, Osborne pointed out that the standard of living here was much higher than in their own countries. "In Pakistan and India, they work harder for a week's wage which is less than they can get here on the dole for doing nothing", Britain was "the honey pot to which they will come, so long as there is any honey in the pot" (16.11.1961, pp.719-720). The analogy manages to draw together an explanation of migration in terms of attraction to the good life (pull factors), the presentation of an image of immigrant numbers (swarms of perhaps dangerous insects) and a view of the immigrant as a welfare scrounger whose excesses in consuming hard-earned social benefits would exhaust the supply for the indigenous population. More imaginative unpacking of the metaphor might provide images of indolent wasps stealing the winter stores of deserving worker bees, together with the moral that is usually drawn from such fables.

In examining the relationships of Britain to the Commonwealth countries, Lucas Tooth (C) likened them to those of parent and child, "The obligations of the parents to their child are quite different from the obligation of the child to the parents" and, therefore, Britain had to have a higher standard of behaviour with regard to immigration than the countries of the Commonwealth, "The child should be free to go to its parents' house .. to share the food,

though possibly making a contribution .. But the child is not entitled to come in and turn the parents out of the house ..." (16.11.1961, p.768). Limitation of the child's behaviour in the interests of the family as a whole was considered necessary because of the child's unreasonable demands. For this reason the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill had to be placed on the statute book.

Quintin Hogg (C), quoting from an official report, used the analogy of the bank to justify the limitation of Kenyan Asian entry to Britain.

"They have an absolute right of entry because they have, for historical reasons of one sort or another, a British passport. Quite obviously, like the customers of a bank, if they all entered and asked the bank for payment of their outstanding balance at the same time, they would cause a run on the bank." (27.2.1968, p.1260.)

Just as an honest man would take control in an emergency and relax control when things improved, the Government had to introduce controls to limit migration from East Africa.

Where analogy is concerned, it is always important to question whether the phoros has any bearing on the theme: did the migration resemble a flight to a honey pot, a child's mistreatment of his parents, or the sudden withdrawal of large quantities of money from a bank? The first describes the entomic world where morals do not obtain, the second a domestic tiff where, if the fifth commandment is to be observed, the child is clearly in the wrong, while the third refers to a dilemma of the commercial world in which the very existence of business morality - as opposed to legality - can be questioned.

Although the Race Relations Bills provide better examples of the intellectual strategies devised for absolving whites from the blame for racial prejudice and discrimination, the Immigration Bills also

contain their share. Basically, they follow, in rudimentary form, the technique Sharf (1964, p.170) noticed in relation to the treatment by the British press of Jewish refugees:

If more Jewish refugees meant or might eventually mean, more anti-Semitism in host countries, then the cause of anti-Semitism was the Jew. And since anti-Semitism, at least in its more virulent form was clearly wrong and barbarous, the only course was to prevent any notable increase in one's own Jewish population.

Hartmann and Husband (1975) recognise the same syndrome when they outline the common argument that:

... since as a tolerant nation we cannot condone any increase in racial prejudice, and since an increase in the black population would surely result in more prejudice, then we must resist any pressure to admit more blacks.

An example of precisely this thinking is provided by Quintin Hogg at the second reading of the 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Bill, when he argued along the lines that black immigration led to insecurity among the whites which created prejudice, which in turn resulted in the need to 'control' black immigration.

... the honourable Gentleman must never forget that at its worst - and it can be very vile indeed - racial prejudice is often based on insecurity and insecurity is largely the result of want of control, and want of control is precisely the thing which the Government are trying to get rid of by what admittedly is a measure which none of us like.

(27.2.1968, p.1267.)

(3) Populist arguments. To argue that because a measure is universally subscribed to, or is popular with the electorate and, therefore, that it is correct and proper to implement it, has been recognised as an informal fallacy from the time of the Greek philosophers. Yet although the argumentum ad populum ('band-wagon' version) is always susceptible to the criticism that what is popular is not necessarily right, its occurrence in a representative democracy, in the context of political debate has special significance.

The axiomatic belief that democracy is based upon the will of the people and that the people's representatives should serve their electorate, seems to give extra force to those who claim that, in the framing of legislation, consideration should be given to the popular voice. If democracy is based upon belief in the popular will, those who oppose the popular will are surely undemocratic. However, an elaborate 'rule' as opposed to 'act' utilitarian justification for democratic decision-making has been developed to protect the vulnerable parliamentarian from the volatile Jacobin mob. What is democratic is what follows democratic procedure. The politician is only directly accountable at intervals to the electorate and recognition is given to the fact that, unlike a delegate, he is entitled to represent his constituents according to the dictates of his conscience. And yet the ambiguity remains. Institutionally, through the electoral system, and ideologically, through his commitment to democracy, he is susceptible to public pressure.

Not surprisingly, then, the politician is likely to turn to expressions of the popular will for justification of his stance on particular legislation. But not only will he do this when he is seeking to advocate a measure in which he believes strongly, but also when he is doubtful about its acceptability to others and his role in its implementation. If legislation can be construed as racist, the ad populum allows him, like Pontius Pilate, to wash his hands of responsibility for the injustice about to be perpetrated. The will of the people takes precedence over his qualms of conscience: it is they, not he, who wished it. In the face of black immigration, whether white 'feeling' is right or wrong is seen to matter very little - of importance is the fact that it exists as a potent force

that politically must be taken into account, Immigration control is regarded as a simple, understandable method of satisfying the people. It may be personally repugnant to the politician (and it is surprising how many supporters of control claim to be disturbed by it) but the people and circumstances so require it. If absolution is achieved, it occurs in as much as the blood of the immigrant is felt to rest on the populace and not on its representatives. In that the measures are undoubtedly inspired to a great extent by popular feeling among sections of the population, the *ad populum* can also be regarded as a truthful admission of the actual social pressures at work on the politicians.

Just under 10 per cent of the arguments used in the three Bills' second readings may be classed as populist. Because populist arguments are somewhat predictable I offer only the following examples:

I have received thousands of letters from people who live in these areas and are affected by this problem ... The right hon. Member for Smethwick gave not nearly enough attention to the English people in the great cities who are affected by this problem.

(Osborne, 16.11.1961, p.717.)

... the public obviously wants a Bill of this type. From the Gallup poll of last week, there is no doubt about where the public stands on this issue. I believe that the public is wrong, but I do not think that hon. Members should utterly disregard a strong expression of opinion by 90.3 per cent of our own electors.

(Fisher, 16.11.1961, p.782.)

We sometimes debate matters as if we lived in a hot house isolated from the rest of the country. We must take into consideration every time that we debate a measure of this vital importance the feelings of the people whom we represent throughout Britain ... The (local inhabitants) will be overwhelmed by (immigrants). Wrongly or rightly, these views are held and we must be aware of them.

(Hall, 27.2.1968, pp.1316-18.)

The basis of control for foreign and Commonwealth citizens and aliens is what was stated at the election and what the people voted for.

(Maudling, 8.3.1971, p.43.)

The moralist counter-claim that it is what is right and not what is popular that should be pursued, is represented by Denis Howell:

In a Christian country ... it is not the job of political leadership to decide its first priority on the basis of electoral advantage. The only decent basis for decisions by the Government is that of ethics and morality.

(16.11.1961, p.765.)

In turn, a populist reply can be juxtaposed that recognises the moralist position:

First, while we should obviously have concern for moral obligation for Commonwealth ideals, for non-racialism and the rest, as MPs in a genuine democracy we have a duty as elected representatives not deliberately, because of our own particular feelings, to create a society contrary to the wishes of the majority of the people who live in this country. It is not our job to over-rule people simply because we may wish to pursue ideals of our own, paying no regard to the sort of society in which the majority of our people wish to live.

(Bennett, 27.2.1968, p.1338.)

(4) Economic arguments. Modern politics might be regarded as a debate about how goods are to be produced and distributed, about the best way to organise the factors of production and to share the products. Some might argue, for example, that at a personal level, goods ought to be distributed according to need, others that risk to capital or wealth should be rewarded, and others that ability, skill, or hard work should be taken into account. The weight of emphasis given to these and other values will vary, but within any political system a practice will develop that reflects the power relations between particular interest groups. If the practice remains comparatively stable over long periods of time, persons who seek to defend existing production and distribution relations will present many aspects of economic choice as if they were unchanging natural phenomena.

Descriptive economics will provide a web of propositions not only about very general economic phenomena, to be found in almost

every social context, but about the particular society or societies for which it seeks to account. Its predictive success will depend on the adequacy of its theoretical concepts, the accuracy of its methods of measurement, and upon the stability of the economy with which it is dealing.

As a general rule, where power relations between countries and classes remain stable, governments will seek to maintain the existing patterns of production and distribution. In order to achieve this, they will apply policies based upon the descriptive and explanatory theories of economics. Subsequently, the 'laws' of economics will be used to justify their policies.

In order to achieve particular economic goals certain technical means must be applied. The 'must', of course, is dependent upon the goals desired and the economic theory which purports to show how the means and the achievement of the goals are related. But, in time, 'must' acquires a politically and morally prescriptive significance. The political values of the mode of production and distribution are first taken for granted, and then the means of achieving them by economic engineering become codified in fairly elaborate economic prescriptions, e.g. "In order to bring down inflation we ought to reduce public expenditure, impose a wage freeze" A subsidiary economic value system emerges which has only tenuous relationships with more fundamental questions of social justice, equality, and welfare. The need for reduction of inflation, industrial efficiency, higher levels of investment, higher wage incentives for managers, more exports, less strikes, a safeguarding of the expenditure of public moneys, become the values of the moment, replacing other primary values.

The economic arguments about immigration may be seen as a debate about 'optimum population' first brought to the fore as a theoretical issue by Thomas Malthus. Economically, the optimum population is defined as the amount of labour which combined with the other factors of production yields the maximum output. If there are job vacancies, immigrant labour might be thought necessary to maintain or increase output. Alternatively, migrants might be seen as part of the "constant tendency in all animated life to increase beyond the nourishment for it", or, in other words, as a burden on resources. The division between production and consumption within the moneyed economy creates the possibility of two kinds of argument.

In 1961, the contribution of migrant labour to the economy provided a powerful Labour argument against immigration control. By 1968, immigration was seen as a recipe for achieving scarcity - a reason for control. Available resources, already thinly distributed, would be unable to adequately satisfy the needs of an increased population, and would lead to a decline in provision for the existing population. Chief areas of shortage were in the essential services of housing, health, and education. Possibly, belief in a popular version of the economic theory of marginal utility supplemented anxiety about scarce resources. The immigrants were thought to be relatively unsatiated consumers whose voracious appetites for commodities would be unlikely to be met for a long while.

Economic arguments usually take it for granted that nationals have first claim to any resources at a country's disposal. Governments are invariably expected to pursue a national economic interest perceived in this context as that of ensuring the maintenance and

improvement of existing supplies of goods and services, rather than of preserving good Commonwealth relations. But what is omitted from the economic argument in favour of restriction are questions of emigration, and of whether the proposed controls limit white immigration from the Commonwealth and Common Market in the same manner.

Economic arguments, then, justify the limitation of migration in terms of the shortage of scarce resources. Some simply express popular concern about perceived or experienced shortage of houses, school places, hospital beds, and jobs. Others are couched in the jargon of the discipline of economics and accompanied by the assumption of subsidiary economic values such as the importance of productive labour, labour efficiency, the maintenance of wage rates, which tend to disguise more fundamental moral questions. The arguments make use of the distinction between production and consumption to deemphasise the contribution of immigrant labour to the production of goods and services. They are generally used to stress the dangers of population increase due to immigration and the immigrants' part in creating shortage. In other words, the cause of shortage is the assumed growth of population in particular areas, the answer to which lies not in the provision of more goods and services, but in the curtailment of demand by a halt to population growth.

Yet the relationship between immigration and scarcity must still be established. There is a tradition of counter arguments which asserts that black immigrants are being scapegoated for government and industrial failure to supply goods, that prejudice results from misplaced blame for scarcity, that immigrants are productive, that the worst housing shortage, unemployment, and strained social services

are to be found in Scotland and Northern Ireland where there are very few black people. The arguments succeed to the extent that they break the hypothesised causal link between the presence of blacks and increased scarcity for whites.

In arguing for the 1961 Bill, Butler stressed the thickly populated nature of the country and mentioned the possibility of a future recession. Osborne (C) argued "we have neither the room nor the resources indefinitely to take all who would like to come" (16.11.1961, p.722). Fisher (C) claimed that one good reason for the Bill was the housing shortage: "and as houses take time to build this, in itself, constitutes a good reason for, at any rate, a temporary check on immigration" (16.11.1961, p.782). But still the Labour Party stress on the contribution of migrants to production, exemplified in the Gordon-Walker speech pervaded the 1961 debate. The subsidiary economic values of the expanding economy and the dangers of labour scarcity were unassailable.

The fact, to which the right hon. Gentleman (R A Butler) and many others who support this Bill shut their eyes, is that an expanding economy creates new jobs. In the Birmingham area, between 1955 and 1960, 60,000 new jobs were created. The services in an expanding economy are continually short ... We could not run the economy without some immigrant labour from somewhere ...

... therefore, an expanding economy, even one expanding at the rate laid down by this Government, produces labour scarcity. We have to accept this as a fact of life. There is a direct relation between labour demand and immigration. Ninety-five per cent of immigrants get jobs quickly. They do not just move about casually. They are able to take a share in the working of our economy.

(Gordon-Walker (L), 16.11.1961, pp.709-710.)

By 1968, in addition to housing shortage, the unavailability of school places and hospital beds came increasingly to the fore as issues. Pannell (L) allowed the immigrants to take the blame for economic deprivation by his use of the mode of attribution: "The working-class people of this country see the immigrants, however ignorantly, as an increased pressure on housing, schools, and the

Health service, and additions to the unemployment figure of 600,000" (Pannell, 27.2.1968, p.1283).

John Hall stressed the fact that immigrant mothers had priority for maternity beds "because the conditions in which they live make it necessary for them to be taken into hospital for their confinement" (27.2.1968, p.1318). In other words, not only did immigrants create scarcity, but they took more than their share.

Patricia Hornsby-Smith (C) explicitly admitted (with the aid of the attribution mode) that whites should have first claim on the country's resources.

Today the figure is 750,000 (unemployed) the majority of whom are what are now called white patrial citizens. Are these people to be called racists because they think that there should be permit job control and they should have the first claim on jobs in Britain?

(8.3.1971, pp.117-118.)

The conflict of the principle of need versus that of priority for a country's nationals is also illustrated by her subsequent remarks:

Let us also spare a thought for the hard-pressed local authorities whose social services have been far outstripped by the influx of immigrants. In some areas, if the housing committees allocated their property exclusively on the basis of social need, no white family would get anywhere near an allocation for the next 10 or fifteen years.

(8.3.1971, p.118.)

Economic arguments accounted for 15 per cent of the total of argument forms, and although there was similarity between the rates of use for both parties, Labour MPs were on the whole more prone to adopting economic justification and of relating it to their other ideological predilections. It could, for example, be easily reconciled with a concept of economic planning as Andrew Faulds (L) indicated:

I entirely accept and with a constituency interest I should make it clear the need for some sort of quota system based on the perfectly reasonable argument that we should absorb no more than our resources, economic and social, can take in. That is an aspect of planning which I accept in an ordered

society.

(27.2.1968, p.1295.)

If the problems that immigrants are felt to create are reducible to those of economic scarcity, then the socialist might see the answer in terms of redistribution of goods to those in need. This is partly the essence of the Labour amendment of 1961 which criticised the 1961 Bill and, by implication the Conservative government, for failing to deal with "deplorable social and housing conditions". In 1968, Renee Short (L) saw the immigrant issue in very much the same light and stressed the hardships caused by the economic effects of immigration in order (successfully) to gain financial concessions for her town of Wolverhampton: "Unless Wolverhampton receives some relief in respect of the constant numbers that are coming into the town, it may well lose hope" (27.2.1968, p.1333). It is important to recognise that the naive economic equation of immigrants = shortage has the advantage that it can apparently be solved with a simple reallocation of resources, a point that was not lost in 1968 on the clamorous MPs, local politicians, and council officials of Wolverhampton.

Unfortunately, much as the man who pays maintenance for a child is thought to acknowledge paternity, a government which contributes money to solving the 'immigrant problem' is seen to agree with the propositions that it is culpably responsible for the presence of immigrants and that they constitute a financial liability. Later, when the problems are not solved by payment, the economic argument can be usefully salvaged by claiming that not enough was given, that it was given too late, or that it was wrongly allocated. As a means of deracialisation, reducing the complexities of race relations to

the business of resource allocation, the economic argument has served respective governments well. Responses to racial inequality have invariably taken the form of Urban Aid and Inner City programmes directed at geographical areas and serving the population as a whole - both black and white. It would seem that the somewhat feeble attempts to reallocate resources from richer to poorer areas was felt to be politically acceptable, while reallocation from white to black was not.

(5) Pro bono publico arguments. This category covers a wide range of argument based on the plea that people will benefit from the measure, that the greatest good for the greatest number will be served. The people concerned might be the indigenous white population, the black immigrants, or all people, both white and black, treated collectively. The advantages to be gained from immigration control may remain unspecified with heavy reliance being placed on the mode of ambiguity, or detailed benefits may be listed. In this latter respect there may be overlapping with economic and social process arguments, as for example, when it is felt that the public good is served by the reduction in prejudice brought about by excluding the cause of prejudice - the immigrant himself.

In the parliamentary debates, the consciousness of race was reflected in the constant occurrence of the claim that blacks would also gain from immigration control. Blacks outside of Britain would benefit from being prevented from coming into appalling urban conditions, while those already here would benefit from diminished pressure on resources, and the advantageous effects of immigration control on white attitudes. The idea that the control would help both whites and blacks was used to counteract the charge that the Bills were racist in effect. In this respect, the pro bono

publico arguments have a resemblance to the reciprocity arguments described below.

The virtue of the pro bono publico argument is that it accepts that certain actions in themselves may be undesirable but that, in summation, the greatest good is done, or that there is a balance of good over evil, or that, of two undesirable actions, the less undesirable is chosen. Even if it were acknowledged that black people would suffer from the legislation, the legislators would still be justified in their action because the overall effects were the best that could be achieved. Pro bono publico arguments accounted for 20 per cent of the total of argument forms in the debates, but this might have been due to the fact that many arguments were of such a vague and summary nature that they could only be placed in this bracket. Because of their repetitive nature, I shall only offer a limited number of pro bono publico arguments put forward by leading proponents of the three Bills:

The Government regret having to produce these proposals but they believe that this Measure is rendered necessary by the course of events. It would have been perfectly easy just to go on watching the situation, but the Government have preferred, admittedly after hesitation, to take a course which is as distasteful to them as it is to many of their critics. We consider this course to be right. I believe this course is right and will be to the advantage of Commonwealth relations ... I hope that we can make the Bill a good and humane instrument for doing a very necessary job.

(R A Butler, 16.11.1961, p.705.)

Merely to wait for difficulties to accumulate, to wait until the need for action had become apparent to all, would certainly have made the job of the Government easier. But it would have done no good to our own people, no good to relations with the Commonwealth. It would have been an abdication of responsibility.

(Hare, 16.11.1961, p.811.)

The Government, Parliament, all parties in the country, are fully committed to the development of a multi-racial society in Britain - a society which will be diverse in culture and will be equal before the law; a society in which all communities will have respect for each other; a society in which there will be unity in purpose and common allegiance. These are the aims, as I see it, as well as Parliament, on this issue.

(Callaghan, 27.2.1968, p.1241.)

I hope they will acknowledge ... that it is possible that the origin of this Bill lies neither in panic nor in prejudice but in a considered judgement of the best way to achieve the idea of a multi-racial society.

(Callaghan, 27.2.1968, p.1242.)

I suspect it has been the objective of every hon. Member on either side of the House, to assist in building at home a homogenous society of which all of us can be proud and which will command the allegiance of everyone dwelling within it. We desire no second-class citizens, we desire no race discrimination, we desire no dilapidated areas, housing different communities from the majority.

(Hogg, 27.2.1968, p.1259.)

I want to stress that the main purpose of immigration policy in the situation which this country faces is as a contribution to the great problem of ensuring that the varied communities which we have here can settle down progressively over the years to live together in peace and harmony.

(Maudling, 8.3.1971, p.43.)

By 1968, the reluctance of 1961 to cut off sources of labour, appeared to have been jettisoned in favour of an eagerness to benefit the community by immigration control. The system of justification developed into a 'full-blown', deracialised form when it was insisted that blacks would benefit also, or more so, from the measures.

We have to take account of the needs of Commonwealth countries as well as our own requirements. I think the House will agree that it would be quite wrong to try to lure away people with skills of which those countries are in urgent need.

(Hare, 16.11.1961, p.806.)

I do not think it would be right for us to sit back and allow Commonwealth citizens to come into this country in vastly increased numbers unless we are satisfied that reasonable living conditions are available to them.

(Hare, 16.11.1961, p.807.)

I am also concerned to avoid that these people who are coming to our country and whom we are wishing to integrate shall be treated not as second-class citizens.
(Lomas, 27.2.1968, p.1324.)

I cannot think it profits anyone to bring families into such conditions.
(Short, 27.2.1968, p.1332.)

If immigrants already here, although they will not say so too publicly, are actually pleading for their difficulties not to be made greater by stepping up the rate of absorption to a point at which they know friction will be caused, the lesson to be drawn is that we must pay serious heed to their view if we claim to have in mind the interests of the present immigrant population.
(Bennett, 27.2.1968, p.1338.)

(This combines the pro bono publico argument with the populist argument.)

... serious consequences will follow for everyone including the Asians themselves (if immigration is not limited).
(Maudling, 27.2.1968, p.1345.)

The simple fact is that some control has become necessary in the interests of society in this country, including, I must again emphasise, those immigrants already here.
(Maudling, C, 8.3.1971, p.43.)

Providing the Bill is administered with sympathy and humanity it can make a contribution to better race relations by allaying the fears of white people and thereby improving the climate in which so many black people have to live and work.
(Hunt, 8.3.1971, p.95.)

In my view the then Government were absolutely right. They pursued these policies not simply in the interests of this country, but in the interests of the community relations and the immigrants themselves.
(Deedes, 8.3.1971, p.101.)

I welcome the new arrangements and controls not only in the interests of people born in this country but in the interests of a very large number of immigrants who have already been allowed to enter.
(Hornsby-Smith, 8.3.1971, p.116.)

(6) Reciprocity arguments Reciprocity arguments seem to be based on an idea of elementary justice for which it is assumed that human beings with similar characteristics, or in similar circumstances, should be treated in the same way. The argument involves picking

out the relations of either symmetry, in such a manner that a measure is seen to be justified, or asymmetry, in which case it is judged unacceptable. Reciprocity arguments and the precepts they reflect can be discovered in many systems of ethics. The Judaeo-Christian ethic of 'do as you would be done by' ("Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them") and Kant's categorical imperative ("Act only on the maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law") deny that any individual is entitled to a morally privileged position.

As racism has often to do with the acceptance of a moral prescription to the effect that members of other races are not entitled to equal treatment, we might expect that arguments about the enshrinement in the framework of law of unequal treatment of different groups hitherto entitled to the same provisions, would involve considerations of reciprocity. In what way are the individuals involved similar or different? By arguing that another race are 'sub-human' the classical racist does not have a case to answer: sub-humans do not have to be treated equally. But what of those who formally concede that the races are equal?

Part of the strength of the principle of reciprocity derives from the quasi-logical symmetry of the argument form: it is as if actions or their effects must be balanced in a mathematical equation, or more appropriately, on the scales of justice. Thus actions are not judged wrong in themselves but only in relation to other actions. Guilt can then be assuaged in a number of ways.

Against the accusation that whites are racist, the counter-accusation is made that blacks behave badly, too. If others have

legislation that discriminates against certain groups, then why, it is reasoned, should we not have similar legislation? The requirement that groups should receive equal treatment irrespective of the colour of their skin is met if it can be shown that whites are affected in the same way as blacks. Those who argue in favour of immigration control must argue either that they are behaving in the same way as others have behaved in like circumstance (e.g. blacks also do it to whites), or that their proposals affect both black and white, or that there are sufficient non-racial differences (asymmetry) between the groups involved to justify their differential treatment. Another possibility is to admit to unfairness in one sphere, but to promise to compensate for it in another. In this way, debit and credit cancel one another out.

A number of important arguments in the race field are centred on the idea of reciprocity. They constituted 10 per cent of the total of argument forms exemplified in the debates on the Bills.

First, there were a whole collection of arguments designed to show that the Bills affected, or were intended to affect, whites as well as blacks. Of these, perhaps the most notorious was that dealing with the unsuccessful attempt to include citizens of the Irish Republic under the provision of the 1961 Bill. As R A Butler pointed out:

.... the Bill was drafted to cover the citizens of the Irish Republic and this is the effect of Clause 1 (4). The Government have always realised the very great difficulty there would be in operating the control against the Republic for practical reasons that I shall explain ... I fully realise, of course, that our decision can be and may well be misunderstood ... The Bill is drafted so that there is no racial discrimination.

(16.11.1961, p.700.)

But the Labour opposition regarded as highly significant the reason

for including the Irish under the Clause, but of admitting that controls could not be enforced. Gordon-Walker accused the Home Secretary of putting the Clause in:

... as a sort of fig leaf to preserve his reputation for liberalism. Now he stands revealed before us in his nakedness. He is an advocate now of a Bill which contains bare-faced open race discrimination.

(16.11.1961, p.706.)

In 1968, the Bill aimed at curtailing Kenyan Asian immigration to Britain, was similarly excused by arguing that were there whites with the same characteristics as the Asians and, were it practical to do so, the measure would also apply to them.

... if we were threatened suddenly with a potential influx of 1 million Scandinavians, Italians, or French, even if we thought that the majority would not come, we should not be called racialsists if we sought to control the situation.

(Hogg, 27.2.1968, p.1264.)

And again, a little later:

It must be added that a number of people of unblemished white descent will be covered by its provisions.

(Hogg, 27.2.1968, p.1265.)

Of course, the reciprocity argument may be used in reverse: if Commonwealth immigrants originally had privileges over, for example, aliens and there is no difference in kind between Commonwealth citizens and aliens, then control restores parity.

Next, there are those arguments which justify British control of certain kinds of migrant on the basis that others do the same, or have a responsibility to do the same, which they are not fulfilling. In 1961, it was the White Commonwealth with its empty spaces that was at fault in not coming to Britain's aid. And if the White Commonwealth excluded 'Commonwealth' immigrants, would not Britain be wise to follow a similar policy? By 1968, the comparison was being made with the Kenyan policy of Kenyanisation. As this was thought to be an undoubtedly racist measure that had led to the Kenyan Asian migration, then Britain in responding to this policy with legislation,

was simply protecting her interests and could not be held responsible for initiating the chain reaction. Both policies might be undesirable, but the question of 'who began the business' becomes significant. The exchange between Hogg and Henig serves to illustrate this kind of thinking:

Hogg: I heard Mr Tom Mboya on the wireless recently claiming that it was lawful to discriminate between residents of a country if they were of a different nationality from one's own. I ask myself when does discrimination become respectable? The answer appears to be when it is called Nationalism and is done by someone else against a third party's race. I ask myself what we have done wrong and why the right hon. Gentleman should be accused of being a racist, when all that he is trying to do is to cope with the situation he did not create.

Henig: There is one point in the right hon. and learned Gentleman's argument which I have not followed. He mentioned the fact that Mr Mboya is passing legislation to discriminate against certain people and it appears from his argument that he is saying that, because they are being discriminated against in Kenya, we should keep them out. But where are these people to go? What is to become of them?

Hogg: ... I was not making that point. I said that we are trying honestly to deal with a situation which was not of our making and that if accusations of racialism or discrimination could be made against anyone, it was not against us

(27.2.1968, p.1264.)

Finally, the idea of legislative compensation of a group for the way it has been maltreated on an earlier occasion is, I submit, illustrated by Callaghan's remark that:

This Bill ... must be considered at the same time and in accordance with, the proposal of the Government to introduce a Race Relations Bill which will establish in this country equality of treatment in the very sensitive areas of housing and jobs, which is to be introduced by the Government during the next six weeks - certainly before Easter. Both these Bills are, in my view and my judgment, essentially parts of a fair and balanced policy on this matter of race relations.

(27.2.1968, p.1242.)

As early as 1965 the dual approach of combining tight immigration controls with policies for "integrating into the community the immigrants" already in Britain was seen as the Labour Party's 'balanced' solution (Crossman, 1975-1977, Vol.1, p.149).

(7) Means-orientated arguments. The previous arguments were used to justify immigration control by giving reasons for the acceptance of the prescription that people of a certain kind ought to be restricted in entering Britain. But there is another type of quasi-argument providing a pseudo-justification for control. The argument is not concerned with ends or values thought to be furthered by the Bills. Rather, the Bills are taken as given, and attention is directed towards the means by which the ends are to be achieved.

Four types of means-orientated argument may be distinguished: the descriptive, the procedural, the effective, and the consistency.

Descriptive 'arguments' consist in outlining in detail the various clauses of a bill, and are especially to be found in the speeches of those who move second readings and who reply to debates. Such arguments do not justify the Bills in the sense of providing reasons for the acceptance of their prescriptions, but they have a strong persuasive effect in that they project, as taken-for-granted, the Bills' values, to such an extent that the casual listener may not even consider the possibility of other lines of action. By the time a bill receives its second reading, it usually exists in such a polished legalistic form that it is a skilled task to penetrate, let alone undermine, its structure. At its second reading, a bill is almost a *fait accompli* and as such is capable of providing a limiting mental set for those who read it complacently.

Another pseudo-justification for a bill lies in claiming that proper procedures were followed in coming to the decision: for

example, that Commonwealth prime ministers, or the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants, or various concerned pressure groups, were consulted in the correct manner. Naturally, if these parties had not been consulted, this would be regarded as a weakness. Again, correct procedures are not directly related to the values and prescriptions propounded by a bill and, in practice, conveniently displace their consideration.

To describe in detail the likely effects of a bill without evaluating them, and in order to illustrate that a bill's instruments fulfil their purpose, may serve as a further strategy for detracting from more fundamental questions about any implicit racist values.

Finally, considerations of the internal consistency of the clauses of a bill, while undoubtedly important in the implementation of any legal measure, are no substitute for a debate on whether the clauses ought to be present in the first place.

Means-orientated arguments accounted for 20 per cent of the total or argument forms.

Table 16 Percentage distribution of argument forms in the parliamentary debates on immigration			
ARGUMENT FORMS	CONSERVATIVE	LABOUR	TOTAL
Personalised	12	13.5	12
Social process	21	24.5	22
Populist	6	8	6
Economic	10	13.5	11
Pro bono publico	24	8	20
Reciprocity	7	13.5	9
Means orientated	20	19	20
TOTAL ARGUMENTS	100 (100)	100 (37)	100 (137)

(Second readings of the 1962 and 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Bills and the 1971 Immigration Bill.)

There are numerous ways in which legislation with racialist effect (as recognised by both the sociologist and a large proportion of the politicians responsible) can be justified without recourse to classical racism. The deracialised discourse is wide-ranging, but in all cases is defensible against the accusation that it is racist. In this way, the politician is absolved from guilt and allowed to maintain a functional ambivalence in the face of the conflicting pressures placed upon him.

In general, the deracialised discourse succeeds in its purpose here by providing other non-racist criteria for discriminating against a group, e.g. shortage of resources in Britain, and by obscuring the fact that the largest numbers of people to be affected by the legislation under debate are distinguishable by their colour. In the main, exclusion of blacks will be the unstated intention of politicians who, faced with a knowledge of their constituents' strongly expressed views about black people's presence in Britain, support Bills aimed at controlling and reducing black immigration.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE PRACTICE OF RACIALISM VERSUS THE RHETORIC OF RACIAL TOLERANCE

(AN ANALYSIS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES ON THE RACE RELATIONS BILLS)

It is clear that reasons given for excluding black people from Britain are rarely couched in terms of their racial inferiority: nearly always other explanations that could apply equally well to white people are made use of. It is widely believed that Britain is a land of freedom and that the British people are, as a rule, tolerant and fair in their social transactions. Most of them are reluctant to acknowledge that racial considerations in any way influence their dealings with other peoples. General agreement on the paramount values of universal brotherhood, equality of opportunity, equality before the law, social justice, and democracy makes public expression of belief in racial inferiority and policies of unequal treatment unacceptable. And yet social scientists are able to establish that these values are frequently violated in practice, and that there is widespread discrimination in Britain against black people.

From an ideological angle, one of the most interesting examples of government attempts to face up to empirical evidence of racist practice in Britain is the race relations legislation of 1965, 1968, and 1976.

On 9.3.1965, Harold Wilson stated that while it was accepted in the House of Commons that when immigrants arrived in Britain they should be treated for all purposes as citizens of the United Kingdom without discrimination, the Labour Government were "not satisfied with progress in integrating Commonwealth immigrants into the community". Accordingly, the aims of the Race Relations Bill published on 7 April 1965 were to prohibit discrimination on racial

grounds in places of public resort, and to create a new offence of incitement to racial hatred in a public meeting or public place.

In 1968, the Labour Government introduced a further bill which extended the scope of the 1965 Act by forbidding racial discrimination in housing, employment, and services, such as insurance and credit facilities. And in 1976, the legislation of 1965 and 1968 was incorporated in a new bill, receiving royal assent on 22.11.1976, which extended the definition of racial discrimination to cover discrimination resulting from the exercise of requirements having a discriminatory effect and discrimination on the grounds of nationality. In the case of the offence of incitement to racial hatred, intent no longer had to be proved. Discrimination in any private club with twenty-five or more members became unlawful, as also did discrimination against contract workers, and by trade unions and employers' associations; in the granting of licences and other qualifications needed for carrying on a particular trade or occupation, by employment agencies; and by certain training bodies. Both the Race Relations Board set up in 1965 and the Community Relations Commission of 1968, were replaced by the Commission for Racial Equality.

The enactment of such increasingly comprehensive legislation posed a number of problems for members of parliament. The justification for such measures could only lie in massive evidence of discrimination practised by the white population and fear of the likely political consequences of this behaviour should it be allowed to continue unabated. But the politicians had also to contend with their own and others' beliefs in the 'tolerant' and 'kindly' British public. Any person with a modicum of nationalistic feeling would be

reluctant to admit to weakness of this kind in the British character. Also, socialists with a strong faith in the inherent decency of the British working class would need to seek other explanations for its apparent moral turpitude in the face of the presence of black working people. Persons arguing for the legislation were at once confronted with the need to justify anti-discriminatory measures in terms of the alleged discrimination by, and prejudice of, the British public, and the need to assert the widespread democratic support for the legislation by all decent-minded citizens. Those arguing against the bills had to challenge the significance or substance of the empirical data on discrimination but, at the same time, reaffirm their abhorrence of racialism and their commitment to racial equality of opportunity.

In the following chapter I deal with the way members of parliament, during the second readings of the three Race Relations Bills, discussed the existence of prejudice and discrimination in Britain. The scope of the survey is then extended, by means of a case study, to a consideration of borough councillors' responses to the same issues.

The Labour Party introduced all three Bills, the first in 1965, being supported by the Conservative Party, in return for the substitution of conciliation procedure for criminal penalties. In 1968, the Conservatives destructively amended the Bill on the second reading, but refrained from opposing it on the third. In 1976, they refrained from voting on the second and third readings in the Commons, but were responsible for Lords amendments which, if accepted, would have substantially weakened the Bill. The Bills were hotly debated by members of the two major parties, by the Liberals and, in 1976, by Enoch Powell, speaking for the United

Ulster Unionist Coalition.

In introducing the second reading of the 1965 Bill, the Labour Home Secretary, Sir Frank Soskice, pointed out that it would be a tragedy if Britain were to "see the beginnings of a distinction between first and second class citizens". Peter Thorneycroft, for the Conservatives, moved an amendment which, while deploring discrimination "whether on racial or religious grounds" declined to give a second reading to a bill which introduced "criminal sanctions into a field more appropriate to conciliation and the encouragement of fair employment practices, while also importing a new principle into the law affecting freedom of speech".

As a result of Conservative pressure, and the opinion of MPs on both sides of the House, Sir Frank Soskice put forward amendments to the Bill which led to the dropping of criminal penalties and the substitution of local conciliation committees to inquire into complaints and to secure just settlements, without recourse to court procedure. If a person continued to discriminate, a newly instituted Race Relations Board could ask the Attorney General to take out an injunction restraining the defendant, on pain of contempt of court, from further discrimination against specified individuals or classes. The amended Bill was supported by the Opposition and given an unopposed third reading.

Three years later, another Labour Home Secretary, James Callaghan, introduced the second reading of the 1968 Bill by pointing out that the legislation would play a part in "preventing potentially serious problems from erupting". It did not seek to give any group a privileged position but, by guaranteeing equal rights, responsibilities, and opportunities, to remove disadvantages suffered by coloured people.

Beset by dissension in the party created by Enoch Powell's speeches on race, the Conservatives chose to move an amendment to the Bill which, while reaffirming their condemnation of racial discrimination and accepting the need for action to improve race relations, sought to deny the Bill a second reading on the grounds that in its practical application it would not contribute to the achievement of racial harmony.

After a lengthy debate, their amendment was defeated by 313 votes to 209. Following an all-night sitting, the Bill received its third reading by 182 votes to 44, the opposing votes being cast by those Conservatives who had not accepted unanimous shadow cabinet advice to abstain from voting. Mr Callaghan had appealed to the Conservatives not to divide the House on a fundamental issue of human equality, but in recommending abstention rather than outright opposition, Quintin Hogg took the brunt of the strongly hostile attitude to the Bill expressed by a substantial minority of Conservative rebels.

In 1976, a third Labour Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins, moved the second reading of a further Race Relations Bill, which the Conservatives did not support, but again chose not to oppose, because of their party's commitment to the principle of equal rights in the achievement of racial harmony. William Whitelaw, for the Conservatives, criticised the Home Secretary for reacting too strongly to the House of Lord's ruling on clubs and for forcing, by legislation, the pace of integration, which was bound to occur naturally. He warned that the Opposition would take a strong line in seeking to amend the Bill.

The Government was indeed defeated in the committee and report stages in the House of Lords on a number of amendments that sought to weaken and undermine the Bill e.g. the Conservative amendment

to delete the clause dealing with discrimination in private clubs, but when the Lords' amendments were considered by the Commons, they were rejected. All three bills, therefore, were beset from the outset by a great deal of controversy within, and outside of, parliament.

The eristical context in which the debate about the necessity of the measures to make racial discrimination unlawful, together with the bills' implication that there was substantial racialism among the white population is of great interest in any analysis of political discourse about race. How were MPs and councillors to discuss the moral failings and injustice of the people they were elected to represent, and what were the similarities and differences between their responses and those of their traditional political opponents? In other words, what had Labour and Conservative MPs and councillors to say about race prejudice and discrimination, their causes, effects and the social policies to be pursued for their eradication?

Before embarking on an examination of these questions, it might be in order to hypothesise that whatever the reasons for the bills - and particularly in 1968 there was ample empirical evidence of the levels of prejudice and discrimination in Britain - there would be a tendency among politicians of both major political persuasions to underplay or excuse what were widely considered to be undesirable traits, completely out of keeping with the British character. In addition, it can be assumed improbable that the white electorate would be presented as having exaggerated negative characteristics, similar to those that a white racist might attribute to black people. If it were the case that white moral responsibility was avoided, assuaged, absolved, or simply denied, then the cognitive strategies

at the discursive level by which this was achieved must be closely examined.

The number of speeches made for or against the three bills (at the second readings, fifty-six in all) contain a complex and varied set of arguments that are not easily categorised under a manageable number of headings. Justification and counter-justification centre on the need for legislation against racial discrimination. As with the Immigration Bills, it is possible to pick out common forms of argument, such as populist, pro bono publico, or means orientated, but in that anti-discriminatory legislation is concerned with a particular social process and with the agents so engaged, it is this area that needs further dissection.

The general factual assumptions by those advocating anti-discriminatory legislation must be that discrimination exists, that it is either undesirable in itself or in its consequences, and that legislation is capable of improving the situation. Those who oppose the legislation may challenge any of these assumptions. Again, as with the Immigration Bills, the contestants are likely to make use of the rhetorical modes of quantification techniques, analogical transformation, ambiguity, and attribution.

How then is discrimination and prejudice on the part of whites dealt with by national and local politicians? The analysis is conducted under five main headings: the characteristics of the principal agents, the manner in which discrimination or prejudice is described, the explanations provided for it at national and local level, and the relationship between explanation and justification (together with an account of justificatory techniques).

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PRINCIPAL AGENTS

The racial interaction with which the Race Relations Bills were concerned involved at least two agents - in this case, white and black. To better understand the nature of the difficulty with which the Bills confronted members of parliament, it is worth examining the way these two agents were presented.

White people as a group, their national identity, and institutions, were frequently referred to throughout the speeches examined here. Both Labour and Conservative politicians constantly paid tribute to the favourable traits of the British people. As illustration, Frank Soskice (L) set the tone by arguing that

"It would be a tragedy of the first order if our country with its unrivalled tradition of tolerance and fair play as between one man or woman and another, and perfect respect for the rights and personal worth and dignity on the individual should see the beginnings of the development of a distinction between first and second-class citizens.

(3.5.1965, p.926*.)

The theme was taken up by Peter Thorneycroft (C) in his reply when he referred to "the kindly sensible British people as a whole" (3.5.1965, p.946). Henry Brooke (C) asserted that "we are a tolerant people" (3.5.1965, p.966), while Selwyn Lloyd (C) thought that although "one is naturally proud of one's own country, we in this country have never been animated by feelings of racial superiority in the worst sense of the word" (3.5.1965, p.1032). David Winnick (L) claimed that "we live in a very tolerant liberal country in which the vast majority of people are against discrimination" (23.4.1968, p.134), Reginald Maudling (C) that we had faced the problem of immigration "with tolerance and common sense" (23.4.1968, p.148),

* This and subsequent full-dated references are to Hansard.

Roy Jenkins (L) mentioned the "traditions of tolerance" of the British people (4.3.1976, p.1551), David Lane (C) "the tolerance of the white majority" (4.3.1976, p.1613), Nick Budgen (C) "the extraordinary tolerance" of the people of this country (4.3.1976, p.1631), and John Stokes (C) "the tolerance of the English working-class - that amazing kindness, goodness, friendliness and gentleness on which we have all remarked" (4.3.1976, p.1645).

Politicians of both persuasions reiterated time and time again their belief in the tolerance and fair play exercised by British whites in their relationships with black people. This confidence remained unshaken by and, at times, apparently reconcilable with the evidence of white prejudice and discrimination which was extensively used to justify the passing of the race relations legislation.

The treatment of black people in the debates was much more varied. My general impression is that, in the descriptions offered of black people and their behaviour, debates on the Race Relations Bills differed from those on the Immigration Bills. The speeches on immigration portrayed blacks as being disadvantageous to the country: the speeches on anti-discrimination scarcely referred at all to black characteristics. Stress was placed instead upon equality of citizenship, on the fact that black people were resident, intended to stay, and that their children were born and educated in Britain. Black difference was neglected because the purpose of the Bills was to achieve actual equality of opportunity among people who were theoretically equal. An emphasis on the economic and social separateness of the black population would have undermined the case for equality of treatment. Furthermore, those arguing against the Bill did so on the grounds that there was no need for it, for black people already had an equality founded on law, tradition, and the

tolerance of the British people.

There were two exceptions to this general 'vacuity' in describing black people and their condition. First, there was the obsessive and long-standing preoccupation of politicians, particularly Conservatives, with immigration and immigration policy, despite the fact that they were supposed to be discussing anti-discrimination legislation. William Whitelaw (C), for example, spent so much of his speech on the subject of immigration that he was interrupted by Thomas Torney (L) who asked the speaker to tell him where in the proposed legislation 'immigration' was mentioned (4.3.1976, p.1572).

Second, one type of explanation for white prejudice was negative black behaviour, and in order to make this convincing, details of problems created by blacks had to be listed.

Where black people were mentioned, they were commonly associated with 'social strains' which developed as a result of their numbers, concentration, or rapid growth ("excessive fertility"). Blacks were seen as threatening white standards, by competing for housing, jobs, and school places, by having different habits, or lower standards of health and hygiene, etc. Sometimes, too, they were thought to abuse "white hospitality", to create problems of public order, and to be excessively sensitive and touchy. Although, in general, most reference to blacks was negative, their economic role was occasionally mentioned. Frank Soskice (L) described them as "harmless, friendly people" who "have brought us their skills and labour" (3.5.1965, p. 943). This sentiment was not always shared. E L Mallalieu (L) described a 'brain drain' in which Britons of "high skill and high potential" were replaced by "immigrants who have less skill and perhaps a lower potential" (23.4.1968, p.144).

The difficulties associated with justifying the Race Relations Bills can be seen against the backcloth of unequally distributed racial characteristics. The two principal characters of the scenario are respectively represented as virtuous and vice-prone and, therefore, given first premises, the Bills seem to be quite inexplicably directed against the virtuous. Perhaps the problem was most straightforwardly and openly recognised by those Conservative patriots who believed most fervently in the moral worth of the nation. "We are passing a vote of no confidence on our own people and organisation", W F Deedes (C) said, "and I cannot accept that" (23.4.1968, p.90). Harold Gurden (C) thought the Bill was directed against the British and reaffirmed his commitment to them:

I deny that the people against whom the Bill is directed are race haters. I deny that my constituents are race haters. Their morality is as good as that of the members of the Government who have brought the Bill before the House.

(23.4.1968, p.147.)

The whole rhetorical course of the Bills is directed to negotiating the contradictions presented by a British people who, on the one hand, were seen as kindly and tolerant, but, on the other, showed race prejudice and practised racial discrimination.

PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION DESCRIBED

Discrimination denied The first and most obvious way of dealing with the issue of white racial prejudice and discrimination is simply to deny that they exist at all. Few national politicians took this extremely straightforward position, although it will be seen from the study of local politicians that this view was well subscribed to. Certainly politicians, such as Ronald Bell (C) challenged the evidence provided for the existence of discrimination (23.4.1968, p.104), but the denial of its existence depends very

much on what is considered to be discrimination. How is 'discrimination' to be defined and explained? Perhaps if what we have in mind is not discrimination after all - certainly not 'unjust' discrimination - then the accusation levelled at the white population cannot be sustained.

Discrimination redefined Prejudice and discrimination, then, are commonly redefined. One method of doing this is to understand 'discrimination' as referring to the exercise of judgement. As Ronald Bell (C) put it:

I would like to make perhaps a hopeless plea for this word "discrimination". It may be too late, but it does seem to me an entirely wrong word to use in this context. It is surely that human quality that is most to be admired. One cannot have too much discrimination; one can only have too little.

(3.5.1965, p.987.)

and

Discrimination is not merely the supreme human quality; it is the very principle of life itself, whether it be vegetable or animal. Discrimination is everything. The perception and evaluation of difference is a basic function of every sentient creature. A heavy responsibility lies upon anyone who proposes to use a law of a country to declare that people must disregard certain things which they believe they perceive. The error which should be castigated, whether legal or not, is the attachment of unreasonable importance to an observed difference. However the process of discrimination is always impeccable. It is always right and should never be discouraged, let alone forbidden.

(4.3.1976, p.1622.)

These quotations clearly show how the connotation of injustice may be conveniently removed from the term.

Related closely to the need to justify the existence of discrimination are other attempts at redefinition. There is, of course, a distinction between people's "prejudice" and people's "resentment" (Maudling, C, 23.4.1968, p.153). "Racial tension" or "friction" are far more abstracted and purged of moral implication

than is "racial hatred". There is also an important difference between claiming that coloured people "suffer from grave disadvantages" in housing, and are "handicapped" in work, and in arguing that these effects are a result of white racial injustice.

Redefinitions invariably remove the moral dimension from black/white relations. White people were not prejudiced but were "genuinely worried" (Dudley Smith, C, 23.4.1968, p.125), had "anxieties" and "real worries" (David Lane, C, 4.3.1976, p.39), and "genuinely believe .." (Reginald Maudling, C, 23.4.1968, p.151). There was "deep feeling" in the country (Shirley Williams, L, 3.5.1965, p.1019) and it was "not prejudice to recognise differences" (E L Mallalieu, L, 23.4.1965, p.143). William Whitelaw, (C), pointed out how important it was to "differentiate between those genuine anxieties and real prejudices shown in the various correspondence ... from the real extremists" (4.3.1976, p.1568). John Stokes, (C), talked of an "explosion of popular feeling" (4.3.1976, p.1645). Less frequently used was the technique of equating prejudice with ignorance, although this did occur. To accuse the British population of ignorance is, after all, almost as offensive as accusing it of prejudice.

It is not just the political Right that has difficulty with the meanings of prejudice and discrimination. The Left, too, in its recognition that the working class also shows prejudice, must look for new definitions. It finds some relief in that area defined by social scientists as institutionalised racism, where the structure of capitalist institutions is held responsible for cumulative acts of discrimination. Discrimination at the personal level is neglected while a description of the 'blind workings' of an

impersonal system takes on a new function of absolution. Colour discrimination may also be neatly converted into class injustice or bias against the poor for "poor whites suffer too". Marcus Lipton (L) typified this approach when he asserted that the main problems of Brixton were due to "urban deprivation" that had "nothing at all to do with race relations or with whether people are black or white" (4.3.1976, p.1610). "Deprivation" and "disadvantage" replace "discrimination".

Of course, some politicians, such as Alexander Lyon (L), were astute enough to make a distinction between racial disadvantage and racial discrimination (4.3.1976, p.1661), and to recognise that good race relations depended on the elimination of both. As the Race Relations Bill was aimed at eliminating discrimination, it was surely incorrect to argue against it, on the grounds that it failed to deal with disadvantage. By making this distinction, Lyon threw into high relief a tendency of the Left to deracialise by reducing issues of individual choice and of racial animosity to a simple matter of abstract and impersonal class relations. Inequality is of different kinds and degrees, and is caused by different social mechanisms, some conscious and recognised, others not, and the social policies for its alleviation or eradication must surely vary. This is not to deny the primacy of economic mechanisms in the distribution of resources but, on the contrary, to assert that race may be one of the criteria used in determining the market value of labour or housing.

The association of "discrimination" with "injustice" has in recent years created new difficulties for those anxiously seeking to grapple with racial inequality - whatever are thought to be its causes. Understandably, the expression "positive discrimination",

intended to denote social policies aimed at repairing the damage of years of "negative discrimination", cannot easily escape from the widely shared connotation that discrimination of any kind is unjust. In order to avoid self-contradiction, the advocates of "positive discrimination" must adopt Ronald Bell's weak definition of discrimination as "the making of distinctions", thus contributing to a redefinition that is most likely to purge white racialism of blame. But for the general public, the connection between "discrimination" and "injustice" seems to be so well established that the phrase "positive discrimination" gives the impression - no doubt an impression eagerly sought by some - that what is intended is unfair, preferential treatment in favour of blacks and unfair discrimination against whites. In recognition of this consequence, Alexander Lyon, in his summing up on the second reading of the 1976 Bill, pointed out how much he disliked the term "positive discrimination" referring to it instead as "correcting the disadvantages of our black citizens" (4.3.1976, p.1666).

The 1976 Act eventually carried a Part 1, entitled "discrimination to which act applies" in which it was stated that "a person discriminates against another ... if on racial grounds he treats that other less favourably than he treats or would treat other persons, or if he applies to the other a requirement or condition applied equally to others, but which a proportion of a racial group cannot comply with and which cannot be shown to be justifiable, etc". The legal definition is clearly concerned with the effects of the discriminatory act and not with the morals of those suspected of discriminating, but in the passage of the legislation, the ghost of the discriminator as moral agent was not to be easily laid.

The discriminatory act was frequently associated with the

prejudiced state of mind. For example, Nick Budgen (C) condemned racial prejudice, defining it as "blind unreasoning dislike of any race", thus following in the mainstream social psychological tradition of Allport (1954), Adorno (1950) and others whom I have criticised in Chapter 2. In fact, like social scientists, politicians seem to be not a little confused by the differing disciplinary approaches to racial questions: by the frequent switching between psychological, sociological, economic, and legalistic positions, with their differing emphases on intention, cause, and effect. Psychological and social psychological approaches, however, do appear to be more susceptible to moralistic nuance and more in need of cognitive strategies for 'defense' of the white population.

As the forms of definition and redefinition adopted are also closely connected with subsequent patterns of explanation and justification, I shall not at this stage dwell on them at length. As a further example, however, it is perhaps worth considering one redefinition of prejudice as "natural feeling", with all the implications that phrase carries for explanation and justification of white racial belief and action. Definitions given to prejudice and discrimination also have implications for attempts to minimise the extent of prejudice and discrimination in Britain.

Discrimination minimised If it is accepted that prejudice and discrimination exist within the population, one way of deemphasising the moral problem they are thought to generate is to describe them as marginal, peripheral phenomena with which few people are involved. Thus, it might be agreed that prejudice exists but that it is not widespread. Peter Thorneycroft (C), for example, criticised Frank Soskice (L) for producing "precious little evidence to the house

that the instances were so widespread" (3.5.1965, p.946). Peter Griffiths thought that the "amount of discrimination in public places is negligible" (3.5.1965, p.1009), and in any case was less than it was five years ago.

The idea that levels of prejudice and discrimination are falling is frequently to be found, for such a belief not only removes the need for government intervention and legislation in this area, but shows how the "kindly British people", though initially suspicious, are now responding in a morally positive way to the challenge of immigration. It is through their efforts that matters are thought to be improving. Dudley Smith (C), for example, admitted that there were people who probably started out with a latent ethnic prejudice but "who have done much by their own efforts to overcome such prejudice" (23.4.1968, p.126). Prejudice might have existed in the past but it was now being overcome. David Lane (C), while welcoming the Bill, was thankful that race relations "are somewhat better today than 10 years ago", a situation for which he paid tribute to the tolerance of the white majority, "who have seen dramatic changes in the British scene during the last quarter of a century" (4.3.1976, p.1613).

A further common argument is to accept that there is prejudice/discrimination but to assert that it exists at a lower level than anywhere else in the world. As Henry Brooke (C), put it, "considering the rapid growth of the coloured population of this country, particularly between 1954, and the coming into force of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act in 1962, it is remarkable not how much racial discrimination there is in this country today, but how little there is. I believe that there is less outward evidence of anti-semitic feeling here than almost anywhere in

the world" (3.5.1965, p.963). Reginald Maudling (C) believed that "if one compares the record of the British people and of British society in these matters with those of so many other countries in every continent of the world, we have a right to be proud of what has happened" (23.4.1968, p.147).

The concurrence of the two major parties in the process of minimisation is well illustrated by the exchange between Roy Jenkins (L) and Winston Churchill (C), when in response to Jenkins's remark that the existing legislation was unable to deal with the widespread patterns of discrimination, Churchill asked him to confirm "that instances of racial discrimination arise from only a tiny minority of the people of this country."

Would he at the same time pay tribute to the wonderful way in which the British people have accepted for the greater part, a very substantial influx of alien culture and alien race into their midst without any open conflict or racial prejudice.

(4.3.1976, p.1550.)

Jenkins replied: "Yes indeed I would. Attitudes of discrimination apply to only a small minority"

Also well illustrated is the failure to distinguish between prejudice as an attitude and discrimination as an act - in the way they are distinguished in social science - but this failure is so widespread as to make the confusion of little significance in the debate. If the two are distinguished, the act of discrimination is held to follow automatically from the prejudiced disposition, acting as "the ghost" in a machine that discriminates. The single exception arises from the use of the institutional discrimination and vicious circle arguments which can be seen to be derived very immediately from sociological and social psychological theory. (See below.)

Another possibility is not to deny the existence of prejudice

but to see it as a highly superficial phenomenon, scarcely affecting the life of the citizens or their institutions, and certainly not structural (in a social scientific sense) in its causes and effects. Callaghan (L) argued, for example, that although racialism was "a live force in this country" it was "not yet deeply rooted" (23.4.1968, p.54). Hugh Fraser (C) thought that the "important thing is to take action now, because in many areas it is still a peripheral problem" (23.4.1968, p.96).

Party politicians have lately come to fix the level of race prejudice in the population at 10 per cent - a figure social scientists have a considerable responsibility for providing and confirming. Reginald Freeson (L) mentioned a survey conducted in Willesden which established "the interesting figure that it can be assumed that about 10 per cent of the community are highly prejudiced" (3.5.1965, p.977). The figure "tied in with figures established by surveys in other countries and at other times in this country".

In 1967, what has come to be known as the Institute of Race Relations' Five Borough Survey, was conducted in Lambeth, Ealing, Wolverhampton, Nottingham, and Bradford. It provided the information for drawing up a prejudice - tolerance scale on which 10 per cent of the population were registered as prejudiced, 17 per cent as prejudiced-inclined, 38 per cent tolerant-inclined, and 35 per cent tolerant. On the basis of these findings a section entitled "Attitudes of the British Public. The Incidence of Race Prejudice in Britain" was written by Mark Abrams for Colour and Citizenship, A Report on British Race Relations. Edited by E J B Rose, this book, together with Colour, Citizenship and British Society, written by

Nicholas Deakin, another contributor to Colour and Citizenship, provided the information for many of the political debates on race relations.

Working with the same material, Christopher Bagley (1970) pointed out that the results of the surveys could be interpreted in different ways:

... when other items of prejudice are taken into account, the proportion who are prejudiced on one or more items shows that a much greater proportion of respondents display prejudice. Two thirds of the population sampled are prejudiced on one or more item. The individuals completely free of prejudice measured in the present terms are in a considerable minority.

Bagley then pointed out that "There is a danger that those scholars, politicians, and journalists who dislike prejudice, who wish it did not exist, will interpret the data they have in ways which tend to show that prejudice is not a major problem" (p.33). To view current events in optimistic terms ran the risk, he thought, of providing psychological satisfaction for the individuals concerned, but had no positive influence on the real situation. Bagley insisted that the level of prejudice revealed by the survey was "alarmingly high" and warned of the danger of the over-optimistic interpretation in which "observers fail to appreciate the moral significance of events they are experiencing" (p.35).

Bagley's views were supported by those of Robin Jenkins (1971) who asserted that the four categories: prejudiced, prejudiced-inclined, tolerant-inclined, and tolerant, into which the population was placed were derived from "a totally arbitrary division of the samples".

It is utterly dishonest and misleading to call a person "tolerant-inclined" when he has said in the interview that 'the authorities should refuse housing to coloured tenants even if they have been on the waiting list the

required time', yet 38 per cent of the sample are labelled tolerant-inclined for saying things like this.

Bagley's fear that minimisation was likely to prove irresistible to politicians appears to be amply borne out by national and local findings.

For those politicians who sense that the magical figure of 10 per cent is something of an illusion, or recognise the size of the adult population, it does, in fact, represent, other methods must be devised for coping with the extent of white racism.

An uncomfortably large population can be bifurcated into a large and less blameworthy group on the one hand, and a small guilty group of more manageable proportions on the other. Redefinition may help this process as when William Whitelaw (C) distinguished the "really prejudiced" from those with "genuine anxieties". Very often, the minority group is blamed for adversely influencing the majority, in much the same way as Communist shop stewards are blamed for the industrial action of trade union members. People who are "genuinely worried" are reluctant moderates, to be distinguished from "race haters", who are willing and active extremists. Almost by definition, extremists are always in a minority and moderates in a majority. Extremists are also invariably thought irrational in their beliefs. Behaviour which is beyond the pale, requires explaining, but when a convincing explanation is not forthcoming, inexplicability is associated with eccentricity, insanity, and severe personality defects on the part of those engaged in acts defined as deviant. No doubt, studies such as Adorno's Authoritarian Personality give a stamp of social psychological authenticity to such beliefs.

David Ennals (L) claimed that it was not the 'kindly' British

people who were the targets of the Bill: it was "the twisted people - and happily they are few in our society" (3.5.1965, p.988). Barnett Janner (L) mentioned a "handful of people - psychopaths perhaps" (3.5.1965, p.957).

The attempt of centre consensual politics to label those on Left or Right flanks as "extremists" is not without political consequence. The anti-racists of the Left are bracketed with the racist enemy of the Right, and vigorous anti-racism is looked upon with suspicion for its criticisms of white complacency are, after all, attacks upon mainstream British institutions. In a self-satisfied society, vigorous anti-racism offends against minimisation. Left-wing politicians who fail to make Marxist distinctions between class in itself and for itself, seem also to be embarrassed by the idea that white workers and trade unionists can also manifest racist behaviour. The Left is particularly fond of explanations couched in terms of a minority of corruptors influencing a majority of corruptible. A hard core of fascists or Nazis are distinguished from their reactionary lumpen proletariat supporters who cannot be blamed for failing to understand the alienating structures of capitalism. "Working-class resentment" should not be associated with "fascist thuggery" (John Binns, L, 3.5.1965, p.1004).

Discrimination accepted One of the difficulties in debating the 1965 Race Relations Bill was the paucity of social scientific evidence available to members of parliament about the extent of prejudice and discrimination in Britain and the likely effect of anti-discrimination legislation. Peter Thorneycroft (C) remarked that Frank Soskice (L) had failed to produce evidence of widespread instances of incitement to racial hatred or of discrimination in

public places (3.5.1965, p.946). In order to support the Bill, therefore, MPs had to fall back upon their personal knowledge of right-wing propaganda and of racial discrimination in their constituencies. Traditional political folk-devils and infernos: Mosley's British Union of Fascists (and Cable Street resistance to it), Hitler, Nazi concentration and extermination camps, together with references to previous incidents of racial violence in Notting Hill and Nottingham, were somewhat inadequately invoked,

In February 1966, Mark Bonham Carter was appointed at first chairman of the new Race Relations Board with the freedom to criticise the 1965 Act and to recommend extensions of it to the Government. Two inquiries were set up, the first into the extent of racial prejudice in employment, housing, insurance, credit facilities, financial services and places of public resort not covered by the 1965 Act, and the second, under the chairmanship of Professor Harry Street, into the anti-discrimination legislation of other countries, its effectiveness and the form that extensions to the legislation in Britain might take. Although, officially, the two inquiries were sponsored by the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants and the Race Relations Board, their originators were Mark Bonham Carter and Roy Jenkins. The first report was published in April, the second in October 1967.

The 1968 Bill was based on research into discrimination in Britain and into the role the law might play in matters of race relations, and this information was widely available to those politicians who felt the need to make use of it in providing justification for the legislation. Thus, Callaghan was able to claim that the evidence was abundantly clear that coloured people were handicapped, despite qualifications, in their search for work, that

the Race Relations Board's annual report provided evidence of the value of the 1965 Act, and that there was evidence from the USA that the very declaration of what the law stood for tended to lessen discrimination in practice*.

Quintin Hogg (C) admitted to being

convinced in the end by the evidence of the PEP Report and the Street Report and various other documents that ... in the fields of housing and employment there were circumstances in which the economic laws would operate in favour of discrimination and against human rights.
(23.4.1968, p.78.)

The PEP and Street Reports were mentioned and quoted approvingly or disapprovingly by many of the subsequent speakers from both sides of the House: Sir Dingle Foot (L), W F Deedes (C), Paul Rose (L), Hugh Fraser (C), Ronald Bell (C), Ivor Richard (L), David Winnick (L), Nigel Fisher (C), and David Ennals (L). Mention was also made of the Milner Holland Report's account of discrimination in advertised properties, house purchase, and by estate agents, and also of the United States Riot Commission's Report. Anthony Lewis's article in The Times, 22.4.1968, on "What Britain can learn from America", in which he asserted that, "from a transatlantic viewpoint" anti-discrimination laws had worked, was also cited by proponents of the Bill.

It is clear, therefore, that politicians heavily predicated their assertion that prejudice and discrimination existed, and that legislation had a place in improving race relations, on the empirical

* Street Report: "we do believe that the law's own impact and its influence on public attitudes, reinforced by the other steps to which we have referred are likely to have ameliorative effects". (p.63.)

evidence made available by the Race Relations Board and the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants. This empirical evidence, which was carefully presented in the reports, had the great advantage that it was usually felt to be scientific and of unquestionable validity (though Ronald Bell (C) regarded much of the evidence as suspect and challenged what he called the "agent provocateur system of situational testing" (23.4.1968, p.104)). But on the whole, the social scientific evidence was accepted as unchallengeable. The strong British empiricist tradition of policy research in the field of social welfare dictates that findings, however unpleasant or offensive, must be accepted as fact - subscription to a religion of facts being the hallmark of British politician and sociologist alike. Facts are beyond the bounds of legitimate political debate. Nevertheless, it was rare for the extent of the white discrimination revealed by situational testing to be spelt out in graphic detail: passing mention of the names of the reports was far more judicious. It was not fact itself, but its factual status, which was used in support of the Bills.

By 1976, the two statutory bodies: the Race Relations Board and the Community Relations Commission, the Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration, and further PEP reports, opinion polls, and newspaper articles, were providing evidence of the inadequacy of the existing legislation in dealing with the widespread discrimination in employment and housing. These, together with quotes from newspaper reports of the views of various experts in the field (e.g. Alan Little on the employment problems of young black people) were extensively used as 'technical' justification for the latest of the Bills.

Always, however, a curious, dispassionate coolness was displayed in the presentation of the evidence for discrimination. This 'distancing' may be partly accounted for by the scientific requirements that sources be specified (which is a form of the mode of attribution), that only limited and frequently quantified generalisations be offered on the basis of available evidence, and that individual anecdotal case studies be avoided. The attitude prevails that science is superintended on the basis of Olympian detachment, and on the complete absence of any apparent commitment to the interests of the victim. Social scientific evidence in favour of the Race Relations Bills seemed always less passionately presented than impressionistic testimony against.

EXPLANATIONS FOR PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION

Some of the explanations offered by national politicians for race prejudice and discrimination among the white population have already been hinted at in the sections on redefinition and minimisation. Debate on the Race Relations Bills does not necessarily require politicians to provide explanations for prejudice and discrimination, but only to establish or deny the existence of these phenomena. However, the relationship between explanation and justification, to be discussed in the following section, means that the kind of explanation offered may have strong value implications. Accordingly, any explanation can be seen as having a purpose over and above that of informing the audience of the cause of prejudice and discrimination.

With a finite number of readily understandable and plausible explanations available to him, each with justificatory import, a politician may choose instead only to describe - rather than to

explain - prejudice and discrimination. In order for him to preserve a particular stance, it might be more appropriate to omit all explanations for which he has sympathy, if there is any likelihood that they offend against the values to which he wants others to subscribe. This may be one reason why Labour politicians were far less likely than Conservatives to provide explanations, preferring instead simply to admit to the existence of prejudice and discrimination.

Nevertheless, a large range of explanations was given by politicians, the kind of explanation varying considerably between parties. The explanations were rarely mutually exclusive, two or three being found in combination in the discourse of a single member of parliament.

Although repetition, differences in thoroughness of treatment, and ambiguity, make classification and statistical treatment of the arguments difficult, it is possible to classify explanations under seven broad headings (each with more refined subcategories) as listed below:

Table 17 List of explanations given for white race prejudice and discrimination

1. Social Process
 - (i) immigration and related issues
 - (ii) economic forces (such as urban decay)
2. White political/legislative agency
 - (i) lack of effective immigration control
 - (ii) anti-discrimination
3. Black people's characteristics
4. Effect on whites' livelihood and economic interests

5. Whites' perception, state of mind
 - (i) social process
 - (ii) white political/legislative agency
 - (iii) black people's characteristics
 - (iv) livelihood, economic interest
(resentment, fear, insecurity, threat, jealousy, anger,
perception of self interest, etc.)
6. Whites' predispositions towards blacks or towards existing state of white society
 - (i) institutional patterns of behaviour
 - (ii) traditional cultural beliefs and values or absence of
 - (iii) bio-psychological dispositions
7. Diffusion of ideas
 - (i) right-wing propaganda
 - (ii) the mass media
 - (iii) J Enoch Powell
 - (iv) speaking about or discussing race

(1) Social process explanations generally centre upon the supposed (adverse) effects of immigration on the host society, and upon the agency of black migrants, although they also provide the (infrequently occurring) possibility of focus on impersonal economic and historic forces, such as urban decay.

(2) White political/legislative agency explanations account for white prejudice and discrimination in terms of either politicians' failure to introduce effective control over (black) immigration or, more frequently, their provocative action in attempting to place the Race Relations Bills on the statute book. Such bills are felt to give blacks legal privileges and to discriminate against whites.

(3) Black people's characteristics. As a more personalised form of social process explanations, mention of the characteristics of black people is also thought to account for white beliefs and behaviour. Explanations in terms of black people's characteristics may develop the themes either of black moral agency and (ir-) responsibility, or of the social causes of black inadequacy.

(4) Effect on whites' livelihood and economic interest. It is but a short step from accounts of the social process of immigration, or of the inadequacy of the migrants, to explanations in terms of their effects on whites' livelihood and economic interests. Immigrants are blamed for shortages in housing, jobs, and social services or for major environmental changes.

(5) Whites' perception, state of mind. A fifth class of explanation makes use of all four of the above categories, but 'inserts' a white state of mind between the social processes, personal agents, or adverse effects on the one hand, and any resultant discrimination on the other. It is whites' perception of the four that is emphasised, and as such, this fifth grouping could be regarded as a more explicit account of the nature of prejudice as a state of mind. Prejudice, it is claimed, is the resentment, fear, insecurity, threat, jealousy, anger, or perception of self-interest created by the factors described in the four categories mentioned above. As an explanation, however, this fifth class differs importantly from the others, in that it assumes a mode of attribution on the part of the politicians, who do not need to assert the factual nature of the claims about social processes, etc., but only to argue that the white population believes these things and is likely to act on them. If the explanation takes the form "the native population fear they will be swamped", the politician does not have to commit himself to answering the questions of whether the swamping will take place or whether such a fear is justified. Using a form of 'ad populum argument', he relies on the strength, rather than the truth of the belief to make his point.

(6) Whites' predispositions towards blacks Another set of explanations concentrates on the predispositions of whites to blacks

or on the pre-existing state of white society that has failed to adapt to the new black presence. Subcategories of institutional patterns of behaviour; traditional, cultural beliefs and values, or their absence; and bio-psychological dispositions, are distinguishable.

(7) Diffusion of ideas. Explanations in terms of the diffusion of ideas provide a seventh category. The dominant theme here is that racist propaganda, or mere mention of racial matters, creates prejudice and discrimination in the mass of the population.

Before going on to provide examples of these explanations, it is worth reiterating the point that they need not be mutually exclusive. What is of interest, however, is the emphasis placed by the various politicians and their parties on different explanations.

Explanations at national level

(1) Social process explanations. Immigration and its effects on Britain are, or seem to be, used to explain white prejudice and discrimination. On the face of it, this does not seem a very convincing argument, but when placed within an interpretative social context, the missing premise, that immigrants create social problems to which whites react, is probably obvious to the white audience. What is of significance is the absence of this premise and the undoubtedly useful political expedient of omitting it, with the consequence that race prejudice and discrimination are directly attributed to abstract and impersonal social processes which, when attempts are made to concretise and personalise them, appear in the main to be initiated by black agents. Sometimes, social process explanations refer mysteriously only to the 'social problems' of immigration, at other times, more specifically, to the

rapidity or size of the immigration, to immigrant concentrations, overcrowding, slums, drain on or competition for resources, or reproduction rates.

Frank Soskice (L) explained that "social strains tend to develop ... where there are large concentrations of coloured people in large towns and cities" (3.5.1965, p.934). His endeavour to depersonalise his explanation and place it safely in the sphere of the abstract is well illustrated, when he argued that the 1965 Bill should be placed on the statute book before "social stresses and ill-will have the chance of corrupting and distorting our relationships" (3.5.1965, p.942). Selwyn Lloyd (C) mentioned the projected numbers of immigrants: "The 800,000 coloured immigrants are certainly reproducing themselves at a rate faster than that of the white population" (3.5.1965, p.1033). Callaghan (L) referred to the "great pressures to which a number of local authorities are subject in matters of education, housing and training" (23.4.1968, p.54). The Race Relations Bills were seen as part of a general programme combining provision of equal rights within the country with effective immigration control, for, as Quintin Hogg (C) said, "this country is not self-evidently underpopulated" (23.4.1968, p.71), and the American experience served as a warning that "the explosive mixture" was caused by under-employment, ghetto housing, inadequate social security, health care, and differential education. Paul Rose (L) thought that the importance of anti-discrimination legislation was that it prevented immigrant "concentrations" which led to "tension" (23.4.1968, p.93). Dudley Smith (C), too, felt overcrowding was responsible for racial tension (23.4.1968, p.127). The answer lay in Government action over housing, schools, health facilities, and stringent control of immigration (23.4.1968, p.130).

The British people, claimed Reginald Maudling (C), had had to face a unique problem of an inflow of people of different cultures, backgrounds, religions and colours, unprecedented in any country (23.4.1968, p.148). Roy Jenkins (L) asserted that there was "a clear limit to the amount of immigration which this country can absorb, and that it is in the interests of the racial minorities themselves to maintain a strict control over immigration" (4.3.1976, p.1548). Preoccupation with continuing immigration was a hallmark of the 1976 debate, with illegal immigration, 'overstaying' and inaccurate immigrant statistics, being seen by the Conservatives, in particular, as playing a major part in the undermining of good race relations. William Whitelaw (C) mentioned all of these (4.3.1976, p.1569). Enoch Powell (UUUC) referred to "the mass and size of the original movement" and "the rate of its continuance" (4.3.1976, p.1584). Dudley Smith (C) complained that the Race Relations Bill contained no provision "for further curbing immigration or curbing it more successfully" (4.3.1976, p.1592). Ronald Bell (C) claimed immigrants were "still pouring into this country legally and illegally" (4.3.1976, p.1620). As John Stokes (C) said, unless immigration was cut, there would be "an inevitable explosion of popular feeling" (4.3.1976, p.1645).

(2) White political/legislative explanations. Social process explanations merge into white political/legislative explanations when the responsible causal agency begins to shift from the process of immigration itself to the failure of politicians to act. The distinction between them is sometimes difficult to make. For example, when John Binns (L) blamed the Conservatives for difficulties created by "floodgates" left "wide open during 13 years of Tory rule" (3.5.1965, p.1005), the responsibility was seen to

lie with the politicians, but it was the process of immigration that was credited with causing the difficulties. Less ambivalently, Selwyn Lloyd (C) blamed the Labour Government's "ferocious opposition to any kind of (immigration) control" for white attitudes (3.5.1965, p.1033). George Sinclair (C) said that there was "widespread feeling" that the Government had "deliberately eased controls and allowed an inflow far in excess of what people had a right to expect from Government statements of policy" (4.3.1976, p.1603).

But it was in direct reference to the Race Relations Bills that prejudice and discrimination were best explained as resulting from white political and legislative measures. Anti-discrimination legislation was seen as provocatively altering the status-quo and furthermore, as providing blacks with unnecessary privileges. White reaction to such measures was either the cause of prejudice or served to seriously exacerbate it. The Bills were opposed on the grounds that there could not be "one law for the blacks and one law for the whites" (Thorneycroft, C, 3.5.1965, p.954). The Bill was likely to create tension and ill feeling (Griffiths, C, 3.5.1965, p.1008). Selwyn Lloyd (C) felt that it was "not a good thing to make classes of people specially protected on the grounds of colour or race" (3.5.1965, p.1036). W F Deedes (C) feared that bad social practices would not be remedied by the Bill, but would flourish in the "atmosphere of resentment" created by it, for one could not "achieve justice for a minority by inflicting injustice on the majority" (23.4.1968, p.90). Reginald Maudling (C), too, thought the Bill would create more resentment (23.4.1968, p.154). Referring to parts of the 1976 provisions that applied to private clubs, William Whitelaw (C) believed that "the right hon. Gentleman will stir up

resentment and antagonism at a time when there was a move in the right direction" (4.3.1976, p.1576). Perhaps the finest example of this form of argument was advanced by J Enoch Powell (UUUC):

(The Bill) is counter productive because the creation of new rights creates new grievances. Make no mistake, this new legislation creates new rights. Those who came into this country as immigrants instantly inherited all the traditional and fought-for rights of the inhabitants of this country ... but the purpose of this legislation is to create new rights, new remedies, which the inhabitants of this country have never enjoyed and never sought, for the sake of this new and growing element which is amongst us. But the creation of new rights in response to such a situation simply creates the ground for new resentment, to use William Deedes' word, and new grievances.
(4.3.1976, p.1585.)

Nick Budgen (C) echoed Powell's sentiments by claiming that the Bill stirred up "the whole issue of racial prejudice once again. It will cause further resentment as it grants yet further rights to the immigrant majority. It will be one more affront ... to the ordinary British people" (4.3.1976, p.1631). John Stokes (C) thought "our people will be unfairly discriminated against and will face new offences. It is the newcomer, the immigrant who will have the privileges" (4.3.1976, p.1645).

A number of politicians were specific about the section of the white population who would be discriminated against by the Bills. John Binns (L) was concerned about the hotelier, cafe proprietor, and shop keeper, who, in complying with the Bill, could lose white customers by serving blacks (3.5.1965, p.1004), and Dudley Smith (C) with the personnel manager who, "if he turns down too many coloured people who fall below his acceptable standards" would suffer the humiliation of being taken before the Race Relations Board (23.4.1968, p.128). For many politicians, then, Government anti-discriminatory legislation was a cause, possibly a major cause, of white prejudice, and introduced into British law, discrimination against the white

population.

(3) The characteristics of black people. The characteristics of black people can also be used to account for white prejudice and discrimination. Black people, to a greater or lesser degree, might be held responsible for the effects or unpleasant consequences of their presence, or alternatively, be seen, individually or collectively, as a non-moral social agency in interaction with whites. The precise characteristics that blacks are thought to possess may be regarded as arising either from deeply embedded psychological traits that are most probably inborn, or as attributable to their social and historical circumstances. In the context of politicians' actual speeches, the analyst is likely to find it difficult to separate these different themes.

Sometimes 'character arguments' are hard to differentiate from social process arguments as when Ronald Bell (C) thought that "tensions" arose from "the fact that very large numbers of people with unfamiliar customs have come to this country ..." (3.5.1965, p.987). John Binns (L), however, was clearly concerned about black standards: "They come straight from the tribal villages of Pakistan and their ideas of personal hygiene are absolutely different from ours" (3.5.1965, p.1007), a theme reiterated by Selwyn Lloyd (C) who thought that "to be fair to our people who are vehement about the problems caused by coloured immigration, the trouble usually begins not because of colour, but because of different social backgrounds, habits, religion ... (personal hygiene) ... and also the excessive numbers" (3.5.1965, p.1033). Dudley Smith (C) asked why people had to change and have new laws "for a section of the community which usually refuses to become part of us" (23.4.1968, p.129). E L Mallalieu (L) thought that prejudice could be explained by the fact

that "immigrants have customs which are different from their neighbours" and it was "not prejudice to recognise differences". If a minority was not allowed the same opportunities as the majority, it would not be "happy" and would become "a cancer inside the body of the community" (23.4.1968, p.143).

The distinction between racial prejudice and racial disadvantage affords politicians the possibility of giving the impression that discrimination may be explained in terms of disadvantage. Michael Allison (C), for example, concentrated on the linguistic inadequacy of Asians and West Indians, their overcrowding, and the poor educational performance of children of West Indian descent, which arose from their mothers going out to work and their being left in "large, inactive, unsupported groups without proper care and stimulus" (4.3.1976, p.1651). To recognise differences in performance between whites and blacks and to choose the objectively better performers, he claimed, was an acceptable form of discrimination. The "real cause of the failure of West Indians and Asians to break through to council housing is that they do not know how to fill in the forms, register, or carry on a conversation with the housing officer" (4.3.1976, p.1655).

This is a sophisticated species of the explanation for white discrimination in terms of black characteristics. Objective features of disadvantage are held to illustrate that blacks are inferior in education, etc, and that inferiority can explain nearly all of the preferential treatment given to whites, which must, after all, be rational because it is based on real differences. As a result, the existence of unjust treatment is scarcely admitted, and black characteristics still serve to exonerate differential treatment.

A form of explanation for white prejudice which comes close to denying that white prejudice exists, arises when blacks are accused of excessive sensitivity, of having "chips on their shoulders", of imagining white hostility when none is there. There is no white prejudice if blacks do only imagine prejudice, but the reasoning hints that there is white reaction arising from the arrogant way blacks conduct themselves in the expectation that whites "owe them a living".

"People who are sensitive to the fact that they are coloured in a community which is largely white", Peter Griffiths (C) claimed, "frequently imagine that they have been discriminated against in circumstances in which no discrimination whatever has existed" (3.5.1965, p.1009). While describing the British people as having displayed extraordinary tolerance when faced with the "burden" of immigration, Nick Budgen (C) remarked that "One of the great difficulties in dealing with immigrant communities is getting through the barrier of excessive sensitivity and extraordinary touchiness that arises from their sense of insecurity" (4.3.1976, p.1633). Reginald Maudling (C) was very concerned that "those who come to this country should not abuse our hospitality. Immense damage is done to race relations by the spectacle of people from other countries doing things for which they would be imprisoned in their own country" (23.4.1968, p.152).

(4) Effects on whites' livelihood and economic interests. Instead of dealing with black characteristics, explanation can emphasise instead the effect of the presence of blacks upon white people's livelihood and economic interests. One group of such explanations which deals with the legal privileges of blacks and discrimination against whites (which supposedly might result from the implementation of the Race

Relations Acts) has been described under (2). Opinions about the general difficulties created for whites, the effects on house prices and quality of property, on children's education, on employment prospects, on the health service (hospital beds), and on the environment, fall into this category. There is a close parallel between those explanations for white feeling and the justifications offered for limiting black immigration.

Selwyn Lloyd (C), for example, listed:

the kind of situation that hurts people - the fact that there are schools at which from 25 per cent to 40 per cent of the pupils are coloured children; that there are places where priority in day nurseries is being given to coloured children; that in the maternity hospitals the beds seem to go to coloured mothers; that there are places where there is residential downgrading of house property ... Anyone who has really studied the matter cannot fail to be impressed by the magnitude of the problems....

(3.5.1965, p.1034.)

John Binns (L) referred to "overcrowded schools" and other conditions and asked what the Race Relations Bill would do to remove "these social problems" (3.5.1965, p.1006). E L Mallalieu (L) was concerned with the sale of property:

If a house in a street is occupied by a coloured immigrant one may be fairly sure that certain things will happen - although not by any means completely sure. It is likely that within a short time, the house will have far too many people in it and that customs and habits will be indulged in which are by no means in keeping with the habits of the neighbourhood. A possible result will be the exodus of the white people of the street and a catastrophic fall in the value of the houses.

(23.4.1968, p.141.)

(5) The white population's perception of the above. The four categories above contain arguments that set out various social processes, characteristics of groups, and adverse effects, as accounting directly for prejudice or discrimination on the part of whites. But many members of parliament elaborate their expectations by including what might be called a 'phenomenological' or 'psychological'

dimension. It is not the social stimuli themselves, but particular forms of white mental reaction to them, that create prejudice and discrimination. A state of mind mediates between the stimulus and response. The most commonly recurring states of mind referred to are resentment, insecurity, fear, threat, worry, anxiety, jealousy, and anger. In attempting to summate the explanations given for prejudice and discrimination, it is probably best to include this category under the previous four, because the objects of resentment, fear, etc., consist of waves of black immigration, black standards, and recognition of the scarcity of certain resources. Nevertheless, the form of explanation is sufficiently different to warrant the provision of a few examples.

Ronald Bell (C) stated that "Behind all is fear. Fear for standards, fear for material interests, the fear of excessive fertility on the part of the immigrants, of being swamped in our own country. They fear miscegenation" (3.5.1965, p.988). W F Deedes (C) thought that discrimination arose largely from fear and lack of confidence. R T Paget (L) referred to "This racial fear of the man who is coming in and who will take the bread out of one's mouth" (23.4.1968, p.110). Discrimination, according to MP Winstanley (Lib) arose essentially from fear and insecurity: "Human beings have weaknesses. They have certain innate tendencies which are less attractive than others. On the whole human beings are insecure. We are easily frightened and our security is easily threatened. It is because of this that the whole problem of racial discrimination arises". People were frightened of differences between town and country, of people who wore different clothes or different hair styles and who ate different foods or used different forms of speech. "We see it most clearly with people whose skins are of a different

colour" (23.4.1968, p.117). Dudley Smith (C) referred to the worry created by the admission of so many immigrants into the country (23.4.1968, p.126), Reginald Maudling (C) to the "genuine fear of uncontrolled immigration" (23.4.1968, p.151), and David Lane (C) to the "real worries over the trend of immigration" (4.3.1976, p.1612). E L Mallalieu claimed that "The reaction of the natives is entirely understandable. In my submission it is due entirely to fear for their own standards" (23.4.1968, p.142). "There is the fear of competition for jobs, competition for houses and for places in hospital and that immigrants will bring in lower standards of accommodation tolerance" claimed Reginald Maudling (C). "This may be an irrational fear, but we cannot legislate it out of existence" (23.4.1968, p.153). John Binns (L) insisted that "Any member who has an immigrant problem within his constituency knows full well that there is a deep resentment within the working-class section of the community at the social problems that follow in the wake of an influx of coloured immigrants" (3.5.1965, p.1003). Ronald Bell (C) thought that if under the proposed legislation a man was forced to sell his house to a complainant "that man, his family, his neighbours, and his friends will all be deeply resentful for ever" for "the coloured man will for the first time have taken a formal hostile step against the native community, with psychological consequences which will remain with him for ever. It is the accumulation over the months and years of thousands of such cases that builds up tensions from which a flash of violence comes" (23.4.1968, p.103). John Stokes (C) talked of the English remembering their history with pride but, for the first time, fearing for their future because of the immensity of the coloured immigration which had "created foreign enclaves in our midst"

(4.3.1976, p.1642).

This kind of explanation has at least two useful rhetorical properties. The fears and anxieties are attributed to the British people or to certain sections of the community. Though voiced by the politician, he need not be seen to subscribe to them (see Maudling above). The worries may be "genuine", but are they justified? The politician makes use of them by relying on a powerful ad populum form of argument which equates the popular and sincere with the morally correct.

(6) Predispositions of whites to the black presence. Explanations in terms of predispositions of whites to the presence of black people can be classed under three sub-headings, institutional, cultural, and bio-psychological. In general they describe the prevailing cultural milieu or persistent psychological and behavioural traits of white society and note their latest manifestation in response to recent black immigration.

Institutional explanations stress that certain social norms within existing institutions do not take into account the special requirements of black immigrants. When institutional norms have the effect of placing blacks in jobs or housing of lower quality, whites may develop prejudice by regarding the blacks' inferior standards as a product of their psychological or cultural characteristics, and by going on to think that blacks deliberately choose to live and work in degrading circumstances. A vicious circle develops when, for these reasons, whites begin to discriminate against blacks, thus reducing their quality of life still further and yet again confirming white conceptions. It may, however, be possible to break the circle by anti-discrimination legislation.

The idea of existing norms affecting the position of blacks was contained in Quintin Hogg's (C) reference to circumstances in the fields of housing and employment where "economic laws would operate in favour of discrimination and against human rights" (23.4.1968, p.78). James Callaghan (L) indicated some familiarity with the theory of the effect of institutionalised discrimination on white consciousness when he remarked that "one cannot legislate prejudice out of existence, but legislation can ensure that prejudice does not show itself overtly in acts of discrimination which provide a favourable breeding ground for resentment and bitterness" (23.4.1968, p.57). Paul Rose (L), too, thought public attitudes were "determined by and derived from public actions. Discrimination, therefore, is not merely caused by prejudice, but itself also causes and contributes towards prejudice" (23.4.1968, p.94). By 1976, he was referring to the "vicious circle of deprivation occurring particularly in respect of young persons of West Indian origin denied a job because of their pigmentation" (4.3.1976, p.1640). George Sinclair (C) believed that laws could change practices which "after an interval change attitudes also" (4.3.1976, p.1601).

On the whole, however, institutional explanations at this level of refinement, and deriving fairly directly from social science, are seldom used by members of parliament.

Cultural values. Another explanation for the existence of prejudice is to regard it as a legacy of empire. British people, it is claimed, developed an ideology of racial superiority to rationalise British rule over a third of the world and to justify their domination, exploitation, and unequal treatment of the peoples of the Empire. This ideology has survived the passing of

empire and is given new opportunities to emerge in British relations with colonial immigrants here in Britain. Although it is the author's impression that this explanation finds strong support among Left-wingers, very few examples of this kind of explanation are to be found in the debates on the Race Relations Bills.

One such reference was made in the speech by Guy Barnett (L) who thought that "all of us are to some degree tainted by the fact that not many years ago we were an Imperial power and regarded ourselves as superior in our abilities to rule and guide our affairs" with the consequence that "black and brown people" were treated as second class (4.3.1976, p.1647). Perhaps the widely shared view of the Empire as a beneficial and civilising influence and of the Commonwealth as a 'family of nations' precludes the possibility that imperial domination can popularly be used to account for the evil of prejudice.

Apart from direct reference to the Empire or slavery, mention can also be made of British racist traditions, and of the part played by deeply embedded associations of black with demonic forces and white with virtue, in fashioning the consciousness of race. Maurice Orbach (L), for example, described the long tradition of discrimination in insurance and business against the Jews. Referring to the Powell speech, he pointed out that everything said about black people was said about his parents sixty years ago (23.4.1968, p.98). Together with the frequent instancing of the anti-Semitism and racial animosity of the past, the theme that racialism is not new is also to be found in the debates on immigration. Jewish MPs, in fact, played an important role in supporting the Race Relations Bills and in attacking racial discrimination.

Related to the explanation for prejudice and discrimination in

terms of a cultural emanation, is the view that prejudice is a product of ignorance of other cultures, or of uninformed preference for one's own. So much of our prejudice, Callaghan (L) stated, "springs from ignorance". "Knowledge and understanding", he continued, "are the essential prerequisites and are therefore the enemies of prejudice" (23.4.1968, p.54). An analysis of racial problems in terms of ignorance is invariably accompanied by a policy recommendation in favour of more education. The "main task before us", David Ennals (L) said, "is an educational one" (3.5.1965, p.989). A solution that requires attitude change may be seen as a softer and more acceptable political opinion, than one requiring enforced change of behaviour, and can be advocated as an alternative to anti-discriminatory legislation.

Bio-psychological predispositions. There are a number of explanations of prejudice and discrimination which regard hostility, suspicion, or mistrust between races as relatively "natural" phenomena. Assertions that a pattern of behaviour is "natural" can sometimes be regarded as implying some kind of instinctive attraction towards "one's own kind" and rejection of others, and, at other times, as a deep-seated, but culturally habituated preference for one's own racial type or customs. "Natural hostility" may also be given a quasi-religious foundation in the concept of original sin. For those offering such explanation, the distinction between nature and nurture is unimportant in comparison with the wish to firmly establish the permanence of the trait in question. The naturalistic argument presumes that what is natural must in the long-term override the superficiality of any counteracting moral or legal regulations. As J Enoch Powell (UUUC) argued, "massive segregation is not arising because of discrimination - certainly not

of any discrimination which it is within the power of the law to influence or remove. It is arising because of the combination between human nature on the one hand and the mass and size ... and the rate of ... continuance (of immigration) on the other" (4.3.1976, p.1584).

The concept of deep and permanent personality traits is also to be found in the use made of the distinctions between tolerant, tolerant-inclined, prejudiced-inclined, and prejudiced respondents. The 10 per cent highly prejudiced section of the community (also described as 'authoritarian') is regarded as a semi-permanent feature of a national psychological landscape. It consists of those with personality defects, of "sick" or "twisted" minds, the "lunatic fringe", who apparently cannot be cured but must be isolated if their disease is not to spread. Reginald Freeson (L) referred to the section of the community - the "cases for psychiatry" - with whom a race relations body or conciliation body cannot hope to deal with adequately (3.5.1965, p.978).

A further variation on the bio-psychological theme, combining elements of moral sickness and natural tendency, is the concept of a prevailing human moral weakness, or frailty, that accounts for human beings' inability to live supportively together, which, in the final analysis, can never be completely eradicated. Reginald Maudling (C) thought

... there are many frailties in the human mind and spirit - greed, intolerance, and all sorts of things - which are morally wrong but cannot be made into crimes. Certain things which happen as a result of these infirmities can be and should be dealt with by law, but there is a definite limit in practice where one can go in this direction.
(23.4.1968, p.150.)

(7) Diffusion of ideas. Explanations of this kind are related to those which accept that a section of the population are predisposed for psychological or cultural reasons to show prejudice and to discriminate, but instead of emphasising the characteristics of the prejudiced person or content of his belief, they concentrate instead on the way ideas are communicated and their likely effect on an audience. It is thought that prejudice is at least partly to be explained by the process by which it is spread and by the agents that spread it. Fascist propaganda, the mass media, the speeches of Enoch Powell, or conversations on the subject of race, are held to be responsible for racialism itself, or for the possibility of it increasing.

No doubt the frequent reference to fascist propaganda by Labour politicians in 1965 was related to the provision making incitement to racial hatred a public offence, but, in addition, it had the advantage of identifying the racist villain in the 1930's clothes of the traditional enemy of socialism. In this way, racism could be firmly associated with both the foreign enemy and its atrocities against which the nation had fought in the war, and with a long-standing political enemy of the working class. Moreover, if racism was an ingredient of the philosophy of the enemy of the working class, it was not of the working class or Labour movement, which could in turn be absolved from niggling accusations of prejudice. Furthermore, the Conservatives' lack of enthusiasm for the Bills could be regarded by those on the Left as indication of their fascist inclinations.

After mentioning Auschwitz, Treblinka, and Bergen Bergen, Barnett Janner (L) insisted that this situation was not created by a large number of people, but by a handful who "by means of ... vicious

propaganda" were able to influence a "civilised and cultured people into doing what nobody would have believed possible at the time" (3.5.1965, p.957). Reginald Freeson (L) believed that the influence of Nazi and fascist groups (3.5.1965, p.965) should not be underestimated. "We fought a war for freedom", David Ennals (L) argued, "but we also fought a war against an abominable racist theory and while in the main, that theory was defeated with the people who advocated it, there are still some in our community who advocate similar themes" (3.5.1965, p.989). Thomas Torney (L) referred to fascists or members of the National Front producing racialist literature (4.3.1976, p.1619), Paul Rose (L) to the continued production of such literature which only differed "in that it is now a good deal more subtle and insidious" (4.3.1976, p.1637).

By 1968, another identifiable source of propaganda who could be blamed for kindling the fires of racialism, was Enoch Powell. His various speeches on race were referred to on both sides of the House throughout the 1968 debate. One of their purposes, of course, had been to turn public opinion against the legislation. Sir Dingle Foot (L) made the connection between Enoch Powell's speeches and those of the fascist leader Sir Oswald Mosley: "The only difference was that in his case the venom was directed against the Jews" (23.4.1968, p.84). David Ennals (L) claimed that "The damage done by that one speech can hardly be overestimated. There has been set loose a torrent of feeling, maybe sincerely held, but extremely damaging to good community relations" (23.4.1968, p.159). David Lane (C) also wondered whether Enoch Powell realised the damage he had done (4.3.1976, p.1615).

The extreme sensitivity of many people to the race issue provides a further possibility for a diffusion explanation of racial prejudice.

It consists of a version of the 'colour blind' argument which holds that if people fail to take colour into account in their behaviour or, if they avoid reference to colour in their speech, racial problems will not emerge. The argument's weakness lies in the fact that colour blind behaviour can condone already existing institutionalised racism and exacerbate race problems by failing to make provision for real social differences between the races.

As an explanation for prejudice, the 'colour blindness' thesis holds that the discussion of racial matters, the public decision to pursue any policy that recognises racial differences, and active propagandising against racialist parties, exacerbate racial prejudice and discrimination and should be assiduously avoided. It provides a convenient argument for those who oppose the Race Relations Bills and wish to excuse themselves from racial politics. Henry Brooke (C) asked whether it is desirable "that our law should emphasise racial or ethnic or national divisions". "Is it a gain?" (3.5.1965, p.967). "When one is dealing with racial prejudice", Quintin Hogg (C) said, "I should have thought that one of the wisest precepts was to refer to race as little as possible and to make rights universally applicable" (23.4.1968, p.73).

Relationship between commonsense and social scientific explanations

The commonsense explanations of prejudice and discrimination provided by politicians show interesting, and far from coincidental, parallels with those to be found in social scientific theories of race relations. Social science either merely reflects and refines the assumptions made in everyday life, or alternatively, provides sophisticated and qualified explanations that are afterwards popularised and vulgarised by the press, and adopted by politicians anxious to illuminate the social problems with which they are

confronted. It is usually difficult to decide which of these two possibilities has occurred, although from the observations below, the former, on the whole, seems the more plausible assumption.

Social scientific theories, like the explanations of politicians, may draw out and emphasise different aspects of a total social process. Also they may serve different justificatory functions. There are sociological theories that highlight, almost exclusively, the social structural handicaps under which black people live. The history of power relations which accounts for the differences is neglected while the actual conditions under which the people live and their cultural adjustments to them are described in detail. Great emphasis is placed on overcrowding, 'ghetto housing', unemployment, unfamiliarity with the British way of life, poor schools, and crime rates. The people are seen as disadvantaged, culturally deprived, inadequate, prone to immediate gratification, developing deviant or criminal culture and work-shy attitudes. Sometimes, historical factors explain the inability of black institutions to cope with the demands of mainstream white society. The Moynihan Report, for example, concentrates on the pathology of black family life. These theories have close connections with the social process and black people's characteristics arguments of the politicians.

Other theories emphasise the psychological or social characteristics of the prejudiced whites. Race prejudice is seen as a product of an authoritarian, ethnocentric personality type, or alternatively, as the consequence of frustration and aggression being diverted from powerful and obscure causes to weak and highly visible groups (scapegoating). Prejudice is often explained by mentioning the socio-economic position of white groups: their low status, downward social mobility, low level of educational attainment, etc. The work of Allport (1954), Adorno (1950), Berkowitz (1962), and

Abrams (1969), might be taken as examples. The politicians' equivalents might be traced in accounts of white perception of blacks and of white bio-psychological predispositions.

Insofar as any clear use of sociological theory can be identified in the debates on the Race Relations Bills, it is in references to institutional racialism, and vicious circles of discrimination. Such theories describe practices that have been traditionally performed, but that now sustain - albeit unintentionally - a racist effect. In turn, this effect adversely influences the conditions and performance of blacks, confirming the low expectations that whites have of them and justifying their continued treatment as inferiors.

A separate group of sociological theories emphasises the cultural values, and ideologies dealing with race, inherent in a particular society. As with Weber's theory of the Protestant Ethic, values are thought to lead to various and systematic forms of social action. Myrdal's An American Dilemma (1969) or Genovese's In Red and Black (1972) provide examples of this kind of explanatory approach. Its 'commonsense' approximation seems to be of the political type that I have called 'cultural predisposition'.

The 'diffusion theories' dealing with the manner in which ideas about race are spread through political propaganda and the mass media may also be seen as part of this culture - and - ideology - orientated group of sociological theories. Politicians' diffusion theories find their nearest theoretical equivalent in the sociological studies of race and the media. (Bagley (1973), Halloran (1974), Hartmann and Husband (1974), Downing (1975), Critcher (1977).)

Racial practice can also be explained by a wide range of economic and Marxist theories. There are theories of competition between strata of workers: good jobs are scarce and each group will try to

develop means for protecting and maintaining its position against outsiders or newcomers. Ill-informed subjective, rather than objective, self-interest may be pursued. Also attempts to equalise opportunities might be seen as removing white benefits or status. Alternatively, white racialism can be attributed to the attempts by capitalists or managers to obtain cheap labour by paying lower wages or offering less favourable conditions of work to blacks, or to the need to hinder working class organisation by dividing it on colour lines. (See Cox (1948), p.393, p.473.) Traces of these approaches can be found in politicians' references to the effects of the black presence on whites' livelihood and economic interests and to whites' fear for their standards. The fact that white benefit or 'equality' will be removed is offered as a reason for opposing the Bills.

The politicians' explanations, however, express the felt need of whites and, in general, serve to justify white privilege, while the social scientific theories endeavour to place the alienation of workers in a much more comprehensive framework and, if justificatory purpose is present at all, to argue for greater equality between races. A distinction can also be made between the social scientists' 'second order' appraisal of whites' expression of economic interest and the politicians' 'first order' reflection or repetition of whites' expression, the former retaining an academic distance and scepticism foreign to the latter. In general, theoretical economic or Marxist analyses of racial prejudice and discrimination are noticeably absent from the debates on the Bills, although they are likely to be found in some form in the campaigning literature of the Communist Party and Trotskyist groups.

Explanations at local level - local case study: prejudice,
discrimination and the Race Relations Acts.

Three survey questions dealt directly with the subject of prejudice, discrimination and the Race Relations Acts:

- (1) Do you think there is prejudice against coloured people in Britain? And the subsidiary: What are the reasons for this prejudice?
- (2) Do you think coloured people are treated fairly in (a) housing and (b) job opportunities?
- (3) In 1976 Parliament passed a Race Relations Act which made it an offence to discriminate on the grounds of race or colour. Have you any views about this legislation?

Table 18 Do you think there is prejudice against coloured people in Britain?			
	CONS	LAB	TOTAL
There is no prejudice against coloured people	0	0	0
There is only a small amount	3	4	7
Prejudice is on the decline, things are improving	0	4	4
There is prejudiced against coloured people	19	13	32
Prejudice is mainly against whites	3	0	3
TOTAL RESPONSES	25	21	46

Treated at face value, the tabulated answers to the question on prejudice are almost meaningless. Colour 'prejudice' was not always understood to entail injustice perpetrated against coloured people, and even when it was, the culpability of the parties was variously assessed, and mitigating circumstances pointed out. It was only by looking at the reasons given for the existence of prejudice that an accurate picture of councillors' conceptions of its nature and cause began to emerge. The sevenfold typology used above to deal with the parliamentary speeches, again proved its worth by demonstrating quite

marked differences between Conservative and Labour responses. Conservative explanation for prejudice focused heavily on the characteristics of black people (as many as 15 respondents' references) and to a lesser extent on bio-psychological dispositions, social processes, and whites' perception of circumstances. Labour, on the other hand, made virtually no mention of black people's characteristics, and concentrated on social processes, whites' perception of social processes and economic interest, traditional cultural beliefs, and the effects of the mass media.

(1) Social process explanations. Conservatives were prone to mention the process of immigration as responsible for prejudice: in particular, "the sheer weight of numbers" (C9), and the speed with which the migration took place (C17). There were also suggestions that unemployment among whites and the generally limited job market might cause ill-feeling. Another point of view was that "whenever you see a group which is in a minority or is wealthier or is more ostentatious or in some way different the host community will always look at it suspiciously" (C4). The ideas of threat and invasion were reflected in the idea that in Wolverhampton "large areas - whole streets and shops" had been taken over by the Asians (C9). This was the (justified) reason for white hostility.

The most common Labour social process explanations were offered in terms of lack of knowledge and education: "lack of knowledge and understanding" (L1), "it's only lack of education" (L10), "because the working man never travelled very much" (L15), "lack of knowledge of the culture of the population who have come to this country" (L19). The theme was developed by one councillor into a classical example of an interaction theory. The respective parties did not know enough about one another because of "insufficient association". Black and

white lived in separate communities with the result that there was no social mixing: "If you go into a pub in this area where they're mixed, the blacks will be in one room and the whites in another" (L5). The economic climate was also mentioned as an important factor in relations between the races (L33). Two other Labour explanations are worth reporting. The first saw military service abroad as partly responsible for poor relations. When soldiers were stationed abroad in barracks, criminal elements used to frequent the area and try to steal everything in sight. This gave a very poor impression to the troops who quite naturally generalised from their limited contact with coloured people, and brought home their experiences with them (L55). Councillor L43 thought that we could not expect anything but prejudice from a working population encouraged to find any scape-goat other than the employing classes for its insecurities.

(2) White political agency. Government measures were far more frequently blamed by Conservatives rather than by Labour for creating prejudice. Anti-discrimination laws featured prominently for "trying to make people accept others by law. There's got to be a lot of freedom in this country and that law's eroding freedom and causing more hatred for the coloured people" (C30). Similarly, a Labour councillor objected to being told "who has got to be loved or hated" (L2). Only the Conservatives mentioned that prejudice had arisen because no-one had ever asked "the indigenous people of Britain if they wanted to be a multi-racial society" (C9), and because "the vast number of coloured people have been thrust upon the British people who have had no say whatsoever in the way their country has been changed" (C47). Councillor C3 felt that hostility occurred because of the government practice of allowing migrants to draw social security as soon as they entered the country. As I have already

argued, concern at the prospect of the poor getting "something for nothing" is a recurring Conservative shibboleth.

(3) Black people's characteristics. Conservatives were overwhelmingly preoccupied with explanations in terms of black people's characteristics and made frequent reference to cultural differences between coloured people and whites. Usually these cultural traits were overtly, or covertly, assumed to stand in the relationship of inferior to superior, e.g.

It's the way they live. When they first started coming to this country they had such dirty habits and they were all the same (C23).

A lot of coloured families didn't have the same sort of standards that we have in this country (C26).

It's their colour. It's their way of life. They live different to us. A lot of them do anyway. Their standards aren't the same as ours and it'll take a long time for them to adjust, but the young people who have been brought up with them will accept them more (C47).

The low standard of the immigrant generally. The average immigrant, and I make exception of immigrant doctors and lawyers, has a very low standard. They've come here because they've failed to succeed in their own country, so you've got immigration from the lower echelons of the countries they've come from. The English people are prejudiced against them because their standards are so much lower (C58).

The last remark is worth noting because it illustrates that 'prejudice' is no longer being used to signify some kind of injustice, but as a synonym for 'ill-will'. The explanations above can be further subdivided into 'possible adjustment' and 'no-adjustment' varieties. The 'possible adjustment' kind assumes that there is some hope of a renunciation of 'inferior ways' and of eventual integration taking place, e.g. "they need to hear about the British way of life" (C40). The 'no-adjustment' variety is pessimistic about the possibility of a white cultural renaissance among black people e.g. "They aren't prepared to accept the British way of life" (C27) and "they don't

want to integrate ... they insist on their own native customs" (C41).

Apart from talk of their low standards and unwillingness to embrace the British way of life, a number of other characteristics of black people were mentioned as reasons for prejudice. There was "the arrogance of the coloured person" (C13). In particular, Councillor C37 was unhappy with the "cocky sort of attitude among the Jamaicans, the younger generation, which I don't like and which I think is turning the people against the coloured people and unfortunately affecting the Asians as well".

In addition, there was the very fact of colour. Both Conservatives and Labour mentioned blackness as if it were the basic reason for white prejudice, e.g. "perhaps it's because of the colour of their skin" (L16), thus suggesting that responsibility lay with the black person for being black. I have preferred, however, to treat this explanation under the head of 'bio-psychological' disposition, although in a number of cases it was clear from the context that it was the black trait of skin colour itself and not the white psychological disposition that was considered to give rise to race prejudice.

As I have already pointed out, Labour rarely offered explanations for prejudice in terms of black characteristics. Apart from the occasional mention of different skin colour there was only one suggestion that "their ways and ours are different in a lot of respects" (L51) but this response was not enlarged upon. The idea, therefore, that the characteristics of black people were responsible for colour prejudice was very much a Conservative monopoly.

(4) Effect on whites' livelihood and economic interest. On the whole, explanations of this kind were uncommon, and difficult to distinguish from those dealing with white people's perception of

their economic interest (see 5 below). Councillor C59 pointed out that coloured people had "come over here, taken jobs and taken over areas where they've introduced their own ethnic ideas" and Councillor C58 sympathised with people in suburbs who didn't want coloured people living there and joining in their social activities. Labour views of the effect of the black presence on white people's interests was invariably presented via the mode of attribution and often without much sympathy for the whites who claimed to have suffered hardships. The Labour responses, therefore, are dealt with in the following section.

(5) The white population's perception of the above. As has already been pointed out, the four kinds of explanation mentioned above, whether or not they are accepted or believed by the politicians, themselves, are nevertheless attributed by them to the white population. What matters in this form of explanation is not that the reasons given for prejudice are accurate, but that they are believed by the electorate to be so.

Conservatives mentioned many of the same things that their colleagues asserted directly, but in these instances they prefixed their remarks with 'many people think' or 'whites are frightened'. Thus, with regard to social process arguments, the interviewer was told that "people fear being swamped" (C9) or were "annoyed by blacks on social security" (C3) or were "frightened by people of a different culture coming to live next door" (C9). But the sub-group of explanations which again predominated were those offered in terms of white people's perception of black characteristics:

They don't dislike all of them - only the type of coloured person who carries a chip on his shoulders (C13),

You can't blame them for feeling frightened when suddenly they find people of a totally different culture living on either side of them, with the smell of garlic and the rest of it (C9).

People are annoyed at blacks' unwillingness to conform (C25).

People tend to say: "Well if they don't want to integrate why don't they go back? After all we've managed to integrate with the Ukrainians and Poles" (C39).

Labour councillors also used the mode of attribution to explain white prejudice, but on the whole, no attempt was made to excuse or justify ill-feeling. On the contrary, they thought many of the beliefs held by whites about black people were misguided. Responses contained reference either directly, or in so many words, to "the traditional idea of scapegoating" (L43). Most of the explanations were offered in terms of a perception of social processes or economic interests. Councillors pointed out that there was anxiety about the provision of jobs and housing and a tendency to blame shortage on consumers who could be readily identified by their distinctive languages, cultures, or colour. Comparison with previous migrations was common:

Just after the war, it was the Central Europeans. They were the threat, they were coming, and they were going to take the jobs which would no longer be there for the chap who'd always lived down the back street. It's not a new phenomenon by any means. It's based on fear and the best way to eradicate it is to provide meaningful and useful work (L56).

A number of reasons offered in this category by councillors for the current pattern of British race relations have a bearing on the theory developed in an earlier chapter and I have previously made use of the material there. But, in brief, they mentioned the fear of the effect that coloured people might have upon whites' material well-being and cultural values, and whites' jealousy at the apparent achievements of ethnic minorities.

Two other suggestions relating to attributed characteristics of black people were forthcoming. Councillor L21 thought that prejudice might be related to sexual myths: "the so-called sexual potency myth you hear about", while Councillor L55 pointed out that many people believed Jamaicans were idle, though he himself could not agree.

(6) Whites' predispositions to the black presence. Explanations of this kind fell under two subheads (a) traditional cultural beliefs and (b) bio-psychological dispositions. Sometimes the two were combined because respondents were not conceptually clear about the distinction between biologically inherent and deep-seated or long-lasting cultural traits. As one Conservative put it: "It's a matter of human and nature and history and it has occurred generation after generation" (C4). Councillor C25 felt that "we've always been prejudiced against all foreigners: you have only got to go back to the Poles", and Councillor C12 thought the reasons went back many years and it was "just one of those human things. It's just there, a natural sort of distinction".

With regard to the more clearly bio-psychological dispositional explanations, Councillor C39 believed that prejudice was "inherent - it's the same in Jamaica", while Councillor C10 reasoned that "withdrawal" was "a natural human reaction to startling social changes". Labour, too, thought that prejudice arose "because we're only human beings and we all have likes and dislikes" (L2), and because "we've always got to blame somebody for something; there's always got to be someone to poke fun at" (L42).

Another set of explanations seemed to assume the existence of a 'colour shock', that is, that white people were in some way directly affected by the perception of blackness: "it's because they're

black basically" (C8), or "it's because of their colour - even the kids, at one time, were a bit frightened of it" (C28). This idea was not a preserve of the Conservatives; a Labour councillor shared the same idea (L16). The explanation in terms of 'colour shock' has been classed here as a white bio-psychological disposition but it seems that those offering the explanation are more inclined to treat the stimulus (black appearance), rather than the dispositional response, as the essential causal factor.

Among Labour councillors, predispositional explanations of prejudice were often assumed to result from the heritage of imperial ideology or from long-established cultural and socialisation practices. Councillor L21 remarked that "the idea of the white man's burden is still there". Councillor L22 thought that prejudice had been brought about by "our attitudes to Empire: we owned a third of the world at one time. Of course, we didn't own it, but because of this the British came to see the rest of the world as inferior". Another suggestion common to Labour was that the parental threat to fetch the black man to naughty children had resulted in life-long fear of black people:

The main reason is that when I was a kid, if we did anything wrong, our parents would say "behave yourself or the darkie man will have you, the black man will have you" (L7).

This early socialisation explanation was also to be found in ingenious combination with the theme of the heritage of empire:

It was probably because fathers and mothers used to say to the kids, "If you don't shut up and be a good lad, I'll fetch the black man to you". My one grandfather fought in the Zulu wars and his stories about the Zulus, they'd frighten anybody to death (L29).

In summary, inasmuch as traditional cultural and bio-psychological disposition could be distinguished, the former explanations occurred more frequently among Labour while the latter were more common among

Conservatives, a distribution pattern that might have been predicted from the parties' differing concepts of man.

(7) Diffusion of ideas. In common with the parliamentary findings, councillors seeking to explain prejudice in terms of the diffusion of ideas were chiefly to be found among the ranks of Labour. Once again the media were seen as mainly to blame for deliberately kindling resentment against black people among the white majority. As Councillor L14 put it, "the media and politicians try to provoke the sentiments of innocent people". Councillor L32 thought that there was no analysis of the facts in the media: "they film anything and concentrate on the sensational. If the media were cut out altogether, we could get down to work and hammer out a proper policy with the various cultural groups".

Local councillors' responses to the question on prejudice also offered a number of indications of how they felt prejudice could be alleviated. The Conservatives clearly felt that the way to achieve good 'community relations' lay in conformity to the British way of life. Black people had to "abide by the rules and laws we lay down" (C25). To be accepted, "they must conform to our way of life which unfortunately they won't do and they don't do" (C28). The same councillor described the ideal: "we have several coloured families in the street and they conform with everything everyone else does ...". While no doubt agreeing with this sentiment to some extent, Labour councillors placed the emphasis in other quarters. For them, the answer lay in better economic conditions, less competition for scarce resources such as houses and jobs, and plenty of education.

Table 19 Percentage distribution of Conservative and Labour explanations for prejudice and discrimination												
Forms of explanation	Members of Parliament*						Local Councillors +					
	Const**		Lab		Total		Cons		Lab		Total	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Social process	12	22	8	21	20	22	9	19	10	25	19	21
White political/legislative agency	13	24	1	3	14	15	4	8	1	3	5	6
Characteristics of black people	7	13	4	11	11	12	16	33	2	5	18	20
Effects on whites' livelihood	4	7	3	8	7	8	3	6	2	5	5	6
Whites' perception of above	9	16	4	11	13	14	8	16	10	25	18	20
Whites' predispositions	7	13	7	19	14	15	8	16	11	27	19	21
Diffusion of ideas	3	5	10	27	13	14	1	2	4	10	5	6
TOTAL	55	100	37	100	92	100	49	100	40	100	89	100

Figures denote total number of explanations given, but not of numbers of speeches made, or responses to questions asked.

* Second Readings of the 1965, 1968, and 1976 Race Relations Bills.

+ Wolverhampton councillors' interviews in Spring 1979.

** Includes J Enoch Powell, UUUC, in 1976.

The table above summarises the frequency with which the various explanations for prejudice occurred in the speeches of members of parliament to the race relations acts, and in the answers given by local councillors to the survey question on the reasons for prejudice. A politician could easily offer more than one explanation in the course of his speech or response, and classification of response was frequently a matter of complex judgment. Nevertheless, despite difficulties of interpretation, ambiguity, repetitiveness and crudity of classification, each party appears to have a distinctive distribution pattern and preference for particular kinds of explanation.

While undue reliance cannot be placed on a table which makes use of such different sources of material (Hansard and private interviews), and in which the classification system is abstract and somewhat dependent on the researcher's whim, a number of observations may be made.

At parliamentary level, white political/legislative agency accounted for 24 per cent of Conservative but only 3 per cent of Labour explanations, while at borough council level, this kind of explanation was made use of far less frequently. Probably, the form of justification was developed, to some extent, for the purpose of providing opposition to the Race Relations Acts and was, therefore, specific to contexts in which Conservatives at parliamentary level had reservations about or opposed the legislation in question.

At both levels, Conservative and Labour made roughly equal use of social process explanations, while diffusion arguments, though generally more common in parliament, were always more popular among Labour politicians. Explanations in terms of the effects on whites'

livelihood were utilised infrequently by both parties and at either level.

Perhaps most telling was the variation between members of parliament and local councillors in the use of 'whites' perception', 'whites' predispositions' and, in particular, 'black characteristics' explanations. At parliamentary level, 'black characteristics' arguments averaged 14 per cent and, though more frequent among the Conservatives, were to be found in both parties. Although the small number of cases at parliamentary level makes any kind of finding highly unreliable, and most probably the result of the contribution of one or two maverick members from both parties, at local level, references to black characteristics appeared much more frequently, and were very much a Conservative speciality, accounting for as many as one third of their explanatory forms. The increase at local level might be accounted for in a number of ways. Interviews were conducted in private, and councillors might have been less likely to deracialise their discourse under those circumstances. Alternatively, councillors at local level might be more likely to be drawn from the social classes they represent, to have greater familiarity with the general discourse and argumentation of a much more immediate electorate, and to be more susceptible to the pressure it brings to bear. In this respect, though Labour did not straightforwardly echo the expressions of antipathy towards black people, their 'whites' perception' and 'whites' predispositions' responses showed that they had a shrewd idea of what they were up against. On the other hand, the Conservatives' nationalism and other ideological traits enabled them to be more direct in their reflection of the population's racial beliefs. The main force of the argument throughout this section has been that the politician

finding himself faced with an electorate presented as antipathetic towards black people, has had to employ various rhetorical strategems to meet the requirements of his station.

Table 20 Do you think coloured people are treated fairly in housing and job opportunities?			
	CONS	LAB	TOTAL
Treated fairly	15*	1	16
Few exceptions, but on the whole, treated fairly	2	1	3
In some, or many instances, treated unfairly	2	12	14
Other	3	1	4
Don't know	1	7	8
TOTAL RESPONSES	23	22	45
Specific reference to fair treatment in local authority housing	9	11	20

* Including 2 responses claiming the treatment of black people was unfair to whites.

By asking whether coloured people were treated fairly in housing and jobs an attempt was made in the survey to make a distinction between prejudice and discrimination. It seems that popularly, prejudice does indeed denote hostile emotions and their expression, whereas discrimination, if even vaguely distinguished from prejudice, is more closely related to action. The expression 'treated fairly' was deliberately chosen in preference to the negatively phrased 'discriminated against' because of the latter's indefinite popular usage.

Discrimination stemming from institutional arrangements was not easily understood, however, and so the only form of discrimination conceived of by most councillors was that which was personally motivated. Inevitably, then, discrimination entailed prejudice.

Generally, a person was thought to discriminate because he was prejudiced and the same defensive strategies were employed in explaining discriminatory acts as in explaining prejudice, although the form of the survey question forced councillors to relate their answers to a context. But prejudice did not entail discrimination. This allowed the employment of a simple defensive ploy of denying that prejudice ever became manifest in action. There is a great deal of difference between accepting that there is ill-feeling against black people and agreeing that it affects the fairness with which they are supposedly treated. Just how different is revealed in the tabulation below, compiled from Tables 21 and 23.

Table 21 The relationship between prejudice and discrimination			
	CONS	LAB	TOTAL
No (or little) prejudice and (on the whole) fair treatment	2	2	4
No (or little) prejudice but unfair treatment	0	0	0
Prejudice but (on the whole) fair treatment	17	0	17
Prejudice and unfair treatment	2	12	14
TOTAL	21	14	35

Seventeen Conservatives were able to claim that although there was prejudice against coloured people they were, on the whole, fairly treated in housing and jobs. But, as with prejudice and injustice, what constituted fairness or unfairness was by no means self-evident. Although Conservatives might admit they were treated differently, the difference of treatment was usually seen as inevitable and/or justifiable. The rare cases where it was considered unjustifiable

arose, not as a result of whites treating blacks unequally, but because blacks were thought to have been given unfair advantage over whites, e.g. "from my limited knowledge, I think they're treated better" (C57). In at least two other instances, answers fully reversed the implication of the question:

You could have asked "are white people being treated fairly by the Asians who own shops and property?" Wolverhampton market is almost fifty per cent Asian stall owners, you know" (C39).

Some employers, instead of taking on whites, have taken on coloured people when they're not the best applicants for the job. They've taken them on for fear of being reported to the Race Relations Board (C26).

On the whole, among Conservatives, complaints of colour discrimination were seen as unfounded and arising from the unrealistic expectations of black people, who were thought of as less qualified than white workers:

I think some of them aspire too quickly, particularly among the Asian community. I've found once or twice that they've wanted to run before they could walk (C8).

When people are looking for employees, they are going to pick the best, and the reason why coloured people don't always get the job is that they're not able to do the job as well as someone else (C49).

It's the type of work. They want to pick and choose (C30). In other responses, it was taken for granted that the white man should be offered the job in situations where black and white workers were equally qualified.

This was something inevitable: it was only human nature to look after your own kind first. When skill and qualifications were equally distributed it was thought to be self-evidently unfair on the white worker for a comparative newcomer to be selected in preference to him.

Labour responses were more complex. Only slightly more than half accepted that black people were treated unfairly with the non-

committal 'don't know' being used in over one quarter of the replies (in contrast to only one Conservative 'don't know'). Frequently, whether the councillor asserted that there was discrimination or that he did not know whether or not it existed, mitigating circumstances were sketched out to excuse white behaviour. This was at least as apparent among Labour as it was among Conservatives, the Labour defenses being, if anything, more elaborately developed:

If two boys, one white and one coloured both went for a job, I would have to think very carefully. I may be biased towards the whites but I'd have to be very convinced that the coloured boy was better before I gave him a job. I don't know whether it's right but that's how I feel (L2).

In this area for years and years we've been motivated towards using and producing things with our hands, But if you bring in the West Indian who's never used his hands before and expect him to fall into the same sort of thing we've been doing for hundreds of years, he can't do it and feels at a loss (L35).

You've got to look at the boss's side. If he wants someone to do a job, he's out to get the best value for his money. If the white person can do the job better than the coloured person because of his background and experience, then he'll get the job. It can be called discrimination, but you've got to realise people are in business. Perhaps as a socialist I shouldn't say this, but we all want the best value for our money (L42).

If the black man and a white man went for a job and were equal in every respect, wouldn't you give it to the white man? (L51).

Two of the above responses also show clear evidence of anxiety ("I don't know whether it's right" and "perhaps as a socialist I shouldn't say this") in the face of a socialist ideological attack on racial injustice of the kind being advocated. Probably, over one quarter of Labour responses provided a justification for treating black and white differently.

But, of course, there were a number of Labour councillors who were most indignant at the treatment black people received. Councillor L14 remarked that:

You know as well as I do that there's discrimination in promotion, training, acceptance, and assessment, and similarly, in the housing sector. They may accept black people as factory workers but I don't think they are yet prepared to accept them in higher posts.

Councillor L5 did not think they were fairly treated in the purchase of housing, while Councillors L19 and L21 both believed that black children had to be much better educated than white children to stand a chance of getting jobs in competition with them. Councillor L55 even admitted that at local level some trade union branches still objected to the employment of black workers. But, while admitting to the existence of discrimination, some councillors still sought to defend certain of their political symbols:

I would hope the trade unions would make sure they are treated fairly in industry (L22).

It's difficult to weigh up whether there's prejudice, but nationalised industries don't have prejudice (L33).

(The last remark also illustrates the difficulty some councillors had in distinguishing prejudice from discrimination.)

One unforeseen consequence of a question directed at councillors on housing was their eagerness to interpret it parochially in terms of council housing in Wolverhampton. A new points system and application form for council housing had recently been introduced in Wolverhampton. One of its features was a voluntary question on ethnic identity aimed at monitoring the allocation and distribution of ethnic minority families on council property, in order that they received a fair proportion of the more desirable properties. The publicity surrounding this innovation led 20 councillors either to claim that there was no discrimination in housing (with no regional qualification or mention of privately owned or rented accommodation) or at least to mention the scheme's merits. Indeed, the advantage of the arrangements led one Labour councillor to remark that:

In Wolverhampton, we have given them good council houses, but I'm afraid the Jamaicans have abused it. Because they're so darned noisy with those all-night parties, we've had to give them whole blocks of flats (L31).

The implication that the allocation of council housing to black people was something of a privilege is but one more sign of the difficulty many white people have in even understanding that a concept of injustice is embedded in 'prejudice' and 'discrimination'. It is similarly indicative that only one councillor (L56) in sixty advocated positive discrimination, the enforcement of the Race Relations Acts, and the adoption of equal opportunity policies. Much more typical was the complacent Labour redefinition of discrimination as behaviour arising from lack of awareness for, after all, "The British people take a long while in understanding, but when they succeed, they're fair, the ordinary folk, and I'm speaking for the ordinary folk" (L1).

Table 22 Views on the 1976 Race Relations Act			
	CONS	LAB	TOTAL
Legislation not strong enough	0	2	2
Legislation a good thing	7	13	20
Legislation a bad thing	14	0	14
Uncommitted, reservations	5	6	11
TOTAL RESPONSES	26	21	47

The survey question on councillors' views of the 1976 Race Relations Act showed 22 to be in favour of legislation and 14 against. Twice as many Labour as Conservative councillors thought legislation to be a good thing, while all the 14 against the legislation were Conservatives, thus showing a significant difference in response between the two parties. It was acknowledged by all concerned that the Act provoked a great deal of controversy among the white

electorate where it was widely seen to be a black man's charter of privilege. "If only people would bear in mind that it's equal for one side and the other", one Conservative (C57) pleaded, while Labour councillor L29 summed it up, thus:

A lot of people point to the Race Relations Act and say there's one law for them and one for us ... (in conversation with an Irishman) ... I said it applies exactly the same to you as it does to a coloured man ... But everybody sees it as a discriminatory law in favour of the blacks. It was never intended that way, and doesn't work that way. It's a good piece of legislation turned on itself because of popular misunderstanding.

Probably, because councillors sensed a popular white groundswell against the Act, most of their responses were offered in the context of the eristic for and against legislation. The effect of their assessment of public opinion meant that even in the case of those councillors who supported the Act, discourse was usually defensive and hedged around with strong reservations. The Labour party might have been generally in favour, but in the light of the paucity of arguments in support, it was difficult to understand quite why.

There were, of course, a number of different reasons for opposing the Act as it stood. It might be claimed that (a) it did not go far enough, (b) it was inadequate or ineffective, (c) it was either not properly enforced or unenforceable, (d) its intention was publicly misunderstood, (e) it did, in fact, discriminate against the white population and, in so doing, increased resentment against black people, (f) it offended against free speech and democracy and, finally, that, (g) race relations itself was not a matter susceptible to improvement by law. In order to avoid being unduly repetitious, I shall offer only a few examples of the reasons given.

Councillors L10 and C21 thought that the Act did not go far

enough. It had been "passed only as an eyewash to coloured people", it had "no power" and it was "impossible to prove anything".

Councillor L10 also considered that the law was unenforceable, while Councillor L19 thought there were many "weird anomalies", and that it did not stop people discriminating, or produce "the results that were hoped for". Furthermore, the judiciary had interpreted the Act "in a way that suits their reactionary aims rather than in favour of the persons for whom the legislation was passed" (L43). "They'd got to pass the Act", Councillor C23 remarked, "but I don't think it's working very well because it's virtually impossible to enforce it - unless someone makes a complaint. And I don't think many coloured people have got the gumption to do it".

A number of councillors voiced concern at the way the Act had been popularly misunderstood. One Conservative asserted that he was entirely against discrimination but felt that it could not be got rid of simply by passing laws. The Race Relations Act had been interpreted "as some kind of charter for black men. This wasn't intended but this is the sort of myth or popular belief that has grown up round it" (C10).

Some councillors, particularly Conservatives, actually believed in the 'myth'. Councillor C9 claimed that "we're the ones that are becoming discriminated against because they've got more laws to protect them than we have". Apart from the Race Relations Act, he instanced the "diabolic" exemption of the Sikhs from wearing motorcycle crash helmets. Another councillor complained that whites did not have a Race Relations Board to go to - and that this made them bitter (C28). Others drew attention to what they considered to be the inequalitarian working of the Act and its consequences in terms of difficulties for employers and worsening race relations:

It's created problems whereby people have become frightened to get in touch with employment agencies out of fear that they'll have to accept the person sent along. If he's black, he may not have the ability of the white, but he'll get the job because of fear of the repercussions if the firm is reported to the Race Relations Board (C25).

Much fear was expressed at the dangers of black people claiming discrimination when none existed. In addition, white people were thought to be unable to express their opinions, thus offending against the principle of free speech, and with the consequence that they had "bottled them up, creating even more hatred" (C28).

A typical response among Labour was to cast around for other more popular and less controversial ways of improving race relations. Doubt would be expressed about the effectiveness of legal remedies, and alternative measures - usually hard political work, education, or the deliberate befriending of black people - suggested, e.g. "in the end it comes down to hard work and education" (L21). As Councillor L5 admitted:

I'm not happy about legislation to make people do something of this kind. I think it's better to do it in a different way, to persuade people of the right way to go. But I understand to back that up, you've got to have some legislation. So it was introduced - so I live with it, but I would have preferred a situation where we didn't have to have legislation for this sort of thing and everybody could live reasonably together.

Certainly, Labour councillors were most earnest in their desire for the problem of racial discrimination to dissolve itself in a convenient and unobtrusive way:

I wish only that we didn't need that kind of legislation and that people could just live ordinary lives irrespective of colour (L20).

If we all made intimate friends in the West Indian and Indian community, we shouldn't have our problem (L19).

Conservatives, too, felt the law was not an appropriate tool to be used in the context of race relations. This kind of behaviour was best left to "the good sense of the people" who would "eventually sort things out" (C47). The Act was unnecessary "because we always had a moral duty not to discriminate and now people had an excuse to do so in the form of an unjust law" (C4).

In summary then, when considered as a whole, the questions on prejudice, discrimination, and the Race Relations Acts revealed a tendency to play down the extent of white prejudice and acts of discrimination, and to excuse hostile behaviour towards members of other races. This was frequently accomplished by the techniques of 'blaming the victim', 'turning a blind eye', or objecting to detail at the expense of an overall purpose. Whites were invariably absolved of guilt or responsibility in the face of the plight of black people, while practical means of resolving difficulties were simply ignored or considered unworkable. Conservatives were very much prone to regard black people's social experience as self-induced and their complaints as unfounded. Solutions were thought to lie in the ethnic minority's own efforts, through hard work and conformist behaviour. Labour were more ready to accept an 'interactionist' analysis of the situation, but in the face of a covert, but general recognition of the electorate's possible hostility, showed an inclination towards 'idealist' futures rather than towards solutions involving some political risk. At a very general level, it would probably be true to say that a theory of scarcity or maldistribution of resources underlay the Labour diagnosis of racial difficulties.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXPLANATION AND JUSTIFICATION

An explanation is a statement or set of statements which enables what has to be explained to be logically inferred and which reduces its problematic character. Acceptable explanations must appear to be relevant and true, but the criteria for accepting an explanation as true will vary considerably. Where scientific explanations are concerned, the evidence of the senses rather than faith or divine revelation is required as the test of truth. But the lack of rigour in the testing of explanations of the social world, the kinds of sensible evidence made available, and the suitability of the uses to which it is put, create difficulties in deciding on its validity and scope. Although politicians would like to believe in the scientific status of their factual assertions, the explanations that they use are likely to be partially selected, dogmatically asserted, and generalised beyond the context for which they were originally formulated. Also the politician is likely to select his explanation and the frequently inadequate evidence in support of it on the basis of his political needs of the moment rather than with an overwhelming desire to establish the truth. In other words, his primary purpose is to justify rather than to explain.

Justification refers to the reasoning aimed at inducing the audience to accept, in this case, a moral or political evaluation or prescription. A justification reassures, convinces, or persuades the self or others of the rightness of a belief or action. Analytically, it differs from an explanation of the cause or function given for the evaluation or prescription. The ambiguous question, 'Why are the British colour-prejudiced?' might be construed as a request for either a justification or an explanation. A colour-

prejudiced white might claim that he hates blacks because they are taking over his country - a country which, he feels, ought to belong to the whites such as himself. His expression aims at convincing the audience that he is morally right in holding such an opinion and at illiciting their support for his views. Alternatively, a social scientist might provide an explanation in terms of the white man's status insecurity, which in itself, does not commit the social scientist to supporting or condoning prejudice, but only to providing a reason for its existence. A person who accepts an explanation of why prejudice exists, is not automatically committed to accepting that prejudice ought to exist or to be condoned. Despite the fact that he can see only too clearly why some people embrace prejudice, he may still wish to reject their evaluation in favour of making no evaluation whatsoever, or of making a contrary one of his own.

The distinction between explanation and justification centres on the evaluation implicit in the latter. The way the social world is, is no reason for supposing that it is the way it ought to be. At least, this is the classical Humean position, based on a logical distinction between fact and value. The history of political thought, however, gives us little reason for believing that such a distinction has ever, in practice, been rigorously maintained. From time immemorial, political justification has been based on accounts and explanations - mythical or historical - of the existing natural world and social structure. Explanation also serves the function of justification. The justificatory systems of modern politicians are likely to prove no exception and to follow the same pattern.

Kant's third antinomy, juxtaposing the causality of the laws of nature which determine everything, against the causality of

freedom, provides some philosophical understanding of the kind of reasoning involved in conflating explanation and justification.

Kant thought that human behaviour is subject to empirical laws and that human action can only be explained as being causally determined. Sufficient knowledge of a human being and his situation would enable us to predict his subsequent behaviour, and in this respect, there is no fundamental difference between nature and human action: "Like all other things in nature he must have an empirical character" (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A546, B574).

However, although it makes sense to say that a human being ought to have acted otherwise, to talk of nature in this way would be meaningless. "We cannot say that anything in nature ought to be other than what in all these time relations it actually is" (Kant, C of Pure R, A547, B575). If a man tells a lie we are able to explain it causally in terms of his socialisation, etc., but we still wish to claim that he ought not to have told a lie. In assessing him morally we must be making use of a non-empirical, a priori law of reason, expressed as an imperative. And we are asserting that the will is determined by reason, rather than by empirical motives, i.e. that the will is able to free itself from empirical constraints and act accordingly to the a priori law of reason:

Reason is present in all the actions of men at all times and under all circumstances, and is always the same; but it is not itself in time, and does not fall into any new state in which it was not before. In respect to new states, it is determining, not determinable.
(Kant, C of Pure R, B584.)

The actions resulting from the exercise of reason, then, are empirical, and are understood not as deriving from a timeless freedom but from a preceding spatio-temporal cause. Thus, freedom is not subject to empirical investigation and the question must arise of

how man, unlike nature, can know he is "conditioned other than in a merely sensible manner". The answer lies in the privileged manner in which man knows himself:

Man, however, who knows all the rest of nature solely through the senses, knows himself also through pure apperception; and this indeed, in acts and inner determinations, which he cannot regard as impressions of the senses. He is thus to himself, on the one hand phenomenon, and on the other hand, in respect of certain faculties the action of which cannot be ascribed to the receptivity of sensibility, a purely intelligible object.

(Kant, C of Pure R, A546, B574.)

The consequence of the separation of the world of phenomena from that of freedom is summed up neatly in Kant's Critique of Judgement where he talked of the division of philosophy. There are, he asserted, "but two kinds of concepts ... those of nature and that of freedom", giving rise respectively to two kinds of philosophy, "a theoretical, as Philosophy of Nature, and a practical as Philosophy of Morals ..." Kant warned of the confusion that arises as a result of identifying "what is practical according to concepts of nature ... with what is practical according to the concept of freedom".

It is precisely this confusion that is reflected in the overwhelming tendency of politicians to convert explanation into justification. Having explained a social phenomenon in terms of a specific causal factor or function, they then use the factor or function in a normative manner to decide upon its moral standing. In the case of prejudice and discrimination the explanations offered for their existence serve to morally condone or condemn the words and deeds involved.

The suspicion occurs that justification is functionally more important and temporarily prior to explanation, and that the explanation is not formulated on the basis of truth, but constructed or selected for its justificatory function. It serves primarily

to produce moral conviction or reassurance in the audience.

However, the fact that the explanation also serves as a justification, does not necessarily have a bearing on its truth or falsity.

A recognisably true explanation is likely to carry justificatory conviction, while a recognisably false one is not. Social science, then, inasmuch as it is regarded as scientific, acquires an importance not only for its explanatory, but also for its justificatory, value. As the realm of science encroaches on the realm of the moral, the social scientist is turned unwittingly into a moralist, while the politician is able to falsely disguise his freedom of choice, or that of his electorate, behind a facade of causal necessity. But when social science does not support the policies he wishes to advocate, the politician will conveniently forget its findings and favour a common-sense approach based upon self-evidence of immediate, hastily generalised experience. Somehow, the beliefs of the electorate, however fantastic, will become identified with empirical fact.

From the general socio-political, and specific discursive, context of the Race Relations Bills, it is possible to make out the justificatory requirements and function of the explanations members of parliament offer for prejudice and discrimination. Supporters of an anti-discrimination measure need to convince others that it should be enacted while opponents must show why it should not become law. These requirements have to be met without impugning the moral worth of the British people, who are held to be tolerant and sympathetic.

A suitable justification for the Race Relations Bills must show that prejudice and discrimination exist in Britain, but that the responsibility for their existence should not be blamed on the electorate as a whole. It will also be useful to show how legislation

can help to reduce prejudice and discrimination. The counter-justification can scarcely deny that the racial prejudice and discrimination syndrome exists somewhere in the world, but must strive to show either that it does not exist in Britain, or that it scarcely exists, or that it exists, but is justified, or that it will not be remedied, but made worse by the proposed legislation. The key to understanding the justificatory exercise is to recognise the politicians' need to resolve the tension between the affirmation of the moral integrity of the British people and the knowledge that the legislation implies that these same people are guilty of morally unacceptable, discriminatory behaviour. How are they to be simultaneously both moral and immoral? The explanations provided for prejudice and discrimination must be examined in the light of this justificatory enigma.

(1) Social process justification. The advantage of the explanation for prejudice and discrimination in terms of social process is that it avoids attributing moral responsibility to any identifiable social group. The social processes of immigration, urban decay, etc, are treated much in the same way as natural events such as floods, crop failure, or plague, which twentieth-century man has excluded from the moral sphere. 'Ought', as Kant pointed out, does not apply to nature. Furthermore, attention is mainly focused on the initiating causal factor, rather than on the human reaction, the link between these two remaining unspecific. If attempts are made to concretise the abstracted social process, by switching from talk of immigration to the person of the immigrant, then moral responsibility will normally be attributed to the black, rather than the white, party. In this context, the social process explanation succeeds, first, by

locating the cause of discrimination in a depersonalised social world of social forces similar in kind to the forces of nature, second, by obscuring the relationship between the external social force and the state of mind it engenders, and third, by ensuring that the social process referred to has, in the final analysis, a black agency. In this way, whites are morally protected in triplicate, while the social process set in motion, however abstract, can serve to justify the legislation, or show that it can never be effective.

(2) White political/legislative justification. White political/legislative explanations place the responsibility for discriminatory acts, not on the British people as a whole, but on the political opposition. Politicians are held to be responsible for immigration or anti-discrimination legislation that has unnecessarily given rise to the present unpleasant circumstances. These could be remedied if only the opposition would see the error of its ways, halt immigration, and abandon the Race Relations Bills. With this kind of explanation, the fact of discrimination is accepted, while the British people are absolved from blame. At the same time, they can be supported in their righteous indignation, which is directed, after all, at the unscrupulous political opposition, and not at their innocent dupes, the blacks, who are not in a position to know any better. The absolution is taken still further, when it is pointed out that whites in their own country will be discriminated against by blacks, to whom the legislation gives an unfair advantage. Surely, the argument goes, there is good reason on grounds of elementary justice for expressing indignation - an indignation that should not be stigmatised as race prejudice - because it is justified, and directed not at blacks, but at white politicians.

(3) Justification in terms of the characteristics of black people.

To explain white prejudice and discrimination in terms of the characteristics of black people provides strong justification for white behaviour. Moral blame is transferred from the perpetrator of the act to his victim. The victim's 'offences' may include his audacity in making his presence known, his obvious social differences, the inferiority of the standards he is said to possess, or the way in which he 'unfairly' competes with the white population. Whites, therefore, are thought to be justified in their hostility, which is regarded as an understandable response in the face of provocation. Under these circumstances, legislation against white prejudice would be unjust. The only difficulty with this explanation is that it runs the risk of being itself exposed as prejudice because it rather too clearly stigmatises blacks and absolves whites from blame. White prejudice can hardly be said to exist if it is a justified response to black behaviour.

Indeed, the stronger versions of the syndrome deny the existence of white prejudice by treating it as a figment of the black imagination, as a symptom of black paranoia. White integrity remains rather too firmly intact. Because of their transparent and symmetrical shift of blame from the traditionally guilty to the innocent party, explanations for white prejudice that dwell at great length on black characteristics, run the risk of themselves being marked out as examples of race prejudice.

(4) Justification in terms of the effect on white livelihood. One answer to this problem is to depersonalise the black focused questions, by turning from the black 'agent' of prejudice to the imagined effect of his actions on whites' livelihood. Whites continue to be justified in their behaviour, particularly if they are thought

to be adversely affected, but the abstraction of a social process may hinder too rapid and obvious identification of the black initiator.

(5) Justification in terms of the white state of mind. Explanations in terms of the white state of mind of resentment, insecurity, threat, worry, anxiety, etc., also have a number of justificatory advantages. None of them possesses the connotation implicit in 'race prejudice', of injustice being perpetrated against blacks: instead, they dwell exclusively on the white state of mind, distantly accounted for by the four kinds of explanation offered above, all of which, to some degree, absolve the white population from responsibility. Generally, if someone is frightened or feels threatened, we accept he has reason for his state of mind, that he is justified in feeling as he does. But the beauty of explanations in terms of the white state of mind is that they attribute that state of mind, not to the politician, but to his electorate. He can claim, therefore, to be representing their opinions whether or not he accepts them as his own. With such explanations, we can never be sure whether the politician thinks his electorate's views are justified or not. The impression is given that the electorate's views are of great social import and should be taken into account in making decisions, but if pushed, the politician can always dissociate himself from the values expressed. The electorate's 'fear' may, or may not, be morally acceptable to the politician and his audience - an ambiguity that pays useful rhetorical dividends.

(6) Justification in terms of white predispositions. Institutional explanations of prejudice and discrimination frequently stress the unwitting or unintentional nature of the racialist effect, thus

removing questions of moral responsibility. Racialism is caused, not by conscious choice, but by the failure to recognise or challenge the working of a traditional norm which has only recently - with the advent of black immigration - revealed its inadequacy. If prejudice is seen as an inevitable psychological result of institutional discrimination, issues of moral choice tend to be displaced by the determination of causal necessity.

Where the cultural values of empire are utilised to explain prejudice, prejudice is still regarded as unfair and morally unacceptable, but its causality is placed in the past. As Kant convincingly shows, historical necessity or "justification by origin" gives the impression that reason is excluded by the inevitability of the natural process. Past history cannot be changed, and responsibility for prejudice and discrimination is removed from the moral agents of the present to the distant causal agents of imperial history. The explanation has justificatory advantages in that it can be used first, to condemn prejudice, which it treats as an unacceptable historical legacy, second, to excuse the perpetrators of its present manifestations as unthinking agents of long-lasting institutional and cultural norms, and third, to show how prejudice might be abolished, by developing a class consciousness that challenges the unthinking acceptance of imperial institutions and culture.

With regard to the last point, if prejudice is to be regarded merely as a relic of imperialism and as having no current economic base, then only consciousness-raising is needed for its abolition. When faced with endemic working-class racialism, Left-wing politicians, for whom class solidarity has great symbolic value, might find the prospect of an analysis in terms of 'cultural lag', rather than of economic structure, more pleasant to bear and more

susceptible to radical posturing. They have a need to project the working class as possessing revolutionary potential, as being beyond reproach, except inasmuch as it stands in need of revolutionary consciousness. The fact that its present economic and political consciousness (and practice) might be responsible for its racialism is an unpleasant prospect, conveniently mitigated if the "legacy of empire" hypothesis is adopted.

The idea that prejudice results from a lack of class consciousness bears a close resemblance to the view that it derives from ignorance. Without awareness of the wrong he is committing, the individual will not be regarded as morally responsible for his actions, and is thus, like a child, absolved from guilt. Allport's work (1954) reveals that the problem of distinguishing between prejudice and ignorance also exercises the mind of the social psychologist, who fails to recognise the implicit moral and political dimension of the concept of prejudice. (See Chapter Two.)

The long history of British racialism expressed in the persecution of immigrant groups over the centuries may be used to show a close association between the various stages of history - particularly the capitalist stage - and to support the view that the problem of prejudice cannot be satisfactorily solved without first achieving socialism. Once more, the moral dimension is removed as a consequence of the acceptance of causal necessity. Alternatively, the eventual British acceptance of the historical migrations of Huguenots, Irish, Jews, Poles and Ukrainians may be used to justify belief in British tolerance, long term optimism, and the redundancy of the Race Relations Bills. If full acceptance of previous migrants could take place without legislation, why, it is asked, is there need for it now?

Emphasis on the cultural continuity of racial concepts, such as those associating black with evil, can also merge with explanations in terms of semi-permanent bio-psychological dispositions. Frequently, these are accompanied by a naturalistic argument along the lines that as black and white do not live happily together, they ought to be kept apart. They are thought not to live happily together because of their respective deep-seated cultural attitudes to colour, or their instinctive attraction towards their own groups, and their rejection of 'outsiders'. No possibility of change or improvement is offered except through racial separation. Unaccompanied, the arguments are likely to be used in favour of immigration control, and against anti-discrimination legislation, which if prejudice is universal to humankind, would have no purpose. Alternatively, of course, naturalistic explanations of this kind could justify legislative and other action to control the "baser instincts" of human beings.

Another form of bio-psychological dispositional explanation makes use of the social psychological concept of the prejudiced or authoritarian personality. A section of the population, as a result of early pathological social relations, or other non-too-clearly-specified factors, acquires a disposition to speak and act in a prejudiced manner. The 10 per cent of the population possessing this trait is generally portrayed as lacking in normality, if not as being mentally ill, or insane. It is unclear whether the norm from which the prejudiced person deviates is descriptive or evaluative, although it is likely that nearly all concepts of mental health are evaluative with strong moral and political elements. The objectivity of standards of mental health will derive from the degree to which they are accepted by the population, particularly those sections

of it with the power to impose their views.

There is a strong presumption, therefore, that the authoritarian personality is not only in a minority, but that it is undesirable. The people who possess it are negatively evaluated and frequently labelled 'sick'. Sickness, however, excuses them from the expectation that they are morally responsible for their actions, because sickness is regarded as a non-moral trait over which they have little or no control. Sickness is treated as a non-moral phenomenon belonging to the realm of nature. It is unfortunate, and to be deplored, it is to be isolated and, if possible, cured, but those who have it can scarcely be blamed for their sickness.

To explain prejudice as sickness, then, has a number of justificatory advantages. Everyone agrees that sickness is a bad thing and that measures should be taken to cure it. At the same time, the sick person is held not to be morally responsible for his illness. Thus, with one label, the political and moral dimension of prejudice can be disguised in an organic model of sickness, remedial action recommended, and the agent excused responsibility for his prejudice. Some difficulty still lies with the size of the prejudiced group which, as it enlarges, loses its credibility as a statistically and normatively deviant entity. Yet sickness may spread and reach epidemic proportions (as the frequently used examples of Nazi anti-Semitism indicate).

(7) Justification by diffusion explanations. At this point, explanations in terms of 'diffusion' take the stage. Prejudice is said to arise from ideas spread among the innocent by a small group of fanatics who may, or may not, be regarded as 'sick'. If stress is placed upon the smallness of the minority that infects the majority of passive and innocent individuals, the British people as a whole are excused responsibility from prejudice while a 'handful'

of vicious propagandists can be blamed. Explanations of this kind are helpful in justifying legislation against incitement to racial hatred and appear plausible in the light of the excesses of the far Right. For the Left there are great political advantages to be gained in identifying racism with the traditional enemies of socialism, while the Conservative Right - however far to the Right - can usually succeed in dissociating themselves from a "lunatic fringe".

Much the same can be said for the idea that responsibility for British race prejudice (and particularly race prejudice in Wolverhampton) can be laid at the door of one man - Enoch Powell. Here again is a convincing portrait of a clever demagogue deliberately arousing the latent passions of his hitherto passive audience.

Finally, we have the popular idea that race problems are created by discussing race, which is particularly useful to those who wish to ignore already existing institutionalised racialism, or to oppose the making of any special provision. Legislators, and others who talk about race, must take the blame, for no distinction is made between racial categorisation, racial prejudice, and racial discrimination or anti-discrimination measures.

In summary, we might say that most of the explanations offered for race prejudice have the effect of assuaging the white offender's guilt. In particular, explanations in terms of white political and legislative measures, of the unpleasant characteristics attributed to blacks, of effects on whites' livelihood, and of whites' perception of the situation, reduce the significance of white prejudice and discrimination to the extent that they are all but justified, with the consequence that anti-discriminatory legislation is made to

appear redundant. The various explanations in terms of predispositions and of diffusion also reduce white moral responsibility, but in some forms, they allow of the possibility that prejudice is socially undesirable and legally remediable.

CONCLUSION

The conclusion offers a short summary of the main theoretical points made in the preceding chapters.

Frequently found in discussion of ideology and discourse dealing with racial matters is the term 'racism'. It refers to the belief that races of human beings exist, differing from one another in significant and enduring ways, and that the differences have social consequences. In addition, if the racism is to be judged 'medium' or 'strong' (as opposed to 'weak'), a moral evaluation, that the differences between races are of superior to inferior, or a moral prescription, that the superior races are entitled to more favourable treatment, must also be present. Because of the existence of egalitarian (or anti-racist) ideologies, of ideologies judged non-racist overall, but containing some racist elements, and of non-racist ideologies justifying racialist practice, I conclude that it is unduly restrictive for the study of 'racism' to be substituted for a more general study of ideologies dealing with those issues thought racial by the social observer.

'Race prejudice' is another expression that has been frequently employed for describing features of racial discourse. Race prejudice, however, has been mistaken for, or reduced to, a mentalistic phenomenon, instead of being treated as a verbal expression that is considered unjust to a racial group. Furthermore, prejudice has been incorrectly associated with accompanying emotional states and behavioural outcomes. Inadequate, individualised explanations, frequently in terms of psycho and socio-pathology, have been offered for the occurrence of prejudice. Prejudice has been treated as self-evidently dysfunctional within the context of a tacitly

assumed, functionalist and teleological view of social structure. The important relationships between race prejudice and other beliefs manifested in public discourse have been underplayed. The ethical/political problem of prejudice as unfair description, evaluation and prescription, has been wrongly transformed into a question of scientific validity. The already complex relationship between racial ideology and racial practice has been obfuscated by a failure to deal with actors and organisations in the context of the political system. Also there has been an insufficient examination of the nature of ideological elements, the structures into which they are built, and the part they play within the political process.

The study of discourse is the best way of treating ideas about race, but it should be remembered that 'racial discourse' is a narrower category than 'discourse dealing with race'. To counter the criticisms above, discourse is most usefully studied in social context, the concept of ideology providing a useful theoretical setting from which to begin. 'Ideology' may be looked at from many different angles: definition, genesis, ontological status, function, truth value, relation to interest, and content. Ideology is identified in terms of its internal logical relations, the kind of substantive cognitive elements that go to make it up, the shared nature of its constituent beliefs, its justificatory purpose, its public availability, its relatively enduring life-span, the social agents that develop, profess, and make use of it, and the social areas in which it is most commonly manifest. Ideology is a discursive system, seeking to justify a particular state of affairs or course of action. It emerges only when human beings are trying to account for their actions to others, that is, when they are expressing their sectional interests as if they were for the common good of all. Racial ideology is

ideology which accounts for events in the social world by making extensive use of racial descriptions and explanations and by utilising racial evaluations and prescriptions in a substantial way. The analysis of ideology involves the deployment of classifications derived from logic and rhetoric and of substantive categories arising from the subject matter of the discourse itself.

An analytical distinction can be made between the economic structure on the one hand, and the population's perception and response to that structure on the other. The economic structure is best represented as a capitalist mode of production, sustaining two main social categories or classes, a bourgeoisie and a proletariat. The contradictions within class-divided society produce responses which are only accommodated with difficulty within the institutions of that society. Race relations can be studied from the point of view of a 'square of alienation', in which human beings fail to cooperate with one another as a result of a number of class contradictions manifested in racial and nationalist terms. These alienated economic relations provide the foundation on which racial 'reaction' is built. Human beings, however, do not live in a crude economic world of stimulus/response, but represent that world symbolically to themselves and to other people. Nevertheless, there are certain responses that appear to be more obviously related than others to the ideally-conceived pure, economic reflex.

A secondary response of control, institutionalised in the form of the state, and arising as a result of the threat to social stability created by economic alienation, is of considerable importance in explaining the forms of racial discourse. The responses, summarised in 'the square of alienation', are articulated within a political context presided over by the state. There is a need to

persuade the population to accept the legitimacy of the existing political order, and the state's justification for its race relations policies must be located in the general context of its attempts at legitimation. The kinds of racial policies and justificatory forms that emerge are likely to be compatible with, and indeed, part of those major ideological configurations providing legitimation for the capitalist structure as a whole.

Because sections of the population respond differently according to their position in the socio-political structure, and are involved to a greater or lesser extent with state and political institutions, the justificatory and persuasive content of their discourse is likely to vary considerably, thus producing different levels of expression and justification, ranging from a straightforward declaration of alienation, to a politically sophisticated statement of racial significance. A simple distinction can be made between the general discourse of the population as a whole, and the specialised political discourse of the politician.

The study of ideology is approached at a less abstract level by looking at actual examples of British political discourse drawn from the utterances of Conservative and Labour politicians at national and local level. A typology is drawn up to provide an overview of the various party values that have had a bearing on race relations, and to enable a comparison to be made between Conservative and Labour approaches. Conservative and Labour ideologies are predominantly class-derived, and usually account for racial phenomena by making use of existing formulae, developed over many years in response to class demands. Traditional formulae provide the patterns against which racial issues are described, interpreted, evaluated, and acted upon. The two parties' racial policies are

nearly always justified along traditional class lines, and the policies themselves are presented as conforming with the parties' established values. For example, Conservatives draw upon tradition, nationalism, the importance of stability, social order, laissez-faire, and self-reliant individualism, while Labour stresses nationalisation, internationalism, egalitarianism, social justice, government intervention, and welfarism.

All this can be viewed as a form of deracialisation. Deracialisation is the attenuation of, elimination of, or substitution for racial categories in discourse, the omission or deemphasis of racial explanation, and the avoidance of racial evaluation or prescription. This is of particular interest to the social scientist when it occurs 'asynchronously', in situations which continue to display signs of practical racial domination, oppression and conflict. A number of different forms of deracialisation may be identified, including systemic ideological deracialisation, occurring on a large scale, and of which social actors may be unaware, and strategic deracialisation, consciously employed by the politician to avoid political discomfort. One form of strategic deracialisation is 'sanitary coding', by which the politician is protected from ideological attack and yet manages to assure his audience of his readiness to take effective action (against another racial group).

Deracialisation and various other rhetorical devices are examined in detail in the context of the parliamentary debates on immigration. Also, the ideological problems raised by the prospect of legislating against racial discrimination in a society in which politicians are reluctant to admit to its existence, are dealt with by taking a close look at the parliamentary debates on the Race Relations Bills. Finally, the study provides an opportunity to

enlarge upon the relationship between explanation and justification, so central for understanding the essential nature of ideology.

In brief, white groups generally justify racial inequality, discrimination, and oppression in Britain by resorting to traditional class-based ideologies, and not to overt racism.

APPENDIX ONE

THE SURVEY OF WOLVERHAMPTON COUNCILLORS: THEIR VIEWS ON RACE AND RACE-RELATED ISSUES

Background

Ever since Enoch Powell, at that time MP for the Wolverhampton South West Constituency, had begun in 1967, to pronounce on the race issue, while making it clear that he was drawing on the experience of his local party organisation and constituents, Wolverhampton acquired its reputation for being at the hub of British racial problems. While it is plausible to argue that, in reality, the Borough's notoriety is without foundation, Wolverhampton has had the misfortune of being presented as the country's epicentre of racist thought and racist practice.

Whether accurate or distorted, Wolverhampton's image has been further established and reinforced by both the press and race relations research. In 1968, The Observer (14.7.1968) carried a long and powerful article by John Heilpern, entitled "Down among Mr Powell's constituents - town that has lost its reason". Heilpern's discussions on race with the white citizens of Wolverhampton (in public houses, clubs, and youth clubs) in which they expressed an overwhelming torrent of abuse towards black people were reported at length. "It seems a grotesque generalisation", he wrote:

... to say that the feelings of Mr Hall and the men in the Oak St pub aren't exceptional but typical of the great majority of people in Wolverhampton, yet it's true. There may be hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Wulfrunians who disagree with them, but if there are they weren't in the pubs I went to, or in the clubs, or the dance halls, or the youth clubs, or the streets.

The difference between the people of Wolverhampton and the public figures who represent them is that the people know there's a colour problem and cannot cope with it, whereas the councillors are in a position to cope with the problem, but refuse to believe it really exists. What is so painful about Wolverhampton is that it is a town that has lost its reason.

(In the context of this study, the councillors' discourse would probably have been better described as 'deracialised'.)

In "Race, the Politicians and Public Opinion", Nicholas Deakin (1970) mentioned the possibility that the propensity to reject immigrants varied in intensity between different areas of the country. He went on to claim that:

although the level of outright rejection is not high, it remains significantly higher for Wolverhampton than for other boroughs. Another significant deviation is that Labour supporters in the borough are more inclined to adopt hostile attitudes than in other areas and that in this neighbourhood working-class hostility is more strongly marked (p.129).

Over a decade has passed since Powell's speech of 20 April 1968. Despite the fact that we can assume very little from the assertions of Heilpern or Deakin about the configurations of racial beliefs held either then, or now, by the average Wulfrunian or his representatives, elsewhere in Britain, and internationally, the widely accepted picture of Wolverhampton is of a hot-bed of racial discontent, where white political leaders have little sympathy or understanding for a black population which, in Powell's terminology, has established "colonies" separate "in habits, occupation and way of life" from other citizens (Powell, 1969, p.297).

If the numbers of black people or their concentration had any bearing on the issue, it would not be difficult to show that Wolverhampton did not live up to its popular image*. And, with regard to the comparative animosity to black people of the town's white population, or its councillors, it would be hard, if not impossible, to agree on the nature and significance of the scale of measurement to be adopted. One of my contentions is that individual attitude tests can give little indication of the ideological and organisational frameworks within which party activists operate, both overtly, and covertly. Yet, as might be expected, the charges of racism still ring loud in Wolverhampton politics.

A prevailing Labour Party view of the Conservatives, is that Nick Budgen, who replaced Enoch Powell as MP for Wolverhampton South West, has attempted to ape his predecessor's opinions about race, and that the Conservative councillors have changed very little from earlier Powellite days. In their turn, the Labour councillors and the Labour-dominated council have been denounced as 'racist' by some black organisations in the town.

While I do not consider it important to establish - indeed, I reject as inexactely formulated, and undemonstrated - the popular accusation that Wolverhampton is "worse than other towns with regard to race relations", I think there was some point in selecting councillors from Wolverhampton for interview on the subject of race. Wolverhampton has historical significance as a centre of Powellite support, and because of press exposure, has become a symbol of Britain's race relations problems, a fact of which its councillors are most self-conscious. It might be expected that as a result of their civic pride, and the town's reputation in the field, local politicians' responses to questions on race might be more carefully considered and 'politically formulated' than elsewhere in the country.

* The 1971 Census showed that of a total population of 269,110, some 20,065 (13.4 of total) had been born in the New Commonwealth, of which 11,370 came from India, 6,170 from Jamaica, 775 from Kenya, and 750 from Pakistan. The 1978-79 National Dwelling and Household Sample Survey showed that 84.3 per cent of the total population of Wolverhampton was white, 5.2 per cent West Indian, 8.9 per cent Asian, 0.1 per cent African, and 0.5 per cent other. The combined population of people of West Indian and Asian ethnic origin were in a majority ^{over white} in 2 of 20 wards, ^{of the total population} Graiseley with 49 per cent and St Peter's with 50.4 per cent. The next highest figures were for Blakenhall (34.3 per cent) and Parkfield (28.9 per cent). The West Midland County Council Household Sample Survey had similar figures. It showed that for Wolverhampton, 14.9 per cent of persons were born in, or had a mother or father born in, the New Commonwealth.

Although it cannot, perhaps, be seen as a critical case - that what happens in Wolverhampton is a precursor or exemplar of what is happening or is likely to happen in Britain as a whole - it might usefully be regarded as having, in similar degree, many of the features of race relations that are typical of urban Britain. In addition, the people of the vicinity, perhaps to a greater degree than those in other boroughs (for reasons already given), are likely to illustrate the main characteristics of British political discourse about race. But, as this is not a geographically comparative study, I make no claim that my findings are representative of Britain as a whole, but only that they are the views of borough councillors in one West Midland town with a poor, if undeserved, reputation in the field of race relations.

There were also two practical reasons for interviewing Wolverhampton councillors. I considered, at one time, the possibility of interviewing national politicians, only to reject it, because of their relative inaccessibility, bearing in mind the time-consuming and arduous nature of the interviews. I was also more interested in the 'intermediate' level of politics and the implementation of local municipal race relations policies. Hansard and Party Conference reports, however, were extensively used in an effort to show themes common to local and national levels in the parties' approach to issues of race. My original, of over-ambitious, intention was to indicate the connection between general party ideology at all levels and policies on race.

Another reason for selecting Wolverhampton councillors for my study was that I was resident in Wolverhampton and conversant with the views of some of the councillors and with the history of the issues that they faced. As a former lecturer in one of the town's local colleges of further education, I had experienced the effect on the local population and on my students of the 1968 Powell speeches, and had always taken an active interest in Wolverhampton race relations.

Apart from the convenience of interviewing Wolverhampton councillors, I also believe that the social scientist has moral and political responsibilities to the community in which he lives. Without wishing to enter into discussion of this issue in any great detail here, one way of his fulfilling, or being seen to fulfil, this requirement is to conduct research on institutions in which he has a personal involvement and with which he must afterwards live, and to ignore the criticism that this is likely to undermine his objectivity. It is not so much the research findings themselves, but the way they are publicly presented that must be handled with caution and political understanding: this is particularly so when race relations is the subject matter.

The very fact that Wolverhampton councillors trusted me sufficiently to answer my questions and that I have felt indebted to them for their cooperation and interest, must raise the question of the reliability of my account. At times, in writing up my findings, I felt my tolerance stretched to the limit. Indeed, I sense that I may have overcompensated in dealing with the opinions I found most antipathetic to my own. Nevertheless, unless one is involved

in espionage, privileged access to information involves some form of moral responsibility to (or bargain with) the informant. I also feel a loyalty to the people of Wolverhampton, both white and black, and a commitment to contributing towards the improvement of Wolverhampton race relations. But the subject matter is highly politically charged, and the difficulty of avoiding offence to various parties must be acknowledged. The researcher cannot (or rather, should not) be committed simultaneously to contrary viewpoints (although many politicians seem to achieve precisely this position).

The research on Wolverhampton councillors is not the focus of the study. I was primarily interested in examining and developing techniques of describing, analysing, and explaining British discourse concerned with and affecting racial matters. The Wolverhampton interviews are used only to exemplify the problems raised by, and solutions offered to, this central concern. Only a fraction of the material gathered was required for this purpose.

Survey

The Borough council has a membership of sixty councillors. One councillor is elected every year for a period of three years for each of the twenty wards of the borough. During Spring 1979, I attempted to interview all sixty councillors. I first wrote to the official leaders of the council's Conservative and Labour groups to convince them of my bona fides and to explain the purpose of the survey. I promised that the confidentiality of individual respondents would be preserved. Apart from this agreed stipulation, no formal conditions were imposed upon my work. Both leaders pointed out that while they wished me well they could not guarantee that members of their parties would cooperate by granting me interviews, particularly as the local council elections (and as it happened the 1979 General election) were due to take place on the 1st May.

The Wolverhampton Municipal Year Book 1978-79 contained a list of councillors' names, addresses and telephone numbers, and this (modified by one name, to take account of the result of a ward by-election on 15th February 1979, caused by the death of Labour Councillor David Hickmott) provided the survey frame. I wrote to each councillor, to explain the nature of my research and to request an interview lasting approximately one hour. I enclosed a stamped postcard on which the councillor could indicate a convenient date, time, and place. My letter read:

Dear

I am a social science research worker at the University of Warwick where I am investigating the views of local councillors on important contemporary issues. On many issues, the views of councillors have not been extensively researched and yet their decisions play an important part in the government of the localities.

As part of my work, I should very much like to meet you and to ask your opinions on a number of topics including that of race relations.

I appreciate that, as a public figure, your time is valuable, but I do hope you will agree to see me in the near future for approximately one hour. I enclose a stamped postcard on which you may indicate a convenient time and venue.

Of course, any information given will be treated in a professional manner, with anonymity and confidentiality guaranteed. Results of the interviews will eventually be written up into a fully objective report.

May I thank you in advance for your cooperation.

Yours sincerely

I received 14 spontaneous written replies, 13 positive, and 1 negative. After three weeks I began systematically to telephone the 46 councillors who had not replied. Because councillors endeavour to make themselves available to the people of their ward, serve on the committees of the council and many outside bodies, and are usually involved in their party's politics at ward, borough and constituency levels, it was not easy to make direct contact with them or to find mutually convenient times for interview. With local and general elections approaching, the problem was exacerbated. In some cases, I telephoned on more than five occasions, although when councillors were contacted, they generally agreed to see me. Eventually, I managed to arrange interviews with 54 of the 60 councillors on my original list. In all, 53 interviews took place and were completed over a period of just more than two months between the end of March and the end of May 1979, the majority being conducted in April. Of the 7 uncompleted, 5 councillors declined, 1 offering no reason, 1 stating he saw no useful purpose in "this sort of thing", 1 claiming he was too busy, and 2 mentioning ill-health (later to be confirmed by colleagues who kindly advised me not to trouble them further). Of the two remaining, one councillor died in late April, and the other, though agreeing to meet me, was selected as a parliamentary candidate and elected for the first time as an MP at the General Election on the 1st May. Although I pursued him even after the election, I felt it prudent to let the matter rest after one meeting failed to materialise as a result of his new and busy itinerary.

Councillors were subjected to a tape-recorded interview of between one and three hours, depending on the length and detail of their responses. To their credit, fifty-two councillors completed interviews on tape about their views on a wide range of topics including race relations, while one councillor allowed me to take notes but not to tape-record his replies. Interviews were conducted in councillors' homes, in the Members' room at the Civic Centre, at Constituency Party Offices, at councillors' places of work, or in my own house.

In the Low Hill ward by-election of 15th February 1979, a Conservative gain from Labour resulted in control of the council passing to the Conservatives. From that date until the May elections when control reverted to Labour, there were 30 Conservative, 28 Labour, and 2 Independent Ratepayer councillors. Interviews were completed for 26 of the 30 Conservative, 25 of the 28 Labour, and for both the Ratepayer councillors (87% of total). For a variety

of reasons, not every person interviewed answered every single question, though sets were usually very nearly complete.

The original questionnaire schedule consisted of some 137 questions in five sections: (1) personal details: sex, age, date of birth, length of residence, occupation, number of years on council, etc., (2) general questions about politics, (3) general questions on race relations, (4) questions on race and specific local issues, (5) questions about councillors' personal experience of, and involvement with, members of other racial groups. Some of the questions in section (1) were derived or adapted from Kenneth Newton's questionnaire on Birmingham councillors (see Second City Politics, 1976, pp 247-255). The detailed questions of section (5) were cut drastically after a prior pilot exercise (conducted on people who were not councillors) because of the overall length of the questionnaire and the irrelevance of the replies to the aims of the survey. Even then, I felt the schedule would test councillors' powers of endurance to the limit. The most significant aspect of the questionnaire was the 'open-endedness' of many of the questions which allowed councillors to express, at any length, their spontaneous opinions on a wide variety of topics. It is noteworthy that many councillors took advantage of this opportunity - some speaking for over two hours - and thus producing nearly one hundred hours of tape-recording for transcription and analysis - a task that took over a year to complete.

Interviews were affected by political events taking place just preceding and during the two months over which they were conducted. Councillors would sometimes use current events to illustrate the points they were making. Certainly it was a politically eventful period at both local and national level. The Labour group on the council were forced to relinquish control to the Conservatives after a local by-election only to win back the town six weeks later in May, when local people went to the polls in simultaneous local and national elections. Many of the councillors were involved in canvassing and campaigning for both council and parliamentary candidates and were extremely busy when I approached them.

With regard to local race relations, the Conservative MP for South West Wolverhampton, Nick Budgen, began the new year by criticising a local committee campaigning for multi-cultural education, claiming that its aims would lead to 'separate development' and questioning its loyalties to the British State. One of the local Indian Workers' Associations responded by calling for the MP's prosecution under the Race Relations Act for "showing disrespect" to Asian culture and language. In February, Dave Stevens, treasurer of the Wolverhampton Anti Racist Committee was acquitted of assaulting police during a march that had taken place in Wolverhampton a year previously in protest against provocation and police harassment. He subsequently threatened to take legal action against the police. In March, a post office robbery at Low Hill, Wolverhampton, in which the subpost-master had been attacked by two 'West Indians' was prominently featured in the local press. In April, Vietnamese refugees began to arrive at Oxley House, Wolverhampton. A Wolverhampton headmaster sent home a Sikh boy for wearing a turban, and refused to reinstate him despite demonstrations outside the school (The Grove). Local black sportsmen and women also featured in the

news: Cyrille Regis was made the Young Player of the year, and Tessa Sanderson, the Midland Sports Personality of the year.

At national level, the scandal of 'virginity testing' of Asian women was exposed and the newspapers announced Labour Government grants of £50 million to help Britain become a multi-racial society. Enoch Powell claimed that his race forecasts had come true, while Robert Relf went on hunger strike in prison. Amid widespread publicity, Neimat Nafar, who came to Britain in 1958, was imprisoned for three years for fraudulently claiming £37,000 of state benefits. Just before the General Election, the Southall anti-National Front demonstration resulted in death and conflict with the police, while nearer at home, the protest at a West Bromwich National Front election meeting taking place in a local multi-racial school led to the mobilisation of large numbers of demonstrators, of 2,000 police and 19 arrests. At an international level, Idi Amin was overthrown in Uganda, while the Rhodesian guerrilla war ground on, with Joshua Nkomo's forces claiming credit for shooting down a Rhodesian passenger aircraft.

Once completed, the tapes were transcribed verbatim for each councillor in the order of the interview, which mostly followed the order of the questionnaire. Each response was numbered according to the question it was intended to answer. The transcribed interviews were then photocopied and individual responses separated and grouped according to question, and party membership. They were then pasted up to provide sets of readily readable responses on particular topics. I then read through responses in question order and tried to devise suitable analytical categories to reveal the intricacies of councillors' opinion. Only a small proportion of the available responses have been used in this study.

Basic Information

Details of councillors' sex, age, ethnic group, education, length of residence, and occupational classification, overall, and by political allegiance, are given below. Despite major boundary changes that have since taken place and the abolition of aldermen, some comparisons may be made between my figures for 1978-79 and the figures given for 1962-63 by G W Jones in Borough Politics (1969), a study of the Wolverhampton Town Council from 1884-1964.

In March 1979 there were 45 male councillors (exactly three quarters) and 15 female councillors (exactly one quarter), with a slightly higher proportion of women among the Conservatives. (Figures for Birmingham in 1971 produced by Kenneth Newton (1976), showed women constituted 30 per cent of the Council.)

The mean age of councillors (data was available for 50 of them) was 54.75 years. The Labour group averaged out at 56, two years older than the Conservatives at 54. The modal age for a councillor was between 50-59 years, similar to the national average. These correspond closely with Jones's figures for the average age of the whole council (including aldermen and councillors) for 1962-3 of 54.8 years overall with a similar age variation of two years between Labour at 55.8 and Conservative at 53.8. G W Jones also observed that a survey of ages of council members from 1888 to 1962 showed little

change: "the average age of all members of the Council stayed in the early and mid-fifties ..." (p.159),

Of the 52 councillors interviewed, 50 indicated they were British, English, Welsh, Scottish, Irish or some combination of these by descent and two said they were Indian but British. Both councillors from the Indian ethnic minority group belonged to the Labour Party and sat for St Peter's ward in which Indians were strongly represented among the electorate and in the ward Labour party.

The average age for completion of full-time education among Conservatives was 16.1, approximately one year more than Labour members at 15.3, indicating the greater likelihood of Grammar school attendance among Conservatives. G W Jones has similar figures. Although one or two members of both parties quibbled over the question of whether one's education was ever completed, there was little evidence that councillors had recently followed any formal studies, with the exception of a few short recreational, and trade union courses. Two Labour councillors, however, had entered higher education later in life and one who had been made redundant from the factory at which he worked as a toolmaker, was currently following a degree course at the local polytechnic. Both were exceptionally articulate and 'ideologically integrated'.

All councillors interviewed had lived within the present town boundaries for at least 10 years, with over half having been resident all their lives, or for over 39 years, in the old Wolverhampton, Wednesfield, Bilston, Willenhall and Tettenhall areas (which have since become part of the borough). Labour party members tended to have lived slightly longer in the Borough. G W Jones's figures for 1962-63 corresponded closely with my own.

There was considerable and significant variation in occupational structure between the Conservative and Labour group on the Council, best illustrated by the tables of occupational orders and unit groups, employee, self-employed, and social class given below. Conservatives were particularly concentrated in construction - small builders (one fifth of Conservative respondents) and sales work (nearly one third of Conservative respondents) - categories totally unrepresented in the Labour group.

Typical Conservative councillor occupations were self-employed small builder or contractor, store manager, small shopkeeper, sales promotion manager, and sales representative. Over one third of the Labour group, on the other hand, were engaged in engineering and allied trades with a small but significant group working for the railway - a traditional Wolverhampton industry. The typical Labour councillor occupations were grinder, welder, setter, toolmaker, maintenance engineer, and railwayman. Both Conservative and Labour group contained what, for want of a better description, might be termed professional workers. A major difference between Conservative and Labour was the number of self-employed among the Conservatives - over two fifths of Conservative respondents, whereas not one Labour councillor was self-employed. According to the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys classification of social class, a roughly equal proportion of both parties fell into class II, Intermediate Occupations.

Just under three quarters of Conservatives belonged to the non-manual classes, whereas the Labour Party was more evenly divided between non-manual and manual classes, over half being manual workers.

Using as his source the annual Council Diary and Yearbook, Jones was able to give the occupations of all council members, although he pointed out that there was a tendency for members in the knowledge of publication to raise the status of their jobs and that many descriptions were too vague to be useful and had to be supplemented by interviews and newspaper reports. As councillors' occupations are no longer published, my approach was to ask councillors for a full description of their work. In order to maximise the occupational relationship, I asked housewives and retired persons to give me their previous occupation (if any) for classification purposes, instead of using, as Jones had done, the separate categories of 'woman' and 'retired'. As some of the women had jobs, this seemed a more useful procedure, but even so, 2 Conservative and 3 Labour women had to remain as housewives (although at least 2 of them gave 'councillor' as their full-time occupation). In total, I was able to classify 47 occupations: 25 Conservative, 20 Labour and 2 Ratepayer, which if Jones's categories of 'women' and 'retired' are excluded, is the same number as he achieved for 1962-63. Even so, it is not easy to compare the two sets of figures as Jones did not use a standard sociological classification.

It is clear, however, that since 1962-63, there have been some major changes in the occupational structure of the council and party groupings. Among my respondents there was none who could be accurately described as 'manufacturer'. Conservatives now had working-class representatives and the Labour Party had professionals, whereas in 1962-63 these groups had been absent respectively from each party. The number of Conservative women had increased from 1 in 1962, to 8 in 1979. Among the Conservatives, there were as many as 13 shopkeepers in 1962: sales and insurance workers together with self-employed builders were not then mentioned. Perhaps it should be added that were it not for the heavy demands on time and energy of council work, many councillors might have achieved upward social mobility which would have placed them in different socio-economic categories. It was freely acknowledged that being a councillor who is forced to take time off from work on council business was a serious obstacle to promotion and to making money, if self-employed.

Overall, it became clear that in terms of their sex, age, length of residence, education, and occupational and class structure, the Wolverhampton councillors whose views are represented herein, were fairly typical of borough councillors generally. The historical continuity revealed by comparison with G W Jones's figures showed they had much in common with Wolverhampton councillors of the past. I was at all times left with the impression of the strength of political tradition and of the stability and ritual repetitiveness of the electoral and local government process. The sense of public service and civic pride among councillors was most marked, and had, I am sure, a telling effect on their racial prescriptions.

Because of the problem of preserving confidentiality, it has not been possible to analyse separately the responses of the Rate Payer

councillors who would have been readily identifiable. Accordingly, all but the purely 'demographic' data from these two interviews has been omitted. On some issues it would also have been interesting to isolate the responses of the two ethnic minority councillors, but for the same reason, this could not be done and they have at all times been treated as part of the Labour group.

Statistical analysis and the application of 'significance tests', while commonly presented in support of research findings, do not necessarily add to the value of the data. Given a total enumeration of the available universe (i.e. councillors in Wolverhampton), no benefit is to be gained by assuming a 'sampling distribution' to test deviation from randomness. There are also problems in social research of accepting mathematical assumptions such as 'additivity', 'exclusivity', and 'ratio value'. Yet statistical tests are wholly dependent on these. The tables within the text are perfectly explanatory and self-evident without the necessity of pretending to some greater scientific objectivity and level of measurement not yet attainable in the study of human relations,

Local case study: basic information about Wolverhampton councillors

Table 23 Average age of councillors				
	CONSERVATIVE	LABOUR	RATEPAYER	TOTAL
G W Jones (aldermen and councillors)	53.8	55.8	-	54.8
April 1979	54	56	56.5(2)	54.75

Table 24 Councillors' sex								
	CONSERVATIVE		LABOUR		RATEPAYER		TOTAL	
	No	%	No	%	No	-	No	%
Male	22	73	22	79	1		45	75
Female	8	27	6	21	1		15	15
Total	30	100	28	100	2		60	100

Table 25 Councillors' education			
	CONSERVATIVE	LABOUR	RATEPAYER
Average age of completing full-time education	16.1	15.3	15(2)

Table 26 Length of residence in Wolverhampton (and surrounding areas now incorporated)				
	CONSERVATIVE	LABOUR	RATEPAYER	TOTAL
Unknown	4	6	0	10
0-9	0	0	0	0
10-19	1	2	1	4
20-29	6	1	0	7
30-39	3	3	0	6
40 or more and all of life	16	16	1	33
TOTAL	30	28	2	60

Table 27 Councillors' occupation groups by party
(Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, Classification of Occupations, 1970.)

	CONSERVATIVES	LABOUR	RATEPAYER	TOTAL
VII Engineering and allied trades workers 031-054	2	7	1	10
XV Construction workers 093-098	5			5
XIX Transport and communication workers 115-135		3		3
XX Warehousemen, storekeepers, packers, bottlers 136-137		1		1
XXI Clerical workers 138-142	1	2		3
XXII Sales workers 143-150	8			8
XXIII Service, sport and recreational workers 151-172	1	1	1	3
XXIV Administrators and managers 173-180	3	2		5
XXV Professional, technical workers, artists, 181-220	5	4		9
TOTAL	25	20	2	47

Table 28 Councillors' social class by party					
	CONSERVATIVE	LABOUR	RATEPAYER	TOTAL	
I Professional occupations	1	7	1	1	1
II Intermediate occupations	11	2		19	8
III Skilled occupations (N) non-manual	6	8		15	3
(M) manual	7	3	1	3	1
IV Partly skilled occupations					
V Unskilled occupations					
TOTAL	25	20	2	47	

Table 29 Councillors as employees and self-employed by party					
	CONSERVATIVE	LABOUR	RATEPAYER	TOTAL	
Employees	14	20	2	36	
Self-employed	11	0		11	
TOTAL	25	20	2	47	

Questionnaire (final version)

(1) PERSONAL DETAILS OF COUNCILLORS

1.1.0 Personal details

(2) GENERAL QUESTIONS

2.1.0 The economy

2.2.0 Education

2.3.0 Population

2.4.0 Housing

2.5.0 Health

2.6.0 Personal relations

2.7.0 Social services

2.8.0 Crime

2.9.0 Nationality

2.10.0 Foreign policy

(3) RACE RELATIONS - GENERAL

3.1.0 Race relations general

3.2.0 Ethnic character

(4) RACE RELATIONS - LOCAL

4.1.0 Wolverhampton race relations

4.2.0 Local politicians and the race issue

4.3.0 The local council and race issues

4.4.0 Race and specific local and party issues

(5) RACE RELATIONS - PERSONAL

5.1.0 Personal contact with members of other ethnic groups

- .1.0 Personal details
- .1.1 Name
- .1.2 Age
- .1.3 Date of birth
- .1.4 Sex
- .1.5 At what age did you finish your full-time education?
- .1.6 What is your present occupation (previous, if housewife or retired)?
- .1.7 How long have you lived in Wolverhampton (or adjoining area)?
- .1.8 Are you married?
- .1.9 Have you any children? (If yes) How many?
What are their ages?
- .1.10 How long have you been in the Conservative Party/Labour Party/Ratepayers?
- .1.11 At what age did you first enter the Council?
- .1.12 How long (excluding breaks) have you served on it (or other local councils)?
- .1.13 Are you a chairman or vice chairman on a council committee? Which committee?
- .1.14 From your point of view, what are the most important policies your party stands for locally?
- .1.15 And what do you see as the main duties of a councillor?
- .1.16 What have been your main interests on council?
- .1.0 The economy
- .1.1 Most people have views about the present state of the economy. Could you tell me what your views are? (Prompt) What do you think are the causes of the present situation? (Prompt) What policies should be followed to improve matters?
- .1.2 What do you think causes unemployment?
- .1.3 Do you think many of the unemployed could get work if they wanted to?
- .1.4 Are you a member of a Trade Union? (If yes) Which one?
- .1.5 Briefly, what do you think of the Trade Unions?
- 2.0 Education
- 2.1 Do you think educational standards are rising or falling?
- 2.2 Could you offer any explanation for this occurring?
- 2.3 In particular, do you think they are rising or falling in Wolverhampton? (If don't know, turn to 2.3.0.)
(If rising or falling) Could you guess as to the causes of this?
(Prompt - if falling) Who or what do you think is to blame? Why?
- 2.4 What do you think can be done about it?
- 3.0 Population
- 3.1 Do you consider Britain to have a population problem? (If yes) What do you see as the population problem?
- 3.2 Should the present level of population be increased, maintained, or reduced?
(If reduced) How would you suggest it be reduced?
- 3.3 Recently, concern has been expressed at the falling birth-rate in Britain.
What sort of effect do you think this is likely to have on the country?
- 3.4 Sir Keith Joseph made a speech in 1974 in which he said that the balance of the British population, its 'human stock' was threatened. The nation was moving towards degeneration because

mothers of low ability and intelligence were giving birth to an undue proportion of the nation's children. Do you think there is any truth in this?

- 2.4.0 Housing
- 2.4.1 It is said that there is a shortage of housing in the country as a whole and in Wolverhampton. Is this true? Could you offer any explanation for why there is a housing shortage?
- 2.4.2 What policies should be pursued to make more housing available?
- 2.4.3 Some people say that the housing problem is not a matter of quantity but of quality. Overall, do you think the quality of housing in Wolverhampton has risen, remained the same, or fallen in the last few years?
(If rising or falling) Why do you think this is?
- 2.4.4 What policies should be pursued to improve the quality of housing in Wolverhampton?
- 2.5.0 Health
- 2.5.1 Would you say that Wolverhampton is a healthy place to live in?
- 2.5.2 Are there any particular health hazards you can think of?
- 2.5.3 Wolverhampton has recently been in the news for its high infant mortality rate - a lot of babies dying. Can you guess at any reason why a higher proportion of babies should die in Wolverhampton than elsewhere?
- 2.5.4 There has been a great deal of talk in the Press about a crisis in the National Health Service. Do you think there is a crisis?
(If yes) What do you think has caused it?
- 2.5.5 We read every so often of contagious diseases breaking out unexpectedly. Do you think this is because we have an inefficient health service or for other reasons? (If other) What?
- 2.5.6 Venereal disease is on the increase. Have you any opinion why the rate of certain venereal diseases has risen in the last few years?
- 2.6.0 Personal relations
- 2.6.1 What do you think about today's standards of sexual morality? (Prompt) Is that good or bad? How do you account for the change in sexual morality?
- 2.7.0 Social services
- 2.7.1 Could you give your views about the present state of the social services in Wolverhampton?
- 2.7.2 Do you think there is much abuse of social security?
(Prompts) In what way? Who's to blame?
- 2.7.3 It is claimed that some people are better off on social security than at work. What are your views on this?
- 2.8.0 Crime
- 2.8.1 Have you any views on the present level of crime? (Prompts) Do you think crime is on the increase? What crimes specifically would you say are on the increase? Which groups in the population do you think are mainly responsible for this increase in crime? What do you think is the cause of the increase in crime? What can be done about it?

- 2.8.2 There have been searching questions asked about the work of the police and the procedures they follow in recent months. What are your views about the police?
- 2.8.3 There have also been complaints about the police abusing their powers. What do you think about this?
- 2.8.4 Recently there have been a series of late-night stabbings in Wolverhampton town centre. Is there anything that can be done to prevent such occurrences?
- 2.9.0 Nationality
- 2.9.1 What nationality would you describe yourself as?
- 2.9.2 If you were asked to describe the main features of the national character, what would you say?
- 2.9.3 Do you think there is much difference between the English and the Irish in temperament?
- 2.9.4 Is national character inborn, or can it be acquired through learning?
- 2.9.5 What, to you, are the most important ingredients of the British way of life?
- 2.10.0 Foreign policy
- 2.10.1 What part do you think the British Commonwealth has to play in the modern world?
- 2.10.2 On the whole, do you think the British Empire was a good or bad thing? Why?
- 2.10.3 What are your views about the aid Britain gives to countries overseas?
- 2.10.4 One of the most persistent world problems is the relationship between black and white in Southern Africa. What policies would you yourself advocate in the present Rhodesian situation?
- 2.10.5 What do you think of apartheid - or separate development - in South Africa?
- 2.10.6 What are your views on the record of African states since independence?
(Prompt) Why do you say that?
- 2.10.7 Could you name a prominent black African that you feel is representative of African political leadership at the present time?

I should now like to turn to the subject of race relations.

- 3.1.0 Race relations - general
- 3.1.1 Have you any strong views about race relations - relations between black and white - in this country? (If yes) Could you tell me what they are?
- 3.1.2 Do you think there is prejudice against coloured people in Britain?
(If yes) What are the reasons for this prejudice?
(If no) Are they treated exactly the same as white people?
- 3.1.3 Do you think coloured people are treated fairly in
(a) housing and (b) job opportunities?
(If no) Why aren't they?

- 3.1.4 In 1976 Parliament passed a Race Relations Act which made it an offence to discriminate on the grounds of race or colour. Have you any views about this legislation?
(If yes) Could you tell me what they are?
- 3.1.5 What immigration policies do you think the Government should follow?
- 3.1.6 If you were running the country and could do what you thought was best without worrying about other people, what would you do about the race situation?
- 3.1.7 Which party or politician even if you agree with them on nothing else - best represents your views on policies towards coloured people? Why?
- 3.2.0 Ethnic character
- 3.2.1 Apart from colour, do you think West Indians differ from us in any important way?
(If yes) How?
- 3.2.2 What about the children - do they differ?
- 3.2.3 Do you think Indians differ from us?
(If yes) How?
- 3.2.4 Do you think the British way of life is affected by the presence of coloured people?
(If yes) How?
- 3.2.5 Do you think coloured people are involved in crime proportionately (a) more (b) the same (c) less than white people?
- 3.2.6 Do you think they commit the same kinds of crime as whites?
(If no) Which crimes do they commit?
- 3.2.7 Do you think coloured people take proportionately (a) more (b) the same (c) less than white people from social services?
(If less, more) How do you explain that?
- 3.2.8 Are there any particular problems that coloured youngsters experience more than other youngsters?
- 3.2.9 There are various things that coloured people could do to improve their position in Britain. What do you think they should do?
- 3.2.10 It has been suggested that, as coloured people seem to have suffered discrimination in Britain, a policy of positive discrimination should be adopted towards them - that is, they should have allocated to them their just proportion of houses, other amenities and jobs which they haven't got at the moment. What do you feel about this?
- 4.1.0 Wolverhampton race relations
- 4.1.1 Is Wolverhampton better, the same, or worse than other towns with regard to race relations?
(If better) Why?
(If worse) What explanation can you give for the poor race relations in the town?
- 4.1.2 Coloured people have now been living in Wolverhampton for over twenty years. Do you think they have affected life in Wolverhampton?
(If yes) In what ways?
- 4.1.3 Do you think they have affected music and entertainment?
In what ways?
- 4.1.4 Do you think they have affected education? In what way?
- 4.1.5 Do you think coloured people have affected industry in any way?

- 4.1.6 Do you think they have affected the employment situation?
- 4.1.7 Do you think coloured people have any effect on religious life?
- 4.1.8 Do you think coloured people have any effect on housing?
- 4.1.9 Do you think they have any effect on health?
- 4.1.10 Do you think coloured people have any effect on the social services?
- Which ones in particular?
- 4.1.11 In January 1978, the police clashed with more than 200 coloured youths in Wolverhampton town centre. What should be done to prevent situations like this arising in the future?
- 4.2.0 Local politicians and the race issue
- 4.2.1 In 1968, Mr Enoch Powell made a speech about race relations that caused him to be dismissed from Mr Heath's shadow cabinet. In hindsight do you think Mr Powell was right or wrong about the race question?
- 4.2.2 Mr Powell advocates a policy of encouraging repatriation. What are your views?
- Do you think this could be a realistic proposition in Wolverhampton?
- Why?
- 4.2.3 Has Mr Powell had any effect on the state of race relations in Wolverhampton?
- 4.2.4 Mr Budgen, the Conservative MP for South-West Wolverhampton, suggested we carry identity cards (E & S, 22.8.78) to help in the detection of illegal immigrants. How do you feel about this?
- 4.2.5 In June 1978, Mr Budgen said that "Wolverhampton will be mostly populated by people of the New Commonwealth and Pakistan ethnic origin in ten years' time. Do you think this will be the case?
- (If yes) Does the prospect worry you?
- (If yes) Why?
- (Prompt) Then what should be done about it?
- 4.2.6 Mrs Renee Short said at the Labour Party Conference (4.10.78) that the police were being infiltrated by fascist sympathisers. What are your views on her statement?
- 4.2.7 In June 1978, Mr Budgen said he would not attend the multi-racial Civic religious service because it included non-Christian beliefs. What did you think of this?
- 4.3.0 The local council and race issues
- 4.3.1 Have any of the committees you have been on recently taken decisions which affect race relations?
- (If yes) Which decisions were those?
- (Prompt) Did you agree with them?
- 4.3.2 National Government is considering making money available to local authorities to meet the special needs of ethnic minorities (by replacing Section II of the Local Government Act). Are you in agreement with this policy?
- (If no) Why not?
- (If yes) Have you any views on how the money should be spent?

- 4.3.3 In what particular areas should the Local Authority, National Government or other agencies, act on race relations in the town?
(Prompt) Are there no welfare policies that could be pursued?
(Prompt) What about law and order?
- 4.3.4 It has been said that, as a result of racial incidents in the town, the Local Authority and other agencies have managed to get increased financial help from Central Government. Is there any truth in this?
(If yes) Is this not likely to encourage more of such incidents?
- 4.3.5 As a Councillor do you ever get complaints from white people in the ward about the behaviour of coloured people? What are the complaints about? Do you think they're usually justified? Do coloured people ever complain about the whites?
- 4.4.0 Race and specific local and party issues
- 4.4.1 Could you give your views on the Wolverhampton Council for Community Relations and your party's policy towards it?
- 4.4.2 Could you give your views on
(a) the proposed Asian Day Centre for Asian men
(b) the home for distressed Asian women?
- 4.4.3 What is your local party's policy towards the National Front and its activities?
- 4.4.4 (Conservatives especially) In April 1978 the Express and Star carried a statement on 'Racial Harmony' signed by the Churches, Labour and Liberal Parties, but the Conservatives did not sign. Can you give any reason for this?
- 4.4.5 Has your party any particular policies it would like to pursue with regard to race relations?
(If yes) What are they?
- 4.4.6 Are there any differences between the policies you personally would like to pursue on race relations and the policies of your party?
(If yes) What are they?
- 4.4.7 Are any of your party's views on race relations opposed by the other party/parties?
(If yes) What views are those?
(Prompt) Why do you think they oppose them?
- 4.4.8 Do you think public opinion constrains your local party's willingness to act decisively on the race issue?
(If yes) In what way?
- 4.4.9 Does National Government affect in any way the decisions your local party would like to pursue with regard to race? How?
- 4.4.10 Has your local party made any special effort to attract the coloured vote?
(If yes) What sort of things has it done?
- 5.1.0 Personal contact with members of other ethnic groups
- 5.1.1 Have you or has any member of your family had any contact with coloured/white people in the last two weeks?
- 5.1.2 Have you got any coloured/white friends?
(Prompt) Are they close friends?

APPENDIX TWO

NOTES

(1) NOMENCLATURE

Very considerable problems of nomenclature arise in writing about British race relations. Questions of nomenclature are of even greater pertinence for a study which is specifically concerned with British discourse about race and which seeks on occasion to make points about other people's usage. Requirements which have affected the choice of terms in this context are mutual intelligibility, familiar and respectable usage, political acceptability, descriptive accuracy, suitable levels of differentiation, logical compatibility of different schema, conciseness of expression and style.

Terms used by the author must be clearly understood by the reader. But frequently, members of the academic or political community do not share or agree on particular word usages. Another difficulty in the study of race relations is the changing connotation of significant words which increases the user's chances of being misinterpreted. In a sociological text which seeks to explore the categories used by social actors, there is also a danger that the social observer will be accredited with those terms he is forced to use to communicate with, or to describe the language of the actors he has chosen to study.

The term 'black' has been selected to refer generally to those people, usually of Afro-Caribbean and Indian sub-continent geographical origin who have black or brown skin colouring. The term focuses on skin colour as the important factor in categorising people as either black or white, a distinction that is of social significance because it is used as a basis for social action. The 1967 PEP report, and all studies since, for example, have revealed "substantial discrimination against coloured people" and that the "differential treatment and experiences of coloured immigrants as against other minority groups (such as Cypriots and Hungarians), leave no doubt that the discrimination is largely based on colour". 'Black' is also widely accepted among people of Afro-American and Afro-Caribbean descent as the proper way of referring to their skin colour and the term has been found increasingly appropriate by people of both Afro-Caribbean and of Asian descent as a means of signifying their similarity of experience and commonality of interest in the face of white hostility in Britain. The term 'white' is used in contrast to 'black', to refer to people usually of European geographical origin with white or light skin colouring.

In referring to black people, alternative expressions in current popular usage are 'immigrant', 'coloured', 'ethnic minority', and 'racial minority'. They are unsuitable for the following reasons.

The term 'immigrant' is inappropriate, first, because it has been, and still is, widely used as a euphemism for 'black person', immigrant or otherwise, and second, because it implies a newcomer status, whereas, in fact, many former black migrants have been resident for over a quarter of a century, and their children (now roughly half of the black population) have been born in Britain. A euphemism is a means of designating an unpleasant or offensive phenomenon by a milder expression. Black people object to their

distinguishing attribute being regarded as so offensive that it cannot be referred to directly.

Politically conscious blacks also object to the euphemistic overtones of the term 'coloured'. They suggest that reference to a dark skin as 'coloured' implies that the speaker is ashamed or embarrassed by the fact of blackness, and is seeking unconsciously to alleviate its impact. 'Coloured' also has the South African connotation of 'mixed race'. Black people point out that they are perfectly content with their blackness, and do not wish to increase their status among racist whites, as might have been possible formerly in some of the colonies, by foolishly laying claim to white ancestry.

Much the same objection can be made against the expression 'ethnic minority', which in recent years has become increasingly popular. Traditionally, an 'ethnos' was regarded as a group that could be identified by ties and traits of both race and culture. In recent years it has shed its bio-racial connotations and has come to refer to a group identified by its common history and cultural attributes. Indeed, scholars have preferred the term 'ethnos' to 'race' precisely because it removes the biological criteria of group identity. In community relations circles the term 'ethnic minority group' is used stipulatively and with prescriptive addenda to refer to all minority groups whose culture is felt to differ sufficiently from that of the majority English. Thus, the Poles, Ukrainians, Jews and Irish are purposely included in the category with Afro-Caribbeans and others, though there remains considerable ambiguity over whether the Welsh and Scottish also qualify. But, whatever the prescriptive definition that informed persons have chosen to impose, the term is widely understood to mean dark-skinned ethnic minority groups. Politically conscious black people believe that white ethnic minority groups are only included as a sop to white liberal elements who wish to avoid talking about the real issue: skin colour. If, on the one hand, the category is to include white groups then, without further qualification, it is unsuitable for referring to black people. If, on the other hand, it is to be popularly used to mean 'black groups', then it acquires the characteristics of another inexcusable euphemism.

'Racial minority group' is perhaps a more exact term, referring as it does to differences of race - defined in terms of certain physiological differences. But even here, the classical bio-racial differences are of less importance than those perceivable or imagined physiological differences that have acquired social significance in the British context. Of these, skin colour is still the most significant. Thus, Indians, who have traditionally been regarded as at least partly Caucasian, have been classed separately from European Caucasian. (See form PTI used by certain Area Health Authorities.) If 'racial difference' is understood to refer to physiological group differences of socio-political as opposed to biological, significance, then 'racial minority group' presents a possible alternative to 'black group'. As a result of its association with nineteenth century scientific racism and the Nazi legacy of racial genocide, however, it is unlikely to be enthusiastically adopted in liberal academic circles, for fear the concept of socio-political race might acquire a new scientific legitimacy in the popular mind. It has not been easy for sociologists to draw a distinction between a social construction of a bio-scientific category and the social creation of a reality to accompany the category.

For these reasons the term 'black' has been selected in preference to other contenders. There are problems, however, in maintaining the consistency of this terminology. The first arises from the fact that the term 'black' is still not widely used by white people, possibly because of the difficulties of displacing a traditional usage affording some euphemistic shelter, for a new one to which whites may be less politically sympathetic. The second arises as a result of the term 'black' coming to be identified with persons of Afro-Caribbean negro ancestry and thus excluding the category of Caucasian people originating from the Indian sub-continent, a distinction preserved by some Indians anxious to distance themselves from Afro-Caribbeans. For both these reasons, it was felt necessary to maintain the term 'coloured' in the questionnaire specifically directed at white and Indian councillors, but to avoid it elsewhere.

In other contexts, those who previously interpreted the expression 'black' as applying only to persons of Afro-Caribbean descent should treat it here as shorthand for 'black and Asian'. In other words, 'black' denotes the traditional English category of 'coloured', but without its politically offensive connotations.

Although the rough distinction between black and white people is perfectly adequate for discussion of what whites perceive as a socially significant group, there are occasions when the category of black persons needs further refinement. It is possible to distinguish between groups of people by considering the following commonly used criteria: skin colouring (black/brown), racial grouping (Negro/Caucasian), geographical origin: continental (African, Caribbean (West Indian), Asian (Indian)), national (Barbadian, Jamaican, Pakistani, Indian, Bangladeshi), constituent regional (Punjabi, Gujarati), or religion (Sikh, Hindu, Moslem). 'Indian', of course, can refer both to persons from the Indian Republic (Bharat) or from the Indian subcontinent. As a result, the even more ambiguous term 'South Asian' has recently become fashionable in race-relations circles. For reasons again of popular usage, the geographical terms 'West Indian' and 'Indian' have sometimes been used to describe the two main sub-groups of black people that feature in this study, despite the fact that many of these people were born in Britain, and the term 'West Indian' is racially ambiguous. An attempt has been made not to mix categories unduly, but occasionally, for stylistic reasons, or to avoid undue repetition, some variety of terminology has crept in. Sometimes, too, the expression 'of Afro-Caribbean origin or ancestry' has been shortened to 'Afro-Caribbean'. The expression 'Afro-Caribbean' more clearly describes (from a racial angle) those people whose ancestors came from Africa via the Caribbean to Europe, than the term 'West Indian', which is far more racially ambiguous. In the West Indies, there are Indo-Caribbeans, Euro-Caribbeans, and many mixed-race Caribbeans.

(2)

COUNCILLORS' VIEWS ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC CHARACTERISTICS

Table 30 Views on racial and ethnic characteristics

	ENGLISH/BRITISH					IRISH					WEST INDIAN					INDIAN				
	CON	LAB	POS	NEUT	NEG	TOT	CON	LAB	POS	NEUT	NEG	TOT	CON	LAB	POS	NEUT	NEG	TOT		
LITTLE OR NO DIFFERENT FROM ENGLISH							5	2	4	3	-	7	-	3	2	1	3	-	4	
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GROUPS																				
(a) General but unspecified differences							1	1	-	2	-	2	5	3	6	3	7	2	12	
(b) Perceived behavioural or attitudinal differences																				
General differences																				
Live in a civilised way	3	-	3	-	-	3														
Do not have a culture													1	-	-	-	-	1		
Diet													1	1	-	1	1	2		
Dress																				
Language																				
Family organisation																				
Strong family ties, extended family																				
Attitude to children													-	1	1	-	-	1		
Attitude to elderly																				
Arranged marriages, women's inequality																				

	ENGLISH/BRITISH						IRISH						WEST INDIAN						INDIAN					
	CON	LAB	POS	NEUT	NEG	TOT	CON	LAB	POS	NEUT	NEG	TOT	CON	LAB	POS	NEUT	NEG	TOT	CON	LAB	POS	NEUT	NEG	TOT
Religion																								
Differences general							5	-	-	2	3	5							4	5	-	8	1	9
Devotion, religiosity													2	-	1	1	-	2						
Politics																								
Committed to freedom, democracy	5	-	5	-	-	5																		
Patriotic							1	1	1	1	-	2												
Cause industrial trouble							1	-	-	-	1	1												
Participate in violence, terrorism							4	2	-	2	4	6												
Practise cast system																			2	-	-	2	-	2
Health, hygiene																								
Live in overcrowded conditions													1	-	-	-	1	1						
Urinate in streets													1	-	-	-	1	1						
Etiquette																								
Polite, good mannered	-	1	1	-	-	1													-	1	1	-	-	1
Rude, ill-mannered, inconsiderate																								
Legality													1	1	-	-	2	2						
Law abiding																								
Criminally inclined, break law													2	-	-	-	2	2						
Morals																								
Sexually lax													2	-	-	1	1	2						

	ENGLISH/BRITISH						IRISH						WEST INDIAN						INDIAN					
	CON	LAB	POS	NEUT	NEG	TOT	CON	LAB	POS	NEUT	NEG	TOT	CON	LAB	POS	NEUT	NEG	TOT	CON	LAB	POS	NEUT	NEG	TOT
Leisure	1	-	-	1	-	1							2	2	3	1	-	4						
Sport-inclined													1	1	2	-	-	2						
Musical, sense of rhythm													4	4	2	1	5	8						
Noisy, noisy parties																								
(c) Differences of Temperament																								
Sanguine							-	3	2	1	-	3	-	4	3	-	1	4						
Extroverted							2	2	4	-	-	4	2	5	7	-	-	7						
Happy, jolly, fun-loving, exuberant																								
Easy going, happy-go-lucky	1	-	-	-	1	1	2	-	1	1	-	2	4	3	4	-	3	7						
Choleric																								
Emotional, excitable, volatile							7	7	2	10	2	14	3	1	-	2	2	4						
blow hot and cold, unstable																								
Hot-tempered, hot-headed, firey, quick-tempered							5	6	-	9	2	11												
Aggressive, troublesome							2	1	-	-	3	3												
Bigotted, intolerant, forcible in expression							2	2	-	-	4	4	-	1	1	-	-	1						
Phlegmatic																								
Introverted, quiet, reserved, passive	-	4	-	1	3	4													3	2	3	1	1	5
Stoical, phlegmatic, cold-fish, unemotional	2	5	2	3	2	7																		
Apathetic, complacent	2	-	-	-	2	2																		

	ENGLISH/BRITISH						IRISH						WEST INDIAN						INDIAN					
	CON	LAB	POS	NEUT	NEG	TOT	CON	LAB	POS	NEUT	NEG	TOT	CON	LAB	POS	NEUT	NEG	TOT	CON	LAB	POS	NEUT	NEG	TOT
(d) Differences in drive																								
High																								
Determined, serious, stubborn, awkward	3	1	3	1	-	4													-	1	-	1	-	1
Persistent, won't take no for an answer																			2	-	-	-	2	2
Hard-working, conscientious, industrious, thrifty, diligent	7	1	8	-	-	8	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	5	2	7	-	-	7
Ambitious, pushy, competitive, dog-eat-dog																			3	1	1	1	2	4
Shopkeeper attitude, business-minded, acquisitive, greedy	1	1	-	-	2	2													4	2	-	3	3	6
Keen on education, work hard at school																			2	4	5	1	-	6
Low																								
Lazy							1	-	-	-	1	1	3	-	-	-	-	3						
Lacking sense of time, manana							-	2	-	2	-	2												
No commitment to education or awareness of its importance													3	-	-	-	-	3						
(e) Differences of cognitive skill																								
High																								
Intelligent, clever, mentally alert, knowledgeable, skilled	-	2	2	-	-	2													-	2	2	-	-	2
Cunning, devious	-	1	-	-	1	1													-	1	-	-	1	1

	ENGLISH/BRITISH						IRISH						WEST INDIAN						INDIAN					
	CON	LAB	POS	NEUT	NEG	TOT	CON	LAB	POS	NEUT	NEG	TOT	CON	LAB	POS	NEUT	NEG	TOT	CON	LAB	POS	NEUT	NEG	TOT
Low																								
Low intelligence, slow, stupid, 'thick'							1	-	-	1	-	1	3	1	-	1	3	4						
(f) Differences in relational attributes																								
Connective																								
Generous, warm-hearted, gentle, good natured							1	4	5	-	-	5												
Understanding, considerate, compassionate	4	3	6	1	-	7																		
Tolerant, fair-minded, playing fair	4	4	8	-	-	8																		
Honest, dependable, loyal, decent	2	2	4	-	-	4																		
Disconnective																								
Proud, cut above others, better than others	8	2	8	1	1	10																		
Insular, parochial, narrow minded, reject strangers	-	2	-	-	2	2																		
Exclusive, clannish, stick together, refuse to mix or integrate													1	1	-	-	2	2	6	3	2	2	5	9

	ENGLISH/BRITISH						IRISH						WEST INDIAN						INDIAN					
	CON	LAB	POS	NEUT	NEG	TOT	CON	LAB	POS	NEUT	NEG	TOT	CON	LAB	POS	NEUT	NEG	TOT	CON	LAB	POS	NEUT	NEG	TOT
Total number of Conservative items for each group							35						46						58					
Total number of Labour items for each group		29						32						31						51				
Total number of items for each group						72						67						77						109
Total number of positive, neutral and negative evaluations of ethnic group characteristics			50	8	14				16	31	20			24				36			37	45	27	
Percentage positive neutral and negative evaluations of ethnic groups			70	11	19	100			24	46	30	100		32				47		34	41	25	100	

(3) IDEOLOGICAL ERISTIC

Political ideologies are systems of justification for competing social groups having different interests and incentives for action. The policies of party X, whether advocated or implemented, must be justified in the face of counter policies from party Y. Party X advocates a line of action as indispensable, while party Y thinks it disastrous. Each contention must be supported by convincing reasons which go to build up an alternative political world picture. As in a scientific theory, an ideology which cannot satisfactorily explain or justify a range of phenomena thought to fall under its jurisdiction, is seriously flawed. Its weakness will be probed and exposed by those embracing alternative ideology. In metaphorical terms, ideologies must shield themselves from the thrusts of rivals and, in turn, attack them at their most vulnerable points. As a process, ideological discourse can be seen as a group's never-ending task of expounding new arguments to justify policies in the face of systematic criticism from other discoursing agents. New and more elaborate arguments develop in situations of weakness in the face of alternative, more persuasive views. This unfolding of discourse in response to other discourse is a socio-psychological phenomenon, but epistemological factors, e.g. the perception of contrary statements and fallacious argument, play an important part in deciding the line of development and acceptable discursive form.

From Greek times, philosophers have recognised the importance of debate in the development of new ideas, and in the pursuit of truth. The term 'dialectic' was applied to the method of seeking and perhaps finding truth by argument between different parties or from apparently irreconcilable positions. The Sophists were condemned by Plato for using argument to win conviction at the expense of truth. The search for truth rather than the teaching of techniques of persuasion came to be seen as the task of philosophy. Plato used the term 'eristic' (from the Greek *ἐρισ*, strife) for false dialectic aimed at tricking audiences into agreement. As ideology's primary aim is persuasion, and not the search for truth, and its chief exponents make extensive use of rhetoric, its form of development might be better termed 'eristical', rather than 'dialectical'. Truth has also come to be recognised as a property of statements of fact and not of evaluation and prescription. 'Eristic', then, is more applicable to the complex of description, evaluation, and prescription, that constitutes ideology. Yet arguments are unlikely to be believed if they are not recognised to be valid or strong: successful eristic must be thought to have these characteristics, too. Many philosophers have, of course, recognised the political phenomenon of the development of ideologies through disputation, and have referred to it as 'dialectic'. Hegel (1821, p 34-35), for example, sees dialectic as "matter's very soul putting forth its branches and fruit organically", but I have chosen to avoid the philosophic ambiguity of the term 'dialectic', in favour of the more appropriate 'eristic'.

The concept of 'eristic' must be developed for use in the analysis of actual political discourse. There is general eristic between individuals and groups within the population, and party eristic. It is clear that debate occurs not just between political parties, but within them, and between parties and the population in general through the media. There are formal inter-political eristical arenas,

such as parliament and the local council chamber, in which the contending parties meet in accordance with formal rules of debate. There are formal intra-political eristical arenas, such as the party conferences, cabinet, and meetings of parliamentary parties. 'Formal' means here, the publicly recognised political institutions bound by laws, rules, and conventions that play a role in the development and implementation of party and government policy. There are, of course, numerous informal meetings and exchanges in which ideas are developed at national, constituency, ward, or personal level.

For any debate, at least two positions, related in terms of common referent, must be posited in symbolic form. A difference of a synthetic or analytic kind must be recognised between the assertions. Traditionally, these have been called thesis and antithesis, but there is no need for the sentences to be contraries or contradictories. If, after examination of the assertions, a synthesised position (synthesis) can be agreed upon, the debate is concluded. If no such agreement is reached, the debate must continue, each assertion being defended and developed in response to the defense and development of the other. In the course of this elaboration, new assertions, drawing on further factual, evaluative, and prescriptive sentences will emerge. We are referring here to the creative, ongoing, social process of producing new sentences, not to the static process of looking for formal logical properties of different arguments. There may be accepted procedures for resolving debate: at a factual level, empirical evidence may be produced, and in the case of a prescription, a vote may be taken.

Formal ideological disputation has the same characteristics as outlined above, except that overall agreement between disputants is rarely achieved: this would, indeed, herald the end of ideology. Limited agreement may, however, be reached between pairs of any of three kinds of sentence: description, evaluation, and prescription. There may be agreement of fact (belief) but not of evaluation (attitude). A particular prescription may be agreed between parties but given different justifications. The implication of this point is neatly brought out by J.S. Mill's account of Lord Mansfield's advice to the man of sound commonsense who, without previous judicial practice or legal education, was expected as governor of a colony to preside in its court of justice. "The advice was to give his decision boldly, for it would probably be right; but never to venture on assigning reasons, for they would almost infallibly be wrong" (Mill, 1879, p. 217-218). A legally trained person might be able to 'justify' the decision after it had been made in accordance with the requirements of the law. Similarly, it may be possible for a competent politician to take some perverse policy forced upon a government, and to justify it, post hoc, by appeal to the mainstream of a political ideology. And different 'justifications', of course, might be produced for different audiences.

In social context, the disputants' perception of ideological boundaries is of major importance. There is a recognition that ideological frontiers must not be transgressed. Because the boundary is decided by group consensus it is never immutable. It may be hazy, but it is frequently clear which one of a set of ideologies is being called upon to justify a given policy, especially when party ideologies at opposite ends of the political spectrum are involved.

A distinction may be made between antagonistic and non-antagonistic eristic on the basis of ideological boundaries and the possibility of achieving synthesis. Antagonistic eristic contains more obviously contrary assertions for which the possibility of achieving synthesis is remote. If ideologies are conceived as having a core of basic assertions surrounded by concentric rings of assertions of decreasing importance, antagonistic eristic is likely to occur as a result of differences of central or basic assertions. Antagonistic eristic is usually to be found in the conflict between political parties in which basic premises are not shared.

Non-antagonistic eristic (although antagonism is more of a relative than absolute matter) consists of debate in which there is a proneness to seek reconciliation between assertions. Apparently contrary assertions are resolved by appeal to more central premises on which agreement already exists. Non-antagonistic eristic may be found in debate within parties, but not invariably so. Often dispute will arise in the process of discovering how a new situation is to be interpreted in terms of existing basic premises. Differences of prescriptive preference may be resolved by following procedures formally laid down. Once a common course of action has been agreed upon, there will be a need for justification in terms of the main ideological stream (but conformity here is not of such importance as the initial agreement itself).

The distance between assertions within a single party and between parties is crucial in any study of political ideology. Also of great interest is the way in which the formal context of political debate influences the form of discourse. In Parliament, for example, Conservative and Labour members will speak in turn, each building his arguments and counter-arguments on the preceding discourse. The second reading of a Bill will be introduced by a Minister or Government representative and followed by a reply from a member of the Opposition. Finally, before the Bill is put to the vote, a Government spokesman will sum up and answer questions arising from the debate. Such formal procedure requires the speakers to consciously and systematically think out the justification for their respective positions in the context of interruption and counter-justification from the Opposition. Over time, each area of contention tends to become finely and delicately elaborated, and each argument balanced by counter-argument.

Arguments are not equally persuasive. But they are rarely judged in isolation, their acceptance depending upon the sophistication of the audience's already existing ideological framework.

The formal eristical arena of government, opposition, and people acting as audience, may be contrasted with the eristic of the common man as when, for example, he discusses a matter of common interest with a friend in the public house. Here, there is no decision to be taken at the end of the evening and no certain, or carefully balanced counter-argument. The audience may be involved or uninterested, or in agreement or disagreement. The unfolding of the discourse, the drawing out and systematic development of critical areas is by no means guaranteed. And there is a marked difference in the degree of stringency expected of an individual's private expression of opinion and that of a politician's views when he is publicly engaged in formal debate.

(4) THE FUNDAMENTAL AND OPERATIVE DIMENSIONS OF LABOUR IDEOLOGY

A bifurcation into fundamental and operative dimensions in Labour thought has a history as enduring as the Party itself. From the Labour Party's inception in 1900 as the Labour Representation Committee, delegates from the trade unions, the Independent Labour Party, Social Democratic Federation, and the Fabians raised questions about its character, the SDF demanding that it be "based upon the recognition of the class war, and having as its ultimate object, the socialisation of the means of production, distribution, and exchange". But, in the interests of maintaining the broadest possible unity between the groups, Keir Hardy argued that the object of the Conference "was not to discuss first principles but to ascertain whether organisations representing different ideals could find an immediate common ground for action". Accordingly, the unity of the Party was achieved by passing a resolution confining its activities to "promoting legislation in the direct interest of Labour" and opposing measures that had the opposite tendency. In other words, agreement over fundamental socialist objectives and the means of bringing them about was suspended and an immediate operative programme of reform substituted in its stead.

One way of reconciling socialism and social democracy, then, is for the former to be employed as Labour's fundamental dimension while the latter is accepted as its necessary operative dimension. But this is not to say either that all policies at the operative level must be social democrat, or that socialism has to be confined to the fundamental. The practical needs of the moment, however, demand workable solutions that do not disturb the Party's ever-precarious grip on power. Full socialism will come about with the consolidation of a political position supported by the electorate's recognition of Labour's gradual improvement of social conditions under capitalism. A much reiterated theme is that "socialism cannot come overnight" (see Let us Face the Future, 1945), and all are agreed that many reforms that are less than fully socialist have to be fought for, as they benefit the working class in the here and now. Thus, the operative dimension of social democracy has always been in the ascendancy, although the fundamental dimension in the form of noble but, for most intents and purposes, ineffectual, socialist sentiments is periodically reaffirmed. Out of government, or among the Party faithful, the Labour politician skilfully reasserts the fundamental dimension, while in government, and when appealing to the electorate as a whole, the operative dimension rules. Chris Mullen, the Tribune writer, put it brutally but clearly: "We have leaders who are Labour in opposition and Tory in government" (3.11.1979).

The stratagem of reconciling socialism and social democracy by the expedient of separating the fundamental and operative dimensions provides the researcher with the problem of locating the real ideological soul of the Labour Party. Justificatory discourse can be seen to fall into three categories: first, the statement in very general terms of socialist principles and programmes, second, apologetics for the actions of the party in power, and third, strenuous efforts to show how principles and actions are, after all, compatible. Thus, the researcher finds the classification of Labour ideology a thoroughly complicated and politically contentious affair. The Labour politician is able to defend his policies from

criticism by appeals to expediency on one occasion, and to socialist principles on another, and when challenged, can usually find reasons for explaining the apparent contradictions between them. In terms of political action, the tendency must always be for justification of the operative dimension to take precedence over the fundamental and, as a result, many researchers have inclined to the view that the Labour Party possesses a social democratic ideology. But at the discursive, rather than the policy implementation level, socialist and social democratic assertions undoubtedly exist side by side. Labour Left-wingers constantly criticise Party policies as betrayals of socialist principle, and Right-wingers still cautiously lay claim to socialist credentials.

But to assert the existence of a 'mixed ideological complex' is not to deny that the Party remains thoroughly social democratic in its practice. Neither is it to claim that socialist principles are invariably present at the fundamental level or that they cannot be formulated on the operative dimension. It is clear that many of the Labour Party's fundamental principles are vague and abstract humanitarian sentiments which, for example, have never been clearly related to Marxian social class analysis. Furthermore, it is possible to make suggestions of a practical nature that are intended to destroy, or seriously to undermine, the capitalist economic formation. I claim only that expressions of socialist ideology are more likely to be found on the fundamental dimension than on the operative dimension, although the fundamental possesses other ideological traits, and the operative may include socialist prescriptions.

(5) THE POSSIBILITY OF A SOCIALIST ALTERNATIVE POLICY ON
MIGRANT LABOUR

Freeman (1978), in his comparison of the handling of immigration and race relations in French and British working-class politics indicated that a socialist alternative was possible. He described how, from 1966, the French Communist Party dominated Confederation General du Travail (CGT) and the socialist-orientated Confederation Francaise Democratique du Travail (CFDT) agreed on a common policy of planned and regulated immigration. The unstable demand for labour power under the capitalist economic system was seen as leading to the need for migrant labour. Immigrants served as a reserve army of labour, providing a plentiful supply of relatively low-paid and non-militant workers who could be easily laid off in times of depression. The Confederations stressed how Government immigration and race relations policy had important political and social consequences for the French working class: it could be used to divide workers, to subproletarianise migrants, and to weaken working-class political power by disenfranchising foreigners.

This analysis was accompanied by Confederation proposals for the reform of immigration policy in the interests of all workers. The achievement of equality of rights and status in social, economic (and trade union) spheres for both indigenous and migrant workers was of paramount importance. If immigration policy, together with bilateral trade agreements with 'sending' countries could be treated as an aspect of economic planning for socialism, then economic rivalry between workers of different nations could be avoided. Failure to plan migration in the past had led to super-exploitation of immigrants and a consequential weakening of the position of the indigenous worker. When every worker was guaranteed employment, equal working conditions and a proper standard of accommodation, however, migrants could not be used to undermine the market position of the indigenous worker or his class solidarity. Furthermore, if the migrant had to be paid and treated without discrimination in the same way as the indigenous worker, his labour power would become less economically attractive to the employer, and immigration would tend to become internally self-regulating. Because government was concerned mainly to further the interests of capital, the Confederations considered it appropriate for trade unionists to play a more important role in the development of a planned socialist immigration policy.

The British Labour Party has never made much use of class analysis and class-based policies in any field, and it should come as no surprise to learn that a class interpretation and justification of immigration control and racial equality of treatment is missing from its ideology. But, ironically, there was a marked similarity between the actual policies recommended by the Confederations - immigration control and equality of treatment - and those of the Labour Party, with justification, in this case, in terms of the operative ideology of social democracy.

(6) THE WIDESPREAD ACCEPTANCE OF PATERNALIST IDEAS

The following entry under 'Commonwealth' in Arthur Mee's Children's Encyclopedia (c.1953) is illustrative of the taken-for-granted nature of belief in the British Empire's benevolent paternalism, and its general acceptability as an uncontroversial doctrine suitable for teaching to young people:

Thus the African territories of the Commonwealth are broadly divided; first into lands where the climate invites white settlers to take up permanent residence though the majority of the people there will always remain coloured African races; and, second, into lands where trade from the coast makes a link between the British people and the native races, and most of the white residents look to the British Isles as their Motherland, while striving to develop civilisation in these regions.

Whichever of these forms of life predominates - active industry, as in farming or mining, or exchange of goods in trade - the broad effect is civilising, bit by bit. Tribal wars are suppressed, peaceful industries are taught, knowledge is steadily spread, and superior conceptions of right and of happiness are continually raising the standard of life, and thus association with a free Empire becomes a permanent blessing.

British influence then, holds sway over immense territories ... British influence is also a force in the great nation that has been welded into the Union of South Africa. It is a record of which we in this country may feel proud, and a responsibility to be handed on to future generations.

(Mee, A., 1953, Vol 5, p.3184.)

(7) USING RACISM IN THE CAUSE OF PEACE AND ANTI-IMPERIALISM

As a consequence of an exclusive emphasis on the value of peace and a ruthless commitment to an anti-imperialist, pro-social democratic foreign policy, a quite unusual example of racist justification emerged in the Labour movement of the 1920s. Reinders (1968) describes how in 1920 the French Government in reprisal for the entry of German troops into the demilitarised zone of the Ruhr, ordered the occupation of Frankfurt, Darmstadt, Hanau, and Homburg. In the course of the occupation, French Moroccan soldiers fired on a German mob in Frankfurt and killed several of them. The Daily Herald ran a number of stories drawing attention to the racial character of the French troops. Under the banner headline reading "Black Scourge in Europe. Sexual Horror let loose by France on Rhine. Disappearance of Young German Girls", the journalist, Edmund Morel wrote that France was "thrusting her black savages ... into the heart of Germany" where the "primitive African barbarians", who were carriers of syphilis, had become a "terror and a horror" to the Palatinate countryside. The "barely restrainable bestiality of the black troops" had led to many rapes, resulting "for well-known physiological reasons" in serious injury to white women.

As a consequence, the National Conference of Labour Women adopted a resolution calling for withdrawal of French African troops from Germany, a cause which was widely taken up by the British trade union and Labour movement.

Reinders offers Claude McKay's explanation of the event: The British Socialists... were frightened that the French militarists intended to destroy the nascent German republic and with it the power of the Social Democrats - the white hope of the Second International. In view of anti-German feeling in Great Britain, the only way to "arouse the notorious moral righteousness of the English in favour of the Germans and against the French" would be "by evoking an appeal to racial prejudice" (p.26). Reinders concludes that Morel's campaign reveals that the British Left were part of a social and political milieu in which a cutting analysis and scathing criticism of capitalistic imperialism (including attacks on the colour bar in the colonies) did not exclude racist attitudes.

The racial sentiments that were exploited in the 1920s were not produced in response to black immigration into Britain, but were most probably the consequence of many years of colonial domination. This readily available reservoir of popular racial feeling could be tapped later by politicians anxious to gain their political ends, even when those ends were peaceful and anti-imperialistic.

(8) THE LABOUR GOVERNMENT'S REPRESSION OF COLONIAL PEOPLE

If the Labour Party provided a moral rather than a class analysis of domestic capitalism and failed to offer a programme by which the transition to socialism could be achieved at home, it is not surprising that the economic element of the relationship between Britain and the colonies was also neglected in favour of the expression of ineffectual liberal humanist intentions. In the face of the power of vested interests the fulfilment of such noble promises tended to be delayed indefinitely.

In the 1929 Election Manifesto, Labour and the Nation, the Party's socialist principles were made more explicit than ever before, but as Williams (1949) explained, the second Labour Government "had not given anything like sufficient thought to the practical application of socialism and particularly to the kind of economic and industrial action which was necessary to make even a small amount of socialism possible". Confronted with the collapse of the capitalist economy (manifested in 1930 by an unemployment rate of twenty per cent of the insured population), Labour clung relentlessly to conventional economic and colonial wisdom. Labour and the Nation had also pledged Labour to recognising the rights of the Indian people to self-government and self-determination, and to becoming an equal partner with other members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. But when Labour gained power, the £1000 million of British investment and captive market of India provided ample excuse for hesitancy and caution.

Even before the Labour Party won the election of May 1929, it had accepted the principle that Empire was a multilateral party matter and had agreed to appoint representatives to a parliamentary commission consisting of members of both houses under the chairmanship of Sir John Simon. The Simon commission, as it was called, went to India to take evidence on the spot, but was boycotted by the Indian National Congress on the grounds that it contained no Indian representatives.

The Labour Party approved of the arrest under the Conservative Government of thirty-one workers' leaders including two Englishmen who were charged with "conspiracy against the King" and sent for trial at Meerut for attempting to organise Indian workers. After the Labour Party had formed the new government it endorsed the earlier prosecution and had another Englishman arrested.

During 1930, troops fired on mass demonstrations in Peshawar and Sholapur, killing large numbers of people. Elsewhere, strikers were shot down, trade unionists imprisoned and newspapers suppressed. Every principal city of India experienced vast demonstrations and conflict with police and troops. In response to the demand for Indian independence the Labour Government adopted a two-fold policy of violent repression on the one hand, and negotiation in the form of a Round Table Conference with the Indian leaders on the other. The Indian National Congress was not represented at the first session but agreed to attend the second.

In Nigeria, African women traders, who protested against the dramatic fall in prices paid to them by the companies, demonstrated at Abaho and Opobo. At Abaho, six women were shot dead by the police, while at Opobo, nineteen women and one man were killed by firing troops, ten women died of their wounds, and eight women were pushed into the river and drowned in the panic which followed the order to fire. The Labour Government neither condemned the price-cutting policies of the companies, nor took action against those responsible for the deaths.

A common Left-wing view was that in the short time the Labour Party was in power before the formation of MacDonald's National Government, the harsh reality of its imperial policies differed little from that of Conservative and Liberal. Left-wing criticism has also been levelled against the foreign and colonial policies of subsequent Labour Governments. Britain was accused of seeking out and encouraging colonial leaders who were sympathetic to British political and economic interests. Nationalist and socialist movements which threatened British investment and defense were suppressed, and instead, Right-wing or preferably social democratic regimes, based on the emergent colonial intelligentsia and bourgeoisie, which could be relied upon to act 'responsibly', were primed for taking power at independence. For the Left-wing radicals and uncompromising nationalists of the colonies, the reality belied Labour's Left-wing posturing.

(9) THE ENDURING NATURE OF THE LABOUR PARTY'S LINE ON FASCISM

In 1931, Oswald Mosley* and a handful of other MPs defected from the Labour Party to form the New Party which was eventually transformed into the British Union of Fascists. Opposed by the Communist Party and others on the Left, BUF 'Blackshirt' activity resulted in much civil disorder, upsetting the mainstream political parties - including Labour.

After describing the BUF demonstration at Olympia at which there had been widespread violence between right and left forces, Benewick (1969, 1972) gives an account of the press response. The Daily Herald, supporter of the Labour Party, agreed with a Government proclamation that disorder of this kind could not be tolerated, but claimed that it was bound to occur if political movements were organised on a military basis. Nevertheless, the Herald wanted some action taken, although it did not want to deny Mosley's right of free speech. Most significantly the paper "blamed the Communist Party for doing the anti-Fascist cause a disservice" for "If there had not been disturbances the meeting would probably have passed unnoticed" (Benewick, 1969, 1972, pp.172-173).

Benewick also describes Labour reaction to the BUF mass rally in Hyde Park on 9 September 1934. Although the Coordinating Committee for Anti-Fascist Activities issued a circular signed by Left-politicians to London working-class organisations, calling for a counter-demonstration, the National Council of Labour asked its affiliated organisations in the Greater London area not to have anything to do with the anti-Fascist action. Benewick also recounts how

The following week, a manifesto 'The Labour Movement and Fascism' by A M Wall, secretary of the London Labour Party advised its readers not to become 'hysterical or neurotic' and thus advertise Fascism, even if it were not to be underestimated. The authors were against a united front and noted the similarities between Communism and Fascism. (p.187.)

The official Labour Party line of ignoring fascist activity and refraining from participating in anti-fascist demonstrations was maintained in the campaigns in the East End of London in 1936. Assembling the day after 'the battle of Cable Street' (4.9.1936), the Labour Party Conference passed an NEC emergency resolution expressing concern over the events in the East End and condemning both the Government for its failure to ban the procession in spite of the danger of a breach of the peace, and the Fascists for their tactics. Whilst asserting that freedom of speech must be preserved, the resolution called for the prohibition of deliberate provocation, racial strife, and the militarisation of politics. The resolution

* Mosley was expelled from the Labour Party. Prior to his membership of the Labour Party, he had been a Conservative.

was credited with the responsibility for the introduction of the Public Order Act (Benewick, 1969, 1972, p.236), which prohibited the wearing of uniforms for political purposes, outlawed paramilitary organisations and regulated public processions.

There were many in the British working-class movement who identified closely with the cause of the Spanish Republican Government in its struggle against Franco's forces. Nevertheless, despite the appeal of the Republic for support, the National Council of Labour backed the non-interventionist policy for the first vital year of the Spanish war, on the grounds that supplying weapons might lead to a European war and undermine the Socialist-led government of France. As arms and troops from Mussolini and Hitler poured into Spain to help France, Charles Dukes explained to Labour delegates at the Edinburgh Conference (1936) that the National Council of Labour had no evidence whatsoever that the rebels were receiving military aid. Aneurin Bevan later denounced the supporters of non-intervention from the rostrum:

If Mr Dukes is representative of the cool, calculated, and well-informed manner in which the official policy of the Party is being decided, then I am all for sentiment and emotion... Everybody in the world knows about the rebels getting arms - except the National Council of Labour (Foot, 1962, p.198.)

At the Labour Party Conference in 1939, after the defeat of Republican Spain, Sybil Wingate addressed the leadership:

Lord Halifax has told us recently that the Government has no Spanish blood on its hands ... We know what to think of that Pontius Pilate, but what are we to say of ourselves, of our movement, of our National Executive, who by their betrayal during the first terrible year, and their obstinate refusal to take any effective action worthy of the situation afterwards, have cost us the key position in the fight against fascism and sacrificed the lives of so many of our best and bravest comrades?

The quiescent approach of the Labour Party Leadership to both domestic and foreign fascism was not confined to the pre-war period. Many Conference delegates saw fascism as the arch-enemy, and repeatedly called on the third Labour Government to outlaw fascist activity. At the 1946 Conference, J Benstead proposed the resolution:

Conference views with deep concern the growth of Fascist activities in this country. Conference recalls the sacrifices made, the lives lost, and the suffering caused during the six years of war recently fought by the United Nations against the forces of Fascism. Conference, therefore, urges the Government to take drastic action to prevent the rebirth of Fascism in our land and so obviate further bloodshed and suffering amongst the people. (LPACR, 1946, p.111.)

This fundamental expression of sentiment was carried but the more operatively explicit resolution calling upon the Government "to introduce legislation making Fascist and near-Fascist organisations illegal; also making action or propaganda calculated to lead to any form of anti-semitism, racial or colour discrimination an offence" (LPACR, 1946, p.112), was lost.

Again, in 1948, in the light of a revival of Fascist activity, Bernard Finlay called on the Government to make criminal the publication, by writing, or from a public platform, defamatory statements concerning groups identifiable by race, creed, or colour, and to ban organisations which propagated racial or religious hatred or discrimination (LPACR, 1948, p.179). He was supported by Mr E C Smith who felt "the colour bar was a disgrace". He had seen negroes banned from taking part in sports and from restaurants in London.

Harold Laski, replying for the National Executive Committee, persuaded Finlay to withdraw his resolution on the grounds that such a legal weapon might be used against Labour Party propaganda, and that, by undermining tolerance - which was a sign of strength rather than weakness - it might do more harm than good. Furthermore, such legislation would be likely to be ineffective because of the difficulty of deciding on what constituted a fascist, of defining a 'defamatory statement', and of identifying a group by race, creed, or colour. Moreover, in Laski's judgment, it was "of the utmost importance that no undue significance be attached to a movement whose noise is loud but whose roots show no signs of going deep into the minds of the population" (LPACR, 1948, p.182).

The following year, A Alman from the Hackney South Constituency Party, moved the reference back of the section of the NEC report dealing with fascist activities. He asserted that the Executive had done nothing to combat the fascist hooliganism that was disrupting social, political, and cultural life in the East End of London. "We are faced with a problem", he continued,

of endeavouring to build up political organisation in an area consisting of a very mixed population and we are finding it impossible to get into our organisation particularly the Jewish comrades who are in despair at the fact that their home town, as it were, is night after night, turned into a cockpit for political hooligans and riff-raff from all over London ... Many sincere Jewish Labour comrades come to headquarters plaintively and with tears in their eyes deploring that they do not feel that they can any longer work for the Party which is not carrying out the elementary principles of protection for the citizens in the area.
(LPACR, 1949, p.115.)

Laski reassured the delegate that, during the course of the year, he had frequently discussed the problem with the Home Secretary, who had been generous, understanding, and devoted in the attention he had given to the control of the fascist menace. With his reassurance that the problem would be borne continuously and carefully in mind, the motion for the reference back was defeated. It appeared that there had been little change since the 1930s.

The debate on the evils of fascism faded from Conference discussion in the 1950s and 1960s, although the 1962 NEC statement mentioned "the recent growth of fascist and other racist propaganda" which it believed was deeply repugnant to the overwhelming majority of British people. The call for legislation against racist propaganda was taken up by Brockway and Sorensen, to protect a different target group, and eventually resulted in the passing of the 1965 Race Relations Act.

(10) EXAMPLES FROM COLONIAL HISTORY OF DISCOURSIIVE DERACIALISATION

Discoursive deracialisation is not a new phenomenon. Huttenback (1976) offers us a number of examples from nineteenth century British white colonial policy arising from the conflict of two sets of principles:

On the one hand marched the concept of what Burke had called "the natural equality of mankind at large" which, under the influence of nineteenth-century liberal humanitarianism and the evangelical movement had turned into the concept of trusteeship and the imperial philosophy of a nonracial empire, all of whose subjects were equal before the law. Emerging on the other hand was the determination of the British settlers in South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada that theirs must be a "White Man's Country" (p.21).

One way to reconcile the desire to exclude non-whites from the colonies and the philosophy of the Empire was to pursue policies racist in effect but to justify them non-racially.

In response to the 1854 anti-Chinese demonstrations in Australia in which the Chinese were "injured, their property destroyed and their claims appropriated as they were driven from the mining communities", an ingenious way of limiting Asiatic immigration was devised (either intentionally or by accident). The Duke of Newcastle "purported to be concerned about the conditions under which Chinese travelled to Australia" and suggested that legislation be introduced imposing penalties "on all ships bringing immigrants to New South Wales in which it might appear that a sufficient proportion of space had not been allotted to the Emigrants or an adequate issue of provision made regularly to them throughout the voyage or that the Ship had left China in an unseaworthy state". The subsequent act introduced a ratio of one immigrant to ten tons of burthen, a landing fee of ten pounds, and further levies on immigrants to pay for the administration of the act. Huttenback adds that: "To make the purpose of the law absolutely clear, an immigrant was defined as "any male adult native of China or of an island in the Chinese seas or any person born of Chinese parents" (p.62).

Likewise, in Natal, the white colonists were fearful of non-white settlers, who were in this case the increasing number of ex-indentured Indians. At first, the colonial government attempted to explicitly exclude free Indians from the colony but met with resistance from the imperial authorities in London. However, the second attempt at legislation was more successful because, prima facie, it was non-racial. Entry requirements were introduced, based on property and a knowledge of a European language, the assessment of language ability being made by the immigration officer. The education test, which came to be known as the 'Natal formula', was "administered in such a way that Europeans were judged eligible to enter Natal while all Indians were not". Huttenback (1976, p.141) describes how:

The prime minister made its purpose quite clear when he told the legislature: "It never occurred to me for a single minute that (the act) should ever be applied to English immigrants ... Can you imagine anything more mad for a Government than that it should apply to English

immigrants? The object of the bill is to deal with Asiatic immigrants.

In Canada, the exclusion of Indians was attempted in yet another way. An order in Council of 8 January 1908, stipulated that whenever the Minister regarded the condition of the labour market as warranting it, immigrants might be prohibited from entering Canada unless they came from "the country of their birth or citizenship by a continuous journey and on through-tickets purchased before leaving the country of their birth or citizenship". Huttenback points out that "There being no direct steamship service between India and Canada, the order in council provided an effective weapon to combat further Indian immigration to Canada" (p.187).

These cases illustrate that by picking out features other than race and nationality - inhumane conditions of transport, language difference, the state of the labour market and type of journey undertaken - a racial group might be identified 'non-racially' and, in addition, its exclusion from a country justified on non-racial grounds. Evidence is provided of both the racial intent of the colonial legislators in that they sought to exclude members of other races and the discriminatory effects of their actions. The imperial ideology of equality before the law, however, forced the legislators to deracialise their legal prescriptions.

(11) FURTHER EXAMPLES OF POPULAR SANITARY CODING

By the late 1970's the number of black people who had lived in Britain for over a quarter of a century and the children that had been born to them here was beginning to make the term 'immigrant' appear inappropriate. A new term for the black population had to be found. It was supplied by social scientists who had rejected the biological connotations of the term 'race' in favour of what they regarded as the more scientifically accurate and culturally orientated expression, "ethnic minority group". In this way, Greeks, Italians, Indians, Pakistanis and Jamaicans could all be distinguished and classified as ethnic minorities living among the British (or, rather, the English, Welsh, and Scottish?) ethnic majority. But, because the largest and most visible ethnic minority groups were black, and most attention was paid to them, 'ethnic minority' began to take on that specific connotation. Soon the term 'minority' could be dropped and 'ethnic' left to mean black - Asian and Afro-Caribbean.

Nowhere was this better contextually illustrated than in the draft of the 1979 Local Government Grants (Ethnic Groups) Act which, before it fell as a result of the 1979 General Election, was to have replaced Section 11 of the Local Government Act. The explanatory memorandum stated that the Bill's purpose was to enable grants to be paid to local authorities towards expenditure incurred by them in helping to remove disadvantages suffered by 'ethnic groups' living in their areas, of providing equally effective services for them, "and of promoting good relations between ethnic groups or between ethnic groups and the rest of the community". It was clear from this that the "rest of the community" which, if it was to mean anything, presumably referred to the indigenous white British, was not regarded as belonging to an ethnic group, for the ethnic party to the relation was no longer limited by the term "minority". From the context, it was apparent that the native white population did not constitute what the authors of the Bill termed an "ethnic group" and that the new expression referred essentially to the 'black British' - or to all those who did not constitute "the rest of the community".

Another example of sanitary coding is revealed in the use of the term "mugging". Hall et al (1978) describe how the term was imported from America accompanied by the numerous private connotations that a recently established informal colloquialism is prone to carry. They give the conventional connotation as that of robbing or beating a victim in a particular way "by petty professional operators or thieves who often work in touring packs of three or more" but stress that the term's significance lies in its considerable accretion of private connotations derived from the contexts in which it was most often used:

"By the 1960's, 'mugging' was no longer being used in the United States simply as a descriptive and identifying term for a specific kind of urban crime. It not only dominated the whole public discussion of crime and public disorder - it had become a central symbol for the many tensions and problems besetting American social and political life in

general. 'Mugging' achieved this status because of its ability to connote a whole complex of social themes in which the 'crisis of American society' was reflected. These themes included: the involvement of blacks and drug addicts in crime; the expansion of the black ghettos, coupled with the growth of black social and political militancy; the threatened crisis and collapse of the cities; the crime panic and the appeal to 'law and order'; the sharpening political tensions and protest movements of the 1960s leading into and out from the Nixon-Agnew mobilisation of 'the silent majority' and their presidential victory in 1968. These topics and themes were not as clearly separated as these headings imply. They tended, in public discussion, to come together into a general scenario of conflict and crisis. In an important sense the image of 'mugging' came ultimately to contain and express them all". (pp.19-20.)

It was with these connotations that the term 'mugging' came to Britain: it referred to street crime, to a breakdown in 'law and order', to black crime, and in its suggestion of recency, to a future of racial distrust and riot in the cities. With its use, the overt mention of race became unnecessary. Indeed, if the racial identity of the 'muggers' was unspecified in the news report, it might automatically be assumed that they were black. It is important to modify with "it might" because 'mugging' maintains a defensive ambiguity. With the term 'mugging', the politician can refer to 'black crime' or to crime generally: the audience decides this in the context of widely-established private connotations.

Critcher treats us to a further example of a term with extensive accretion of subjective connotation: 'the ghetto'. He claims crime, race, poverty and housing are "condensed into the image of the 'ghetto'" (Hall et al, 1978, p.118). Certainly, 'ghetto' has come to mean more than an area of the city to which Jews - or other racial groups - are confined. It is now linked - in the same way as the expressions, 'inner city area', 'twilight zone', and 'slum', with urban poverty and racial deprivation. The term may be an indicator of the existence of liberal theories purporting to explain the behaviour of the poor and the black in environmental terms and seeking to alleviate their troubles by resource reallocation. Alternatively, the ghetto might be seen as the place in which black immigrants prefer to live, as a pocket of hostile people who revel in their degradation, actively seek to maintain their exclusivity, and act as a Trojan horse within the 'host' society. I deal more fully with the force of the word 'ghetto' in the section on imaging.

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